Uncommon and nonpartisan: Antidemocratic attitudes in the American public.

Democratic regimes flourish only when there is broad acceptance of an extensive set of norms and values. In the United States, fundamental democratic norms have recently come under threat from prominent Republican officials. We investigate whether this antidemocratic posture has spread from the elite level to rank-and-file partisans. Exploiting data from a massive repeated cross-sectional and panel survey ([Formula: see text] = 45,095 and 5,231 respectively), we find that overwhelming majorities of the public oppose violations of democratic norms, and virtually nobody supports partisan violence. This bipartisan consensus remains unchanged over time despite high levels of affective polarization and exposure to divisive elite rhetoric during the 2022 political campaign. Additionally, we find no evidence that elected officials' practice of election denialism encourages their constituents to express antidemocratic attitudes. Overall, these results suggest that the clear and present threat to American democracy comes from unilateral actions by political elites that stand in contrast to the views of their constituents. In closing, we consider the implications of the stark disconnect between the behavior of Republican elites and the attitudes of Republican voters.

Measuring dynamic media bias.

Ideological media bias is increasingly central to the study of politics. Yet, past literature often assumes that the ideological bias of any outlet, at least in the short term, is static and exogenous to the political process. We challenge this assumption. We use longitudinal data from the Stanford Cable News Analyzer (2010 to 2021), which reports the screen time of various political actors on cable news, and quantify the partisan leaning of those actors using their past campaign donation behavior. Using one instantiation of media bias-the mean ideology of political actors on a channel, i.e., visibility bias-we examine weekly, within-day, and program-level estimates of media bias. We find that media bias is highly dynamic even in the short term and that the heightened polarization between TV channels over time was mostly driven by the prime-time shows.

Link recommendation algorithms and dynamics of polarization in online social networks.

The level of antagonism between political groups has risen in the past years. Supporters of a given party increasingly dislike members of the opposing group and avoid intergroup interactions, leading to homophilic social networks. While new connections offline are driven largely by human decisions, new connections on online social platforms are intermediated by link recommendation algorithms, e.g., "People you may know" or "Whom to follow" suggestions. The long-term impacts of link recommendation in polarization are unclear, particularly as exposure to opposing viewpoints has a dual effect: Connections with out-group members can lead to opinion convergence and prevent group polarization or further separate opinions. Here, we provide a complex adaptive-systems perspective on the effects of link recommendation algorithms. While several models justify polarization through rewiring based on opinion similarity, here we explain it through rewiring grounded in structural similarity-defined as similarity based on network properties. We observe that preferentially establishing links with structurally similar nodes (i.e., sharing many neighbors) results in network topologies that are amenable to opinion polarization. Hence, polarization occurs not because of a desire to shield oneself from disagreeable attitudes but, instead, due to the creation of inadvertent echo chambers. When networks are composed of nodes that react differently to out-group contacts, either converging or polarizing, we find that connecting structurally dissimilar nodes moderates opinions. Overall, our study sheds light on the impacts of social-network algorithms and unveils avenues to steer dynamics of radicalization and polarization in online social networks.

Interindividual cooperation mediated by partisanship complicates Madison's cure for "mischiefs of faction".

Political theorists have long argued that enlarging the political sphere to include a greater diversity of interests would cure the ills of factions in a pluralistic society. While the scope of politics has expanded dramatically over the past 75 y, polarization is markedly worse. Motivated by this paradox, we take a bottom-up approach to explore how partisan individual-level dynamics in a diverse (multidimensional) issue space can shape collective-level factionalization via an emergent dimensionality reduction. We extend a model of cultural evolution grounded in evolutionary game theory, in which individuals accumulate benefits through pairwise interactions and imitate (or learn) the strategies of successful others. The degree of partisanship determines the likelihood of learning from individuals of the opposite party. This approach captures the coupling between individual behavior, partisan-mediated opinion dynamics, and an interaction network that changes endogenously according to the evolving interests of individuals. We find that while expanding the diversity of interests can indeed improve both individual and collective outcomes, increasingly high partisan bias promotes a reduction in issue dimensionality via party-based assortment that leads to increasing polarization. When party bias becomes extreme, it also boosts interindividual cooperation, thereby further entrenching extreme polarization and creating a tug-of-war between individual cooperation and societal cohesion. These dangers of extreme partisanship are highest when individuals' interests and opinions are heavily shaped by peers and there is little independent exploration. Overall, our findings highlight the urgency to study polarization in a coupled, multilevel context.

The nonlinear feedback dynamics of asymmetric political polarization.

Using a general model of opinion dynamics, we conduct a systematic investigation of key mechanisms driving elite polarization in the United States. We demonstrate that the self-reinforcing nature of elite-level processes can explain this polarization, with voter preferences accounting for its asymmetric nature. Our analysis suggests that subtle differences in the frequency and amplitude with which public opinion shifts left and right over time may have a differential effect on the self-reinforcing processes of elites, causing Republicans to polarize more quickly than Democrats. We find that as self-reinforcement approaches a critical threshold, polarization speeds up. Republicans appear to have crossed that threshold while Democrats are currently approaching it.

Putting the affect into affective polarisation.

While many believe that affective polarisation poses a significant threat to democratic stability, the definition and operationalisation of the concept varies greatly. This leads to conceptual slippage as well as imprecise tests of the causes and consequences of affective polarisation. In order to clearly identify and target its micro-foundations, we must understand the degree to which political divides are, in fact, affective. In this paper, we do so. We begin by delineating affective polarisation, a social divide that is purportedly distinct from policy-based disagreements. Subsequently, we explore the influence of emotions in politics, including how affect is conceptualised within the framework of polarisation. Where possible, our literature review is supplemented with analyses of existing datasets to support our points. The paper concludes by proposing a series of questions emotion researchers could address in the study of polarisation.

How Christians reconcile their personal political views and the teachings of their faith: projection as a means of dissonance reduction.

The present study explores the dramatic projection of one's own views onto those of Jesus among conservative and liberal American Christians. In a large-scale survey, the relevant views that each group attributed to a contemporary Jesus differed almost as much as their own views. Despite such dissonance-reducing projection, however, conservatives acknowledged the relevant discrepancy with regard to "fellowship" issues (e.g., taxation to reduce economic inequality and treatment of immigrants) and liberals acknowledged the relevant discrepancy with regard to "morality" issues (e.g., abortion and gay marriage). However, conservatives also claimed that a contemporary Jesus would be even more conservative than themselves on the former issues whereas liberals claimed that Jesus would be even more liberal than themselves on the latter issues. Further reducing potential dissonance, liberal and conservative Christians differed markedly in the types of issues they claimed to be more central to their faith. A concluding discussion considers the relationship between individual motivational processes and more social processes that may underlie the present findings, as well as implications for contemporary social and political conflict.

Persistent polarization: The unexpected durability of political animosity around US elections.

The scholarly literature suggests that, as elections approach, political tensions intensify, and, as they pass, tensions return to pre-election levels. Using a massive new dataset of 66,000 interviews (cross-sectional and panel), we find that animosities are durable and consistent over the course of the 2022 US election. Individuals with more exposure to the campaign tend to be more polarized, and this sentiment endures post-election. Contrary to expectations, partisans who voted for the winning candidate are no less polarized post-election than those on the losing side. In closing, we note that the durability of polarization has important implications not only for our understanding of the scope of partisan divides but also for efforts designed to ameliorate polarization.

Affective polarization is uniformly distributed across American States.

US partisans view each other with increasing negativity. While many attribute the growth of such affective polarization to nationally cross-cutting forces, such as ideological partisan sorting or access to partisan media, others emphasize the effects of contextual and institutional forces. For the first time, we introduce and explore data sufficiently granular to fully map the extent of partisan animosity across the US states. With a massive, nationally representative survey we find that, counter to expectations, variation in affective polarization across states is relatively small, and is instead largely a function of individual-level attitudinal (but not demographic) characteristics. While elections pit regions of the country against others, our results suggest affective polarization is a national, not regional, problem, requiring national interventions.

Unraveling polarization: insights into individual and collective dynamics.

Polarization poses a critical threat to the stability of nations around the world, as it impacts climate change, populism, democracy, and global health. This perspective examines the conceptual understanding, measurement challenges, and potential interventions for polarization. Our analysis highlights the distinction and interactions between the individual and collective levels of polarization, conceptually, methodologically, and in terms of interventions. We conclude by pointing out future directions for understanding polarization and highlighting the interrelations between polarization and other social phenomena.

Correcting misperceptions of partisan opponents is not effective at treating democratic ills.

Many warn that the United States is on the brink of democratic collapse, because partisan animosity, support for partisan violence, and support for undemocratic practices are on the rise. Quelling some fears, scholars have offered interventions that use messages to correct misperceptions about citizens' partisan opponents (the "out-party"). In this article, we provide evidence that the effects of these interventions are not as robust or consistent as hoped. First, we use panel data ( n = 9,810 ) to show that perceptions of the out-party are highly variable. This suggests that these perceptions are weakly held and thus unlikely to be a significant cause of hostile attitudes. The oscillation of perceptions over time also suggests that, for many, any effect of corrections would likely be overwhelmed in just 1 month. Second, in a meta-analysis of 67 statistical tests from 12 studies in eight papers, we document that current evidence on the efficacy of corrections is weak. Third and finally, in pre-registered experiments ( n = 2,846 ), we find that changing Americans' perceptions of the out-party's demographics, policy attitudes, and support for undemocratic practices has no consistent effect on partisan animosity, support for partisan violence, or support for undemocratic practices. These observations suggest that correcting misperceptions of the out-party is not a panacea for our democratic ills.

Negative partisanship is not more prevalent than positive partisanship.

The dominant narrative among scholars and political pundits characterizes American partisanship as overwhelmingly negative, portraying citizens as more repelled by the opposing party than attached to their own party. To assess the valence of partisan identity, we use various measures collected from several new and existing nationally representative surveys and behavioural outcomes obtained from two experiments. Our findings consistently depart from the negative partisanship narrative. For the majority of Americans, partisanship is either equally positive and negative or more positive than negative. Only partisan leaners stand out as negative partisans. We pair these observational findings with experimental data that differentiate between positive group behaviour and negative group behaviour in the partisan context. We find that the behavioural manifestations of party identity similarly include both positive and negative biases in balance, reinforcing our conclusion that descriptions of partisanship as primarily negative are exaggerated.

Auditing local news presence on Google News.

Local news outlets have struggled to stay open in the more competitive market of digital media. Some have noted that this decline may be due to the ways in which digital platforms direct attention to some news outlets and not others. To test this theory, we collected 12.29 million responses to Google News searches within all US counties for a set of keywords. We compared the number of local outlets reported in the results against the number of national outlets. We find that, unless consumers are searching specifically for topics of local interest, national outlets dominate search results. Features correlated with local supply and demand, such as the number of local outlets and demographics associated with local news consumption, are not related to the likelihood of finding a local news outlet. Our findings imply that platforms may be diverting web traffic and desperately needed advertising dollars away from local news.

Binding Moral Foundations and the Narrowing of Ideological Conflict to the Traditional Morality Domain.

Moral foundations theory (MFT) posits that binding moral foundations (purity, authority, and ingroup loyalty) are rooted in the need for groups to promote order and cohesion, and that they therefore underlie political conservatism. We present evidence that binding foundations (and the related construct of disgust sensitivity) are associated with lower levels of ideological polarization on political issues outside the domain of moral traditionalism. Consistent support for this hypothesis was obtained from three large American Internet-based samples and one large national sample of New Zealanders (combined N = 7,874). We suggest that when political issues do not have inherent relevance to moral traditionalism, binding foundations promote a small centrist shift away from ideologically prescribed positions, and that they do so out of desire for national uniformity and cohesion.

Do needs for security and certainty predict cultural and economic conservatism? A cross-national analysis.

We examine whether individual differences in needs for security and certainty predict conservative (vs. liberal) position on both cultural and economic political issues and whether these effects are conditional on nation-level characteristics and individual-level political engagement. Analyses with cross-national data from 51 nations reveal that valuing conformity, security, and tradition over self-direction and stimulation (a) predicts ideological self-placement on the political right, but only among people high in political engagement and within relatively developed nations, ideologically constrained nations, and non-Eastern European nations, (b) reliably predicts right-wing cultural attitudes and does so more strongly within developed and ideologically constrained nations, and (c) on average predicts left-wing economic attitudes but does so more weakly among people high in political engagement, within ideologically constrained nations, and within non-Eastern European nations. These findings challenge the prevailing view that needs for security and certainty organically yield a broad right-wing ideology and that exposure to political discourse better equips people to select the broad ideology that is most need satisfying. Rather, these findings suggest that needs for security and certainty generally yield culturally conservative but economically left-wing preferences and that exposure to political discourse generally weakens the latter relation. We consider implications for the interactive influence of personality characteristics and social context on political attitudes and discuss the importance of assessing multiple attitude domains, assessing political engagement, and considering national characteristics when studying the psychological origins of political attitudes.