How Individualized Niches Arise: Defining Mechanisms of Niche Construction, Niche Choice, and Niche Conformance.

Organisms interact with their environments in various ways. We present a conceptual framework that distinguishes three mechanisms of organism-environment interaction. We call these NC3 mechanisms: niche construction, in which individuals make changes to the environment; niche choice, in which individuals select an environment; and niche conformance, in which individuals adjust their phenotypes in response to the environment. Each of these individual-level mechanisms affects an individual's phenotype-environment match, its fitness, and its individualized niche, defined in terms of the environmental conditions under which the individual can survive and reproduce. Our framework identifies how individuals alter the selective regimes that they and other organisms experience. It also places clear emphasis on individual differences and construes niche construction and other processes as evolved mechanisms. The NC3 mechanism framework therefore helps to integrate population-level and individual-level research.

Cognitive bias in animal behavior science: a philosophical perspective.

Emotional states of animals influence their cognitive processes as well as their behavior. Assessing emotional states is important for animal welfare science as well as for many fields of neuroscience, behavior science, and biomedicine. This can be done in different ways, e.g. through assessing animals' physiological states or interpreting their behaviors. This paper focuses on the so-called cognitive judgment bias test, which has gained special attention in the last 2 decades and has become a highly important tool for measuring emotional states in non-human animals. However, less attention has been given to the epistemology of the cognitive judgment bias test and to disentangling the relevance of different steps in the underlying cognitive mechanisms. This paper sheds some light on both the epistemology of the methods and the architecture of the underlying cognitive abilities of the tested animals. Based on this reconstruction, we propose a scheme for classifying and assessing different cognitive abilities involved in cognitive judgment bias tests.

Do ecosystems have functions?

'Ecosystem function' and 'ecosystem functioning' became core keywords in the ecological literature on ecosystems, their structure, development and integrity. We investigate functions from the perspective of causal contributions to higher capacities, as selected effects, as contributions to the stability and self-maintenance of organisms and as type-fixed effects. Based on an in-depth discourse in philosophy of science, we conclude that ecosystems do not have functions in any sense that goes beyond a mere description of a causal contribution. We recommend the terms 'ecosystem function' and 'ecosystem functioning' be avoided in the ecological literature (and beyond).

The hologenome concept: we need to incorporate function.

Are we in the midst of a paradigm change in biology and have animals and plants lost their individuality, i.e., are even so-called 'typical' organisms no longer organisms in their own right? Is the study of the holobiont-host plus its symbiotic microorganisms-no longer optional, but rather an obligatory path that must be taken for a comprehensive understanding of the ecology and evolution of the individual components that make up a holobiont? Or are associated microbes merely a component of their host's environment, and the holobiont concept is just a beautiful idea that does not add much or anything to our understanding of evolution? This article explores different aspects of the concept of the holobiont. We focus on the aspect of functional integration, a central holobiont property, which is only rarely considered thoroughly. We conclude that the holobiont comes in degrees, i.e., we regard the property of being a holobiont as a continuous trait that we term holobiontness, and that holobiontness is differentiated in several dimensions. Although the holobiont represents yet another level of selection (different from classical individual or group selection because it acts on a system that is composed of multiple species), it depends on the grade of functional integration whether or not the holobiont concept helps to cast light on the various degrees of interactions between symbiotic partners.

Can functionality in evolving networks be explained reductively?

Philosophers of biology disagree about an adequate explication of the concept of function. Instead of perpetuating the debate on the level of in principle-arguments, this paper aims first at reconstructing functional talk in the biological research papers of Marom and Braun, which focus on two different kinds of evolving networks, and in discussing the ontological consequences which the authors draw from their results. Marom investigates evolving neural networks controlling Braitenberg vehicles. Braun observes the evolutionary rearrangement or "rewiring" of the genetic network of genetically modified yeast on a short time scale. In both cases, the parameters under investigation are defined in functional terms. However, both authors report striking differences in the structures that realize one and the same function, as well as striking differences in the function of identical structures. From this, they construct an argument against reductionism. The second aim of my paper is an inquiry into the epistemic legitimacy of this conclusion. This requires addressing critically several concepts on which Marom and Braun's argument is built.

Convenience experimentation.

Systems biology aims at explaining life processes by means of detailed models of molecular networks, mainly on the whole-cell scale. The whole cell perspective distinguishes the new field of systems biology from earlier approaches within molecular cell biology. The shift was made possible by the high throughput methods that were developed for gathering 'omic' (genomic, proteomic, etc.) data. These new techniques are made commercially available as semi-automatic analytic equipment, ready-made analytic kits and probe arrays. There is a whole industry of supplies for what may be called convenience experimentation. My paper inquires some epistemic consequences of strong reliance on convenience experimentation in systems biology. In times when experimentation was automated to a lesser degree, modeling and in part even experimentation could be understood fairly well as either being driven by hypotheses, and thus proceed by the testing of hypothesis, or as being performed in an exploratory mode, intended to sharpen concepts or initially vague phenomena. In systems biology, the situation is dramatically different. Data collection became so easy (though not cheap) that experimentation is, to a high degree, driven by convenience equipment, and model building is driven by the vast amount of data that is produced by convenience experimentation. This results in a shift in the mode of science. The paper shows that convenience driven science is not primarily hypothesis-testing, nor is it in an exploratory mode. It rather proceeds in a gathering mode. This shift demands another shift in the mode of evaluation, which now becomes an exploratory endeavor, in response to the superabundance of gathered data.