Field experiment evidence of substantive, attributional, and behavioral persuasion by members of Congress in online town halls.

Do leaders persuade? Social scientists have long studied the relationship between elite behavior and mass opinion. However, there is surprisingly little evidence regarding direct persuasion by leaders. Here we show that political leaders can persuade their constituents directly on three dimensions: substantive attitudes regarding policy issues, attributions regarding the leaders' qualities, and subsequent voting behavior. We ran two randomized controlled field experiments testing the causal effects of directly interacting with a sitting politician. Our experiments consist of 20 online town hall meetings with members of Congress conducted in 2006 and 2008. Study 1 examined 19 small meetings with members of the House of Representatives (average 20 participants per town hall). Study 2 examined a large (175 participants) town hall with a senator. In both experiments we find that participating has significant and substantively important causal effects on all three dimensions of persuasion but no such effects on issues that were not discussed extensively in the sessions. Further, persuasion was not driven solely by changes in copartisans' attitudes; the effects were consistent across groups.

Can money buy control of Congress?

Can a political party spend enough across electoral campaigns to garner a majority within the U.S. Congress? Prior research on campaign spending minimizes the importance of campaign heterogeneity and fails to aggregate effects across campaigns, rendering it unable to address this question. Instead, we tackle the question with a system-level analysis of campaign expenditures. First, using a flexible machine learning approach, we show that spending has substantial and nonlinear marginal effects on outcomes at the level of the campaign. Second, by aggregating these effects to the entire U.S. Congress, we show that large seat swings that change congressional control have, in the past, been possible for expenditure levels consonant with those presently observed after having removed the most extreme levels. However, this possibility appears to have faded over the past decade. Our approach also allows us to illustrate the often significant effects that eliminating campaign spending could have.