No consent for brain death testing.

The overwhelming weight of legal authority in the USA and Canada holds that consent is not required for brain death testing. The situation in England and Wales is similar but different. While clinicians in England and Wales may have a prima facie duty to obtain consent, lack of consent has not barred testing. In three recent cases where consent for brain death testing was formally presented to the court, lack of consent was not determinative, and in one case the court questioned whether the clinicians were even required to seek consent from the parents of a child at all.

Determination of Brain Death/Death by Neurologic Criteria: The World Brain Death Project.

IMPORTANCE: There are inconsistencies in concept, criteria, practice, and documentation of brain death/death by neurologic criteria (BD/DNC) both internationally and within countries. OBJECTIVE: To formulate a consensus statement of recommendations on determination of BD/DNC based on review of the literature and expert opinion of a large multidisciplinary, international panel. PROCESS: Relevant international professional societies were recruited to develop recommendations regarding determination of BD/DNC. Literature searches of the Cochrane, Embase, and MEDLINE databases included January 1, 1992, through April 2020 identified pertinent articles for review. Because of the lack of high-quality data from randomized clinical trials or large observational studies, recommendations were formulated based on consensus of contributors and medical societies that represented relevant disciplines, including critical care, neurology, and neurosurgery. EVIDENCE SYNTHESIS: Based on review of the literature and consensus from a large multidisciplinary, international panel, minimum clinical criteria needed to determine BD/DNC in various circumstances were developed. RECOMMENDATIONS: Prior to evaluating a patient for BD/DNC, the patient should have an established neurologic diagnosis that can lead to the complete and irreversible loss of all brain function, and conditions that may confound the clinical examination and diseases that may mimic BD/DNC should be excluded. Determination of BD/DNC can be done with a clinical examination that demonstrates coma, brainstem areflexia, and apnea. This is seen when (1) there is no evidence of arousal or awareness to maximal external stimulation, including noxious visual, auditory, and tactile stimulation; (2) pupils are fixed in a midsize or dilated position and are nonreactive to light; (3) corneal, oculocephalic, and oculovestibular reflexes are absent; (4) there is no facial movement to noxious stimulation; (5) the gag reflex is absent to bilateral posterior pharyngeal stimulation; (6) the cough reflex is absent to deep tracheal suctioning; (7) there is no brain-mediated motor response to noxious stimulation of the limbs; and (8) spontaneous respirations are not observed when apnea test targets reach pH <7.30 and Paco2 ≥60 mm Hg. If the clinical examination cannot be completed, ancillary testing may be considered with blood flow studies or electrophysiologic testing. Special consideration is needed for children, for persons receiving extracorporeal membrane oxygenation, and for those receiving therapeutic hypothermia, as well as for factors such as religious, societal, and cultural perspectives; legal requirements; and resource availability. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: This report provides recommendations for the minimum clinical standards for determination of brain death/death by neurologic criteria in adults and children with clear guidance for various clinical circumstances. The recommendations have widespread international society endorsement and can serve to guide professional societies and countries in the revision or development of protocols and procedures for determination of brain death/death by neurologic criteria, leading to greater consistency within and between countries.

Medical Futility and Potentially Inappropriate Treatment: Better Ethics with More Precise Definitions and Language.

The primary objective of this article is to defend the vocabulary in the Multiorganization Policy Statement. The Multiorganization Statement narrows but does not abolish the term futility. Rather, it offers a richer and more precise vocabulary that facilitates better ethical decision-making. The secondary objective of this article is to defend the continuing utility of the terms and concepts "quantitative futility" and "qualitative futility" defended by Schneiderman, Jecker, and Jonsen (2017).

Voluntarily stopping eating and drinking (VSED) to hasten death: may clinicians legally support patients to VSED?

Jox and colleagues recently compared and contrasted two leading end-of-life exit options, namely voluntarily stopping eating and drinking (VSED) and medical aid in dying (MAID). The authors argue that policymakers and medical societies should consider VSED and MAID in a uniform and consistent manner given that clinician participation in both constitutes assisted suicide. This is a very controversial topic. Herein, it is questioned whether there really is disparate consideration of VSED and MAID and whether it is justified, bearing in mind that VSED is not assisted suicide.Please see related article: http://bmcmedicine.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12916-017-0950-1 .

Physician Power to Declare Death by Neurologic Criteria Threatened.

BACKGROUND: Three recent lawsuits that address declaration of brain death (BD) garnered significant media attention and threaten to limit physician power to declare BD. METHODS: We discuss these cases and their consequences including: the right to refuse an apnea test, accepted medical standards for declaration of BD, and the irreversibility of BD. RESULTS: These cases warrant discussion because they threaten to: limit physicians' power to determine death; incite families to seek injunctions to continue organ support after BD; and force hospitals to dispense valuable resources to dead patients in lieu of patients with reparable illnesses or injuries. CONCLUSIONS: Physicians, philosophers, religious officials, ethicists, and lawyers must work together to address these issues and educate both the public and medical community about BD.

Legal Briefing: Unwanted Cesareans and Obstetric Violence.

A capacitated pregnant woman has a nearly unqualified right to refuse a cesarean section. Her right to say "no" takes precedence over clinicians' preferences and even over clinicians' concerns about fetal health. Leading medical societies, human rights organizations, and appellate courts have all endorsed this principle. Nevertheless, clinicians continue to limit reproductive liberty by forcing and coercing women to have unwanted cesareans. This "Legal Briefing" reviews recent court cases involving this type of obstetric violence. I have organized these court cases into the following six categories: 1. Epidemic of Unwanted Cesareans 2. Court-Ordered Cesareans 3. Physician-Coerced Cesareans 4. Physician-Ordered Cesareans 5. Cesareans for Incapacitated Patients 6. Cesareans for Patients in a Vegetative State or Who Are Brain Dead.

Legal Briefing: Mandated Reporters and Compulsory Reporting Duties.

This issue's "Legal Briefing" column, one product of a Greenwall Foundation grant, reviews recent developments concerning compulsory reporting duties. Most licensed clinicians in the United States are "mandated reporters." When these clinicians discover certain threats to the safety of patients or the public, they are legally required to report that information to specified government officials. Over the past year, several states have legislatively expanded the scope of these reporting duties. In other states, new court cases illustrate the vigorous enforcement of already existing duties. I have organized all these legal developments into the following eight categories: 1. Overview of Mandatory Reporting Duties 2. Controversy over the Benefits of Mandatory Reporting 3. New and Expanded Duties to Report 4. Criminal Penalties for Failing to Report 5. Civil Liability for Failing to Report 6. Disciplinary Penalties for Failing to Report 7. Legal Immunity for Good-Faith Reporting 8. Protection against Employers' Retaliation.

Legal Briefing: Stopping Nonbeneficial Life-Sustaining Treatment without Consent.

In the United States, authoritative legal guidance remains sparse on whether or when clinicians may stop life-sustaining treatment without consent. Fortunately, several significant legislative and judicial developments over the past two years offer some clarity. We group these legal developments into the following seven categories: 1. Lawsuits for Damages 2. Amendments to the Texas Advance Directives Act 3. Constitutional Attack on TADA 4. Legislation Prohibiting Clinicians 5. Legislation Authorizing Clinicians 6. Cases from Canada 7. Cases from the United Kingdom.

Legal Briefing: Medicare Coverage of Advance Care Planning.

This issue's "Legal Briefing" column covers the recent decision by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to expand Medicare coverage of advance care planning, beginning 1 January 2016. Since 2009, most "Legal Briefings" in this journal have covered a wide gamut of judicial, legislative, and regulatory developments concerning a particular topic in clinical ethics. In contrast, this "Legal Briefing" is more narrowly focused on one single legal development. This concentration on Medicare coverage of advance care planning seems warranted. Advance care planning is a frequent subject of articles in JCE. After all, it has long been seen as an important, albeit only partial, solution to a significant range of big problems in clinical ethics. These problems range from medical futility disputes to decision making for incapacitated patients who have no available legally authorized surrogate. Consequently, expanded Medicare coverage of advance care planning is a potentially seismic development. It may materially reduce both the frequency and severity of key problems in clinical ethics. Since the sociological, medical, and ethical literature on advance care planning is voluminous, I will not even summarize it here. Instead, I focus on Medicare coverage. I proceed, chronologically, in six stages: 1. Prior Medicare Coverage of Advance Care Planning 2. Proposed Expanded Medicare Coverage in 2015 3. Proposed Expanded Medicare Coverage in 2016 4. The Final Rule Expanding Medicare Coverage in 2016 5. Remaining Issues for CMS to Address in 2017 6. Pending Federal Legislation.

Legal Briefing: Adult Orphans and the Unbefriended: Making Medical Decisions for Unrepresented Patients without Surrogates.

This issue's "Legal Briefing" column covers recent legal developments involving medical decision making for incapacitated patients who have no available legally authorized surrogate decision maker. These individuals are frequently referred to either as "adult orphans" or as "unbefriended," "isolated," or "unrepresented" patients. The challenges involved in obtaining consent for medical treatment on behalf of these individuals have been the subject of major policy reports. Indeed, caring for the unbefriended has even been described as the "single greatest category of problems" encountered in bioethics consultation. In 2012, JCE published a comprehensive review of the available mechanisms by which to make medical decisions for the unbefriended. The purpose of this "Legal Briefing" is to update the 2012 study. Accordingly, this "Legal Briefing" collects and describes significant legal developments from only the past three years. My basic assessment has not changed. "Existing mechanisms to address the issue of decision making for the unbefriended are scant and not uniform." Most facilities are "muddling through on an ad hoc basis." But the situation is not wholly negative. There have been a number of promising new initiatives. I group these developments into the following seven categories: 1. Increased Attention and Discussion 2. Prevention through Better Advance Care Planning 3. Prevention through Expanded Default Surrogate Lists 4. Statutorily Authorized Intramural Mechanisms 5. California Litigation Challenging the Team Approach 6. Public Guardianship 7. Improving Existing Guardianship Processes.

Legal briefing: coerced treatment and involuntary confinement for contagious disease.

This issue's "Legal Briefing" column covers recent legal developments involving coerced treatment and involuntary confinement for contagious disease. Recent high profile court cases involving measles, tuberculosis, human immunodeficiency virus, and especially Ebola, have thrust this topic back into the bioethics and public spotlights. This has reignited debates over how best to balance individual liberty and public health. For example, the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues has officially requested public comments, held open hearings, and published a 90-page report on "ethical considerations and implications" raised by "U.S. public policies that restrict association or movement (such as quarantine)." Broadly related articles have been published in previous issues of The Journal of Clinical Ethics. We categorize recent legal developments on coerced treatment and involuntary confinement into the following six categories: 1. Most Public Health Confinement Is Voluntary 2. Legal Requirements for Involuntary Confinement 3. New State Laws Authorizing Involuntary Confinement 4. Quarantine Must Be as Least Restrictive as Necessary 5. Isolation Is Justified Only as a Last Resort 6. Coerced Treatment after Persistent Noncompliance.

Legal briefing: Brain death and total brain failure.

This issue's "Legal Briefing" column covers recent legal developments involving total brain failure. Death determined by neurological criteria (DDNC) or "brain death" has been legally established for decades in the United States. But recent conflicts between families and hospitals have created some uncertainty. Clinicians are increasingly unsure about the scope of their legal and ethical treatment duties when families object to the withdrawal of physiological support after DDNC. This issue of JCE includes a thorough analysis of one institution's ethics consults illustrating this uncertainty. This experience is not unique. Hospitals across the country are seeing more DDNC disputes. Because of the similarity to medical futility disputes, some court cases on this topic were reviewed in a prior "Legal Briefing" column. But a more systematic review is now warranted. I categorize recent legal developments into the following nine categories: (1) History of Determining Death by Neurological Criteria, (2) Legal Status of Determining Death by Neurological Criteria, (3) Legal Duties to Accommodate Family Objections, (4) Protocols for Determining Death by Neurological Criteria, (5) Court Cases Seeking Physiological Support after DDNC, (6) Court Cases Seeking Damages for Intentionally Premature DDNC, (7) Court Cases Seeking Damages for Negligently Premature DDNC, (8) Court Cases Seeking Damages for Emotional Distress, (9) Pregnancy Limitations on DDNC.

Legal briefing: voluntarily stopping eating and drinking.

This issue's "Legal Briefing" column covers recent legal developments involving voluntarily stopping eating and drinking (VSED). Over the past decade, clinicians and bioethicists have increasingly recognized VSED as a medically and ethically appropriate means to hasten death. Most recently, in September 2013, the National Hospice and Palliative Care Organization (NHPCO) called on its 2,000 member hospices to develop policies and guidelines addressing VSED. And VSED is getting more attention not only in healthcare communities, but also in the general public. For example, VSED was recently highlighted on the front page of the New York Times and in other national and local media. Nevertheless, despite the growing interest in VSED, there remains little on-point legal authority and only sparse bioethics literature analyzing its legality.This article aims to fill this gap. Specifically, we focus on new legislative, regulatory, and judicial acts that clarify the permissibility of VSED. We categorize these legal developments into the following seven categories: 1. Definition of VSED. 2. Uncertainty Whether Oral Nutrition and Hydration Are Medical Treatment. 3. Uncertainty Regarding Providers' Obligations to Patients Who Choose VSED. 4. Judicial Guidance from Australia. 5. Judicial Guidance from the United Kingdom.

Legal briefing: informed consent in the clinical context.

This issue's "Legal Briefing" column covers recent legal developments involving informed consent.1 We covered this topic in previous articles in The Journal of Clinical Ethics.2 But an updated discussion is warranted. First, informed consent remains a central and critically important issue in clinical ethics. Second, there have been numerous significant legal changes over the past year. We categorize recent legal developments into the following 13 categories: (1) Medical Malpractice Liability, (2) Medical Malpractice Liability in Wisconsin, (3) Medical Malpractice Liability in Novel Situations, (4) Enforcement by Criminal Prosecutors, (5) Enforcement by State Medical Boards, (6) Enforcement through Anti-Discrimination Laws, (7) Statutorily Mandated Disclosures Related to End-of-Life Counseling, (8) Statutorily Mandated Disclosures Related to Aid in Dying, (9) Statutorily Mandated Disclosures Related to Abortion, (10) Statutorily Mandated Disclosures Related to Telemedicine, (11) Statutorily Mandated Disclosures Related to Other Interventions, (12) Statutorily Mandated Gag and Censorship Laws, (13) Informed Consent in the Research Context.