Epidemiological analysis of African swine fever in the European Union during 2023.

In 2023, 14 Member States were affected by African swine fever (ASF), including Croatia and Sweden where ASF emerged (wild boar outbreaks only) and Greece where ASF re-emerged after being free since 2021. The number of ASF outbreaks among domestic pigs in the EU was five times higher than in 2022, reaching a similar magnitude to that in 2019. This was predominantly driven by the introduction and subsequent spread of ASF in Croatia and its resurgence in Romania, representing 96% of the EU outbreaks. ASF outbreaks in domestic pigs were clearly seasonal in all countries, with 88% of outbreaks reported between July and October. Most of the ASF outbreaks among domestic pigs were detected through clinical suspicion (94%), followed by tracing from affected establishments (3%), and the weekly testing of at least two dead pigs in establishments (3%). In wild boar, a 10% increase in the number of notified outbreaks was observed in the EU in comparison with 2022, with considerable variations between countries. A winter peak was observed only in Poland, Slovakia and Hungary. The epidemiological situation in wild boar improved in Germany and Hungary, as suggested by the decrease in the number of outbreaks and in the proportions of PCR-positive samples from dead wild boar. Overall, 31% of wild boar carcasses found during passive surveillance tested positive by PCR, representing 69% of the ASF outbreaks in wild boar in the EU. In contrast, 0.4% of hunted wild boar tested positive, representing 31% of the outbreaks. Despite the introduction of ASF into new countries and the increase in the number of outbreaks, the size of restricted zones in the EU remained stable, due to the highly clustered outbreaks in Croatia, and the reduction of restricted zones in Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria (in domestic pigs), and Hungary (in wild boar).

Epidemiological analysis of African swine fever in the European Union during 2022.

This report presents the epidemiological analysis of African swine fever (ASF) during 2022 based on the surveillance and pig population data submitted by the European Union (EU) affected countries and one neighbouring country. Coinciding with regulatory changes and an important decrease in ASF outbreaks in 2022 in the EU, the number of domestic pig samples tested as part of active surveillance decreased by 80%, while the number of samples from passive surveillance almost doubled compared with 2021. Most outbreaks among domestic pigs in the EU were detected by testing clinical suspicions (93% of outbreaks), followed by tracing activities (5%) and weekly testing of the first two dead pigs per establishment (2%). Although most of the wild boar samples came from hunted animals, the probability of detecting PCR-positive animals was much higher in wild boar found dead. The ASF outbreaks among domestic pigs in the EU decreased by 79% while a decrease of 40% in the wild boar cases was observed in comparison with 2021. This was strongly marked in Romania, Poland and Bulgaria, with a reduction of 50-80% compared with 2021. In many countries, an important decrease in the number of pig establishments was observed, especially of small establishments with fewer than 100 pigs. The regional between farm incidence and proportion of pigs lost due to ASF in the EU was in general very low (average of 1%) apart from some regions in Romania. The impact of ASF on wild boar populations was variable, with a decline in wild boar abundance observed in certain countries versus a stable or even increased population after ASF introduction. This supports the negative relationship observed in this report between the proportion of the country with restricted zones due to ASF in wild boar and wild boar hunting bags.

Assessment of listing and categorisation of animal diseases within the framework of the Animal Health Law (Regulation (EU) No 2016/429): infectious pancreatic necrosis (IPN).

Infectious pancreatic necrosis (IPN) was assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular, the criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9, and Article 8 for listing animal species related to IPN. The assessment was performed following a methodology previously published. The outcome reported is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with an uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether IPN can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (50-90% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that IPN does not meet the criteria in Section 1 (Category A; 0-1% probability of meeting the criteria) and it is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 (Categories B, C, D and E; 33-66%, 33-66%, 50-90% and 50-99% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for IPN according to Article 8 criteria are provided.

Assessment of listing and categorisation of animal diseases within the framework of the Animal Health Law (Regulation (EU) 2016/429): infection with Gyrodactylus salaris (GS).

Infection with Gyrodactylus salaris was assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular, the criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as laid down in Article 9 and Article 8 for listing animal species related to infection with G. salaris. The assessment was performed following the ad hoc method for data collection and assessment previously developed by AHAW panel and already published. The outcome reported is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with an uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether infection with G. salaris can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (33-70% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that Infection with G. salaris does not meet the criteria in Section 1 and 3 (Category A and C; 1-5% and 10-33% probability of fulfilling the criteria, respectively) and it is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 2, 4 and 5 (Categories B, D and E; 33-80%, 33-66% and 33-80% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for infection with G. salaris according to Article 8 criteria are provided.

Assessment of listing and categorisation of animal diseases within the framework of the Animal Health Law (Regulation (EU) 2016/429): Bacterial kidney disease (BKD).

Bacterial kidney disease (BKD) was assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular the criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as laid out in Article 9 and Article 8 for listing animal species related to BKD. The assessment was performed following the ad hoc method on data collection and assessment developed by AHAW Panel and already published. The outcome reported is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with an uncertain outcome. According to this assessment, BKD can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (66-90% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that BKD does not meet the criteria in Sections 1, 2 and 3 (Categories A, B and C; 1-5%, 33-66% and 33-66% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively) but meets the criteria in Sections 4 and 5 (Categories D and E; 66-90% and 66-90% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for BKD according to Article 8 criteria are provided.

Assessment of listing and categorisation of animal diseases within the framework of the Animal Health Law (Regulation (EU)2016/429): Infection with salmonid alphavirus (SAV).

Infection with salmonid alphavirus (SAV) was assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular the criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as laid out in Article 9 and Article 8 for listing animal species related to infection with SAV. The assessment was performed following the ad hoc method on data collection and assessment developed by AHAW Panel and already published. The outcome reported is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with an uncertain outcome. According to the assessment, it was uncertain whether infection with salmonid alphavirus can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (50-80% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that infection with salmonid alphavirus does not meet the criteria in Section 1 (Category A; 5-10% probability of meeting the criteria) and it is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 (Categories B, C, D and E; 50-90%, probability of meeting the criteria). The animal species to be listed for infection with SAV according to Article 8 criteria are provided.

Assessment of listing and categorisation of animal diseases within the framework of the Animal Health Law (Regulation (EU) 2016/429): Spring Viraemia of Carp (SVC).

Spring Viraemia of Carp (SVC) was assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular the criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9 and Article 8 for listing animal species related to SVC. The assessment was performed following the ad hoc method for data collection and assessment previously developed by the AHAW panel and already published. The outcome reported is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with an uncertain outcome. According to the assessment performed here, it is uncertain whether SVC can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (45-90% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that SVC does not meet the criteria in Section 1 (Category A; 5-33% probability of meeting the criteria) and it is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 (Categories B, C, D and E; 33-66%, 10-66%, 45-90% and 45-90% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for SVC according to Article 8 criteria are provided.

Technical specifications for a baseline survey on the prevalence of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in pigs.

The European Commission requested scientific and technical assistance in the preparation of a EU-wide baseline survey protocol for a European Union (EU) coordinated monitoring programme on the prevalence of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) in pigs. The objective of the survey is to estimate the MRSA prevalence in batches of fattening pigs at slaughter at both European and national levels, with a 95% level of confidence and a level of precision of 10% considering an expected prevalence of 50%. The survey protocol defines the target population, the sample size for the survey, sample collection requirements, the analytical methods (for isolation, identification, phenotypic susceptibility testing and further genotypic testing of MRSA isolates), the data reporting requirements and the plan of analysis. The samples are to be analysed according to the laboratory protocols available on the European Union Reference Laboratory (EURL-AR) website. Generalised linear models will be used to estimate proportion (with 95% confidence intervals) of batches of slaughter pigs tested positive to MRSA. The necessary data to be reported by the EU Member States to support this baseline survey are presented in three data models. The results of the survey should be reported using the EFSA data collection framework.

Risks related to a possible reduction of the waiting period for dogs after rabies antibody titration to 30 days compared with 90 days of the current EU legislative regime.

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the risks related to a possible reduction of the waiting period after rabies antibody titration test to 30 days compared with 90 days of the current EU legislation, for dogs moving from certain non-EU countries to the EU. This Scientific Report assessed the probability of introduction of rabies into the EU through commercial and non-commercial movements of vaccinated dogs with a positive titration test (≥ 0.5 IU/mL) if the waiting period decreases from 90 to 30 days. Assuming that all the legal requirements are complied with, the risk of transmission of rabies through the movement of a vaccinated dog is related to the risk of introducing an animal incubating rabies that was infected before the day of vaccination or shortly after vaccination but before the development of immunity (21 days post-vaccination). Using published data on the incubation period for experimental and field cases in dogs and considering the rabies incidence data in certain countries, the aggregated probability for the annual introduction of rabies through dogs was assessed. Considering the uncertainty related to the duration of the incubation period, the number of imported dogs, and the disease incidence in some countries it was concluded with a 95% certainty that the maximum number of rabies-infected imported dogs complying with the regulations in a 20-year period could increase from 5 to 20 when decreasing the waiting period from 90 to 30 days. Nevertheless, the potential impact of even a small increase in probability means the risk is increased for a region like the EU where rabies has long been a focus for eradication, to protect human and animal health.

Epidemiological analyses of African swine fever in the European Union: (September 2020 to August 2021).

This report provides a descriptive analysis of the African swine fever (ASF) Genotype II epidemic in the affected Member States in the EU and two neighbouring countries for the period from 1 September 2020 to 31 August 2021. ASF continued to spread in wild boar in the EU, it entered Germany in September 2020, while Belgium became free from ASF in October 2020. No ASF outbreaks in domestic pigs nor cases in wild boar have been reported in Greece since February 2020. In the Baltic States, overall, there has been a declining trend in proportions of polymerase chain reaction (PCR)-positive samples from wild boar carcasses in the last few years. In the other countries, the proportions of PCR-positive wild boar carcasses remained high, indicating continuing spread of the disease. A systematic literature review revealed that the risk factors most frequently significantly associated with ASF in domestic pigs were pig density, low levels of biosecurity and socio-economic factors. For wild boar, most significant risk factors were related to habitat, socio-economic factors and wild boar management. The effectiveness of different control options in the so-named white zones, areas where wild boar densities have been drastically reduced to avoid further spread of ASF after a new introduction, was assessed with a stochastic model. Important findings were that establishing a white zone is much more challenging when the area of ASF incursion is adjacent to an area where limited control measures are in place. Very stringent wild boar population reduction measures in the white zone are key to success. The white zone needs to be far enough away from the affected core area so that the population can be reduced in time before the disease arrives and the timing of this will depend on the wild boar density and the required population reduction target in the white zone. Finally, establishing a proactive white zone along the demarcation line of an affected area requires higher culling efforts, but has a higher chance of success to stop the spread of the disease than establishing reactive white zones after the disease has already entered in the area.

Assessment of the control measures for category A diseases of Animal Health Law: Contagious Caprine Pleuropneumonia.

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for Contagious Caprine Pleuropneumonia (CCPP). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period, (iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones and iv) the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. Different clinical and laboratory sampling procedures are proposed depending on the scenarios considered. The monitoring period of 45 days was assessed as effective in affected areas where high awareness is expected, and when the index case occurs in an area where the awareness is low the monitoring period should be at least 180 days (6 months). Since transmission kernels do not exist and data to estimate transmission kernels are not available, a surveillance zone of 3 km was considered effective based on expert knowledge, while a protection zone should also be developed to include establishments adjacent to affected ones. Recommendations, provided for each of the scenarios assessed, aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to CCPP.

Assessment of the control measures for category A diseases of Animal Health Law: Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia.

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia (CBPP). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period, (iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones, and (iv) the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. Different clinical and laboratory sampling procedures are proposed depending on the scenarios considered. The monitoring period of 45 days was assessed as not effective and at least 90 days (3 months) is recommended in affected areas where high awareness is expected; when the index case occurs in an area where the awareness is low the monitoring period should be at least 180 days (6 months). Since transmission kernels do not exist and data to estimate transmission kernels are not available, the effectiveness of surveillance and protection zones for CBPP was based on expert knowledge. A surveillance zone of 3 km was considered effective, while a protection zone including establishments adjacent to affected ones is recommended. Recommendations, provided for each of the scenarios assessed, aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to CBPP.

Annual Report on surveillance for avian influenza in poultry and wild birds in Member States of the European Union in 2020.

In 2020, Council Directive 2005/94/EC required EU Member States (MSs) to carry out surveillance for avian influenza (AI) in poultry and wild birds and notify the results to the responsible authority. Based on this, MSs, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom implemented ongoing surveillance programmes to monitor incursions of AI viruses in poultry and wild birds. EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to collate, validate, analyse and summarise the data resulting from the avian influenza surveillance programmes in an annual report. This is the second such report produced using data directly submitted to EFSA by MSs. This report summarises the results of the surveillance activities carried out in poultry and wild birds in 2020. Overall, 24,768 poultry establishments (PEs) were sampled, of which 46 were seropositive for H5 virus strains and seven for H7 strains. Seropositive PEs were found in nine MSs (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Sweden) and the United Kingdom. As per previous years, the highest percentages of seropositive PEs were found in establishments raising waterfowl game birds and breeding geese. Out of the 53 PEs with positive serological tests for H5/H7, seven tested positive in polymerase chain reaction (PCR) or virology for H5/H7 virus strains: six for Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza (LPAI) and one for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). In addition, 13 countries also reported PCR results from 748 PEs which did not correspond to the follow-up testing of a positive serology event (e.g. in some PEs, PCR tests were used for screening). Twenty-five of these PEs were found positive for AI viral RNA. These positive PEs were located in Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, Romania and Slovakia. A total of 18,968 wild birds were sampled, with 878 birds testing positive to HPAI virus. Fourteen countries reported HPAI-positive wild birds, with all HPAI strains identified as H5. Most positive birds were infected with H5N8, with a smaller number of N1, N3, N5 and unidentified NA subtypes. In addition, there were 317 birds testing positive for LPAI H5 or H7 virus and 429 birds testing positive for non-H5/H7 AI virus, reported by 31 countries. The surveillance findings for poultry and wild birds for 2020 are discussed in relation to the current knowledge of the epidemiology of AI in Europe, in particular the H5N8 epidemic which has been identified late 2020.

Epidemiological analysis of African swine fever in the European Union (September 2019 to August 2020).

An update on the African swine fever (ASF) situation in the 10 affected Member States (MS) in the EU and in two neighbouring countries from the 1 September 2019 until the 31 August 2020 is provided. The dynamics of the proportions of PCR- and ELISA-positive samples since the first ASF detection in the country were provided and seasonal patterns were investigated. The impact of the ASF epidemic on the annual numbers of hunted wild boar in each affected MS was investigated. To evaluate differences in the extent of spread of ASF in the wild boar populations, the number of notifications that could be classified as secondary cases to a single source was calculated for each affected MS and compared for the earliest and latest year of the epidemic in the country. To evaluate possible risk factors for the occurrence of ASFV in wild boar or domestic pigs, a literature review was performed. Risk factors for the occurrence of ASF in wild boar in Romanian hunting grounds in 2019 were identified with a generalised linear model. The probability to find at least one PCR-confirmed ASF case in wild boar in a hunting ground in Romania was driven by environmental factors, wild boar abundance and the density of backyard pigs in the hunting ground area, while hunting-related variables were not retained in the final model. Finally, measures implemented in white zones (ASF-free zones that are geographically adjacent to an area where ASF is present in wild boar) to prevent further spread of ASF were analysed with a spatially, explicit stochastic individual-based model. To be effective, the wild boar population in the white zone would need to be drastically reduced before ASF arrives at the zone and it must be wide enough. To achieve the necessary pre-emptive culling targets of wild boar in the white zone, at the start of the establishment, the white zone should be placed sufficiently far from the affected area, considering the speed of the natural spread of the disease. This spread is faster in denser wild boar populations. After a focal ASF introduction, the white zone is always close to the infection hence pre-emptive culling measures in the white zone must be completed in short term, i.e. in a few months.

Scientific Opinion on the assessment of the control measures for category A diseases of Animal Health Law: Foot and Mouth Disease.

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for foot and mouth disease (FMD). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, ii) monitoring period and iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones, and the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere; nonetheless, the transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radius of the protection zone of 3 km and of the surveillance zone of 10 km are shown. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. The monitoring period of 21 days was assessed as effective, and it was concluded that the protection and the surveillance zones comprise > 99% of the infections from an affected establishment if transmission occurred. Recommendations, provided for each of the scenarios assessed, aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to FMD.

ASF Exit Strategy: Providing cumulative evidence of the absence of African swine fever virus circulation in wild boar populations using standard surveillance measures.

EFSA assessed the role of seropositive wild boar in African swine fever (ASF) persistence. Surveillance data from Estonia and Latvia investigated with a generalised equation method demonstrated a significantly slower decline in seroprevalence in adult animals compared with subadults. The seroprevalence in adults, taking more than 24 months to approach zero after the last detection of ASFV circulation, would be a poor indicator to demonstrate the absence of virus circulation. A narrative literature review updated the knowledge on the mortality rate, the duration of protective immunity and maternal antibodies and transmission parameters. In addition, parameters potentially leading to prolonged virus circulation (persistence) in wild boar populations were reviewed. A stochastic explicit model was used to evaluate the dynamics of virus prevalence, seroprevalence and the number of carcasses attributed to ASF. Secondly, the impact of four scenarios on the duration of ASF virus (ASFV) persistence was evaluated with the model, namely a: (1) prolonged, lifelong infectious period, (2) reduction in the case-fatality rate and prolonged transient infectiousness; (3) change in duration of protective immunity and (4) change in the duration of protection from maternal antibodies. Only the lifelong infectious period scenario had an important prolonging effect on the persistence of ASF. Finally, the model tested the performance of different proposed surveillance strategies to provide evidence of the absence of virus circulation (Exit Strategy). A two-phase approach (Screening Phase, Confirmation Phase) was suggested for the Exit Strategy. The accuracy of the Exit Strategy increases with increasing numbers of carcasses collected and tested. The inclusion of active surveillance based on hunting has limited impact on the performance of the Exit Strategy compared with lengthening of the monitoring period. This performance improvement should be reasonably balanced against an unnecessary prolonged 'time free' with only a marginal gain in performance. Recommendations are provided for minimum monitoring periods leading to minimal failure rates of the Exit Strategy. The proposed Exit Strategy would fail with the presence of lifelong infectious wild boar. That said, it should be emphasised that the existence of such animals is speculative, based on current knowledge.

Research gap analysis on African swine fever.

The most significant knowledge gaps in the prevention and control of African swine fever (ASF) were identified by the EU Veterinary services and other stakeholders involved in pig production and wild boar management through an online survey. The respondents were asked to identify the major research needs in order to improve short-term ASF risk management. Four major gaps were identified: 'wild boar', 'African swine fever virus (ASFV) survival and transmission', 'biosecurity' and 'surveillance'. In particular, the respondents stressed the need for better knowledge on wild boar management and surveillance, and improved knowledge on the possible mechanism for spread and persistence of ASF in wild boar populations. They indicated the need for research on ASFV survival and transmission from the environment, different products such as feed and feed materials, and potential arthropod vector transmission. In addition, several research topics on biosecurity were identified as significant knowledge gaps and the need to identify risk factors for ASFV entry into domestic pig holdings, to develop protocols to implement specific and appropriate biosecurity measures, and to improve the knowledge about the domestic pig-wild boar interface. Potential sources of ASFV introduction into unaffected countries need to be better understood by an in-depth analysis of the possible pathways of introduction of ASFV with the focus on food, feed, transport of live wild boars and human movements. Finally, research on communication methods to increase awareness among all players involved in the epidemiology of ASF (including truck drivers, hunters and tourists) and to increase compliance with existing control measures was also a topic mentioned by all stakeholders.

Risk assessment of African swine fever in the south-eastern countries of Europe.

The European Commission requested EFSA to estimate the risk of spread of African swine fever (ASF) and to identify potential risk factors (indicators) for the spread of ASF, given introduction in the south-eastern countries of Europe (region of concern, ROC), namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia. Three EU Member States (MS) - Croatia, Greece and Slovenia - were included in the ROC due to their geographical location and ASF-free status. Based on collected information on potential risk factors (indicators) for each country and the relevant EU regulations in force, the estimated probability of spread of ASF within the ROC within one year after introduction into the ROC was assessed to be very high (from 66% to 100%). This estimate was determined after considering the high number of indicators present in most of the countries in the ROC and the known effect that these indicators can have on ASF spread, especially those related to the structure of the domestic pig sector, the presence of wild boar and social factors. The presence of indicators varies between countries in the ROC. Each country is at risk of ASF spread following introduction; however, some countries may have a higher probability of ASF spread following introduction. In addition, the probability of ASF spread from the ROC to EU MSs outside the ROC within one year after introduction of ASF in the ROC was estimated to be very low to low (from 0% to 15%). This estimate was based on the comparison of the indicators present in the ROC and the already affected countries in south-eastern Europe, such as Bulgaria and Romania, where there was no evidence of ASF spread to other EU MS within one year.

Epidemiological analyses of African swine fever in the European Union (November 2017 until November 2018).

This update on the African swine fever (ASF) outbreaks in the EU demonstrated that out of all tested wild boar found dead, the proportion of positive samples peaked in winter and summer. For domestic pigs only, a summer peak was evident. Despite the existence of several plausible factors that could result in the observed seasonality, there is no evidence to prove causality. Wild boar density was the most influential risk factor for the occurrence of ASF in wild boar. In the vast majority of introductions in domestic pig holdings, direct contact with infected domestic pigs or wild boar was excluded as the route of introduction. The implementation of emergency measures in the wild boar management zones following a focal ASF introduction was evaluated. As a sole control strategy, intensive hunting around the buffer area might not always be sufficient to eradicate ASF. However, the probability of eradication success is increased after adding quick and safe carcass removal. A wider buffer area leads to a higher success probability; however it implies a larger intensive hunting area and the need for more animals to be hunted. If carcass removal and intensive hunting are effectively implemented, fencing is more useful for delineating zones, rather than adding substantially to control efficacy. However, segments of fencing will be particularly useful in those areas where carcass removal or intensive hunting is difficult to implement. It was not possible to demonstrate an effect of natural barriers on ASF spread. Human-mediated translocation may override any effect of natural barriers. Recommendations for ASF control in four different epidemiological scenarios are presented.

Evaluating the connectivity of a protected areas' network under the prism of global change: the efficiency of the European Natura 2000 network for four birds of prey.

Climate and land use changes are major threats to biodiversity. To preserve biodiversity, networks of protected areas have been established worldwide, like the Natura 2000 network across the European Union (EU). Currently, this reserve network consists of more than 26000 sites covering more than 17% of EU terrestrial territory. Its efficiency to mitigate the detrimental effects of land use and climate change remains an open research question. Here, we examined the potential current and future geographical ranges of four birds of prey under scenarios of both land use and climate changes. By using graph theory, we examined how the current Natura 2000 network will perform in regard to the conservation of these species. This approach determines the importance of a site in regard to the total network and its connectivity. We found that sites becoming unsuitable due to climate change are not a random sample of the network, but are less connected and contribute less to the overall connectivity than the average site and thus their loss does not disrupt the full network. Hence, the connectivity of the remaining network changed only slightly from present day conditions. Our findings highlight the need to establish species-specific management plans with flexible conservation strategies ensuring protection under potential future range expansions. Aquila pomarina is predicted to disappear from the southern part of its range and to become restricted to northeastern Europe. Gyps fulvus, Aquila chrysaetos, and Neophron percnopterus are predicted to locally lose some suitable sites; hence, some isolated small populations may become extinct. However, their geographical range and metapopulation structure will remain relatively unaffected throughout Europe. These species would benefit more from an improved habitat quality and management of the existing network of protected areas than from increased connectivity or assisted migration.