Molecular relatedness of ESBL/AmpC-producing Escherichia coli from humans, animals, food and the environment: a pooled analysis.

Background: In recent years, ESBL/AmpC-producing Escherichia coli (ESBL/AmpC-EC) have been isolated with increasing frequency from animals, food, environmental sources and humans. With incomplete and scattered evidence, the contribution to the human carriage burden from these reservoirs remains unclear. Objectives: To quantify molecular similarities between different reservoirs as a first step towards risk attribution. Methods: Pooled data on ESBL/AmpC-EC isolates were recovered from 35 studies in the Netherlands comprising >27 000 samples, mostly obtained between 2005 and 2015. Frequency distributions of ESBL/AmpC genes from 5808 isolates and replicons of ESBL/AmpC-carrying plasmids from 812 isolates were compared across 22 reservoirs through proportional similarity indices (PSIs) and principal component analyses (PCAs). Results: Predominant ESBL/AmpC genes were identified in each reservoir. PCAs and PSIs revealed close human-animal ESBL/AmpC gene similarity between human farming communities and their animals (broilers and pigs) (PSIs from 0.8 to 0.9). Isolates from people in the general population had higher similarities to those from human clinical settings, surface and sewage water and wild birds (0.7-0.8), while similarities to livestock or food reservoirs were lower (0.3-0.6). Based on rarefaction curves, people in the general population had more diversity in ESBL/AmpC genes and plasmid replicon types than those in other reservoirs. Conclusions: Our 'One Health' approach provides an integrated evaluation of the molecular relatedness of ESBL/AmpC-EC from numerous sources. The analysis showed distinguishable ESBL/AmpC-EC transmission cycles in different hosts and failed to demonstrate a close epidemiological linkage of ESBL/AmpC genes and plasmid replicon types between livestock farms and people in the general population.

Confirmation of spatial patterns and temperature effects in Bluetongue virus serotype-8 transmission in NW-Europe from the 2007 reported case data.

Two separate analyses were carried out to understand the epidemiology of Bluetongue virus serotype 8 (BTV-8) in 2007 in North West Europe: First, the temporal change in transmission rates was compared to the evolution of temperature during that season. Second, we evaluated the spatio-temporal dynamics of newly reported outbreaks, to estimate a spatial transmission kernel. For both analyses, the approach as used before in analysing the 2006 BTV-8 epidemic had to be adapted in order to take into account the fact that the 2007 epidemic was not a newly arising epidemic, but one advancing from whereto it had already spread in 2006. We found that within the area already affected by the 2006 outbreak, the pattern of newly infected farms in 2007 cannot be explained by between-farm transmission, but rather by local re-emergence of the virus throughout that region. This indicates that persistence through winter was ubiquitous for BTV-8. Just like in 2006, we also found that the temperature at which the infection starts to spread lies close to 15 °C. Finally, we found that the shape of the transmission kernel is in line with the one from the 2006 epidemic. In conclusion, despite the substantial differences between 2006 and 2007 in temperature patterns (2006 featured a heat wave in July, whereas 2007 was more regular) and spatial epidemic extent, both the minimum temperature required for transmission and the transmission kernel were similar to those estimated for the 2006 outbreak, indicating that they are robust properties, suitable for extrapolation to other years and similar regions.

The optimisation of Salmonella surveillance programmes for pullet and layer farms using local farm density as a risk factor.

Human salmonellosis cases are often caused by Salmonella serovars Enteritidis and Typhimurium and associated with the consumption of eggs and egg products. Many countries therefore implemented general surveillance programmes on pullet and layer farms. The identification of risk factors for Salmonella infection may be used to improve the performance of these surveillance programmes. The aims of this study were therefore to determine 1) whether local farm density is a risk factor for the infection of pullet and layer farms by Salmonella Enteritidis and Typhimurium and 2) whether the sampling effort of surveillance programmes can be reduced by accounting for this risk factor, while still providing sufficient control of these serovars. We assessed the importance of local farm density as a risk factor by fitting transmission kernels to Israeli surveillance data during the period from June 2017 to April 2019. The analysis shows that the risk of infection by serovars Enteritidis and Typhimurium significantly increased if infected farms were present within a radius of approximately 4 km and 0.3 km, respectively. We subsequently optimized a surveillance programme that subdivided layer farms into low and high risk groups based on the local farm density with and allowed the sampling frequency to vary between these groups. In this design, the pullet farms were always sampled one week prior to pullet distribution. Our analysis shows that the risk-based surveillance programme is able to keep the between-farm R0 of serovars Enteritidis and Typhimurium below 1 for all pullet and layer farms, while reducing the sampling effort by 32% compared to the currently implemented surveillance programme in Israel. The results of our study therefore indicate that local farm density is an important risk factor for infection of pullet and layer farms by Salmonella Enteritidis and Typhimurium and can be used to improve the performance of surveillance programmes.

The transmission potential of Rift Valley fever virus among livestock in the Netherlands: a modelling study.

Rift Valley fever virus (RVFV) is a zoonotic vector-borne infection and causes a potentially severe disease. Many mammals are susceptible to infection including important livestock species. Although currently confined to Africa and the near-East, this disease causes concern in countries in temperate climates where both hosts and potential vectors are present, such as the Netherlands. Currently, an assessment of the probability of an outbreak occurring in this country is missing. To evaluate the transmission potential of RVFV, a mathematical model was developed and used to determine the initial growth and the Floquet ratio, which are indicators of the probability of an outbreak and of persistence in a periodic changing environment caused by seasonality. We show that several areas of the Netherlands have a high transmission potential and risk of persistence of the infection. Counter-intuitively, these are the sparsely populated livestock areas, due to the high vector-host ratios in these areas. Culex pipiens s.l. is found to be the main driver of the spread and persistence, because it is by far the most abundant mosquito. Our investigation underscores the importance to determine the vector competence of this mosquito species for RVFV and its host preference.

Quantitative analysis of transmission parameters for bluetongue virus serotype 8 in Western Europe in 2006.

The recent bluetongue virus serotype 8 (BTV-8) epidemic in Western Europe struck hard. Controlling the infection was difficult and a good and safe vaccine was not available until the spring of 2008. Little was known regarding BTV transmission in Western Europe or the efficacy of control measures. Quantitative details on transmission are essential to assess the potential and efficacy of such measures.To quantify virus transmission between herds, a temporal and a spatio-temporal analysis were applied to data on reported infected herds in 2006. We calculated the basic reproduction number between herds (Rh: expected number of new infections, generated by one initial infected herd in a susceptible environment). It was found to be of the same order of magnitude as that of an infection with Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) in The Netherlands, e.g. around 4. We concluded that an average day temperature of at least 15 °C is required for BTV-8 transmission between herds in Western Europe. A few degrees increase in temperature is found to lead to a major increase in BTV-8 transmission.We also found that the applied disease control (spatial zones based on 20 km radius restricting animal transport to outside regions) led to a spatial transmission pattern of BTV-8, with 85% of transmission restricted to a 20 km range. This 20 km equals the scale of the protection zones. We concluded that free animal movement led to substantial faster spread of the BTV-8 epidemic over space as compared to a situation with animal movement restrictions.

Assessing the introduction risk of vector-borne animal diseases for the Netherlands using MINTRISK: A Model for INTegrated RISK assessment.

To evaluate and compare the risk of emerging vector-borne diseases (VBDs), a Model for INTegrated RISK assessment, MINTRISK, was developed to assess the introduction risk of VBDs for new regions in an objective, transparent and repeatable manner. MINTRISK is a web-based calculation tool, that provides semi-quantitative risk scores that can be used for prioritization purposes. Input into MINTRISK is entered by answering questions regarding entry, transmission, establishment, spread, persistence and impact of a selected VBD. Answers can be chosen from qualitative answer categories with accompanying quantitative explanation to ensure consistent answering. The quantitative information is subsequently used as input for the model calculations to estimate the risk for each individual step in the model and for the summarizing output values (rate of introduction; epidemic size; overall risk). The risk assessor can indicate his uncertainty on each answer, and this is accounted for by Monte Carlo simulation. MINTRISK was used to assess the risk of four VBDs (African horse sickness, epizootic haemorrhagic disease, Rift Valley fever, and West Nile fever) for the Netherlands with the aim to prioritise these diseases for preparedness. Results indicated that the overall risk estimate was very high for all evaluated diseases but epizootic haemorrhagic disease. Uncertainty intervals were, however, wide limiting the options for ranking of the diseases. Risk profiles of the VBDs differed. Whereas all diseases were estimated to have a very high economic impact once introduced, the estimated introduction rates differed from low for Rift Valley fever and epizootic haemorrhagic disease to moderate for African horse sickness and very high for West Nile fever. Entry of infected mosquitoes on board of aircraft was deemed the most likely route of introduction for West Nile fever into the Netherlands, followed by entry of infected migratory birds.

Modelling BSE trend over time in Europe, a risk assessment perspective.

BSE is a zoonotic disease that caused the emergence of variant Creuzfeldt-Jakob disease in the mid 1990s. The trend of the BSE epidemic in seven European countries was assessed and compared, using Age-Period-Cohort and Reproduction Ratio modelling applied to surveillance data 2001-2007. A strong decline in BSE risk was observed for all countries that applied control measures during the 1990s, starting at different points in time in the different countries. Results were compared with the type and date of the BSE control measures implemented between 1990 and 2001 in each country. Results show that a ban on the feeding of meat and bone meal (MBM) to cattle alone was not sufficient to eliminate BSE. The fading out of the epidemic started shortly after the complementary measures targeted at controlling the risk in MBM. Given the long incubation period, it is still too early to estimate the additional effect of the ban on the feeding of animal protein to all farm animals that started in 2001. These results provide new insights in the risk assessment of BSE for cattle and Humans, which will especially be useful in the context of possible relaxing BSE surveillance and control measures.

Cross-Validation of Generic Risk Assessment Tools for Animal Disease Incursion Based on a Case Study for African Swine Fever.

In recent years, several generic risk assessment (RA) tools have been developed that can be applied to assess the incursion risk of multiple infectious animal diseases allowing for a rapid response to a variety of newly emerging or re-emerging diseases. Although these tools were originally developed for different purposes, they can be used to answer similar or even identical risk questions. To explore the opportunities for cross-validation, seven generic RA tools were used to assess the incursion risk of African swine fever (ASF) to the Netherlands and Finland for the 2017 situation and for two hypothetical scenarios in which ASF cases were reported in wild boar and/or domestic pigs in Germany. The generic tools ranged from qualitative risk assessment tools to stochastic spatial risk models but were all parameterized using the same global databases for disease occurrence and trade in live animals and animal products. A comparison of absolute results was not possible, because output parameters represented different endpoints, varied from qualitative probability levels to quantitative numbers, and were expressed in different units. Therefore, relative risks across countries and scenarios were calculated for each tool, for the three pathways most in common (trade in live animals, trade in animal products, and wild boar movements) and compared. For the 2017 situation, all tools evaluated the risk to the Netherlands to be higher than Finland for the live animal trade pathway, the risk to Finland the same or higher as the Netherlands for the wild boar pathway, while the tools were inconclusive on the animal products pathway. All tools agreed that the hypothetical presence of ASF in Germany increased the risk to the Netherlands, but not to Finland. The ultimate aim of generic RA tools is to provide risk-based evidence to support risk managers in making informed decisions to mitigate the incursion risk of infectious animal diseases. The case study illustrated that conclusions on the ASF risk were similar across the generic RA tools, despite differences observed in calculated risks. Hence, it was concluded that the cross-validation contributed to the credibility of their results.

A systematic knowledge synthesis on the spatial dimensions of Q fever epidemics.

From 2007 through 2010, the Netherlands experienced the largest Q fever epidemic ever reported. This study integrates the outcomes of a multidisciplinary research programme on spatial airborne transmission of Coxiella burnetii and reflects these outcomes in relation to other scientific Q fever studies worldwide. We have identified lessons learned and remaining knowledge gaps. This synthesis was structured according to the four steps of quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA): (a) Rapid source identification was improved by newly developed techniques using mathematical disease modelling; (b) source characterization efforts improved knowledge but did not provide accurate C. burnetii emission patterns; (c) ambient air sampling, dispersion and spatial modelling promoted exposure assessment; and (d) risk characterization was enabled by applying refined dose-response analyses. The results may support proper and timely risk assessment and risk management during future outbreaks, provided that accurate and structured data are available and exchanged readily between responsible actors.

Attributable sources of community-acquired carriage of Escherichia coli containing ß-lactam antibiotic resistance genes: a population-based modelling study.

BACKGROUND: Extended-spectrum ß-lactamase-producing Escherichia coli (ESBL-EC), plasmid-mediated AmpC-producing E coli (pAmpC-EC), and other bacteria are resistant to important ß-lactam antibiotics. ESBL-EC and pAmpC-EC are increasingly reported in animals, food, the environment, and community-acquired and health-care-associated human infections. These infections are usually preceded by asymptomatic carriage, for which attributions to animal, food, environmental, and human sources remain unquantified. METHODS: In this population-based modelling study, we collected ESBL and pAmpC gene data on the Netherlands population for 2005-17 from published datasets of gene occurrences in E coli isolates from different sources, and from partners of the ESBL Attribution Consortium and the Dutch National Antimicrobial Surveillance System. Using these data, we applied an established source attribution model based on ESBL-EC and pAmpC-EC prevalence and gene data for humans, including high-risk populations (ie, returning travellers, clinical patients, farmers), farm and companion animals, food, surface freshwater, and wild birds, and human exposure data, to quantify the overall and gene-specific attributable sources of community-acquired ESBL-EC and pAmpC-EC intestinal carriage. We also used a simple transmission model to determine the basic reproduction number (R0) in the open community. FINDINGS: We identified 1220 occurrences of ESBL-EC and pAmpC-EC genes in humans, of which 478 were in clinical patients, 454 were from asymptomatic carriers in the open community, 103 were in poultry and pig farmers, and 185 were in people who had travelled out of the region. We also identified 6275 occurrences in non-human sources, including 479 in companion animals, 4026 in farm animals, 66 in wild birds, 1430 from food products, and 274 from surface freshwater. Most community-acquired ESBL-EC and pAmpC-EC carriage was attributed to human-to-human transmission within or between households in the open community (60·1%, 95% credible interval 40·0-73·5), and to secondary transmission from high-risk groups (6·9%, 4·1-9·2). Food accounted for 18·9% (7·0-38·3) of carriage, companion animals for 7·9% (1·4-19·9), farm animals (non-occupational contact) for 3·6% (0·6-9·9), and swimming in freshwater and wild birds (ie, environmental contact) for 2·6% (0·2-8·7). We derived an R0 of 0·63 (95% CI 0·42-0·77) for intracommunity transmission. INTERPRETATION: Although humans are the main source of community-acquired ESBL-EC and pAmpC-EC carriage, the attributable non-human sources underpin the need for longitudinal studies and continuous monitoring, because intracommunity ESBL-EC and pAmpC-EC spread alone is unlikely to be self-maintaining without transmission to and from non-human sources. FUNDING: 1Health4Food, Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the EU's Horizon-2020 through One-Health European Joint Programme.

Prevalence of tick-borne viruses in Ixodes ricinus assessed by high-throughput real-time PCR.

Ticks are one of the principal arthropod vectors of human and animal infectious diseases. Whereas the prevalence of tick-borne encephalitis virus in ticks in Europe is well studied, there is less information available on the prevalence of the other tick-borne viruses (TBVs) existing worldwide. The aim of this study was to improve the epidemiological survey tools of TBVs by the development of an efficient high-throughput test to screen a wide range of viruses in ticks.In this study, we developed a new high-throughput virus-detection assay based on parallel real-time PCRs on a microfluidic system, and used it to perform a large scale epidemiological survey screening for the presence of 21 TBVs in 18 135 nymphs of Ixodes ricinus collected from five European countries. This extensive investigation has (i) evaluated the prevalence of four viruses present in the collected ticks, (ii) allowed the identification of viruses in regions where they were previously undetected.In conclusion, we have demonstrated the capabilities of this new screening method that allows the detection of numerous TBVs in a large number of ticks. This tool represents a powerful and rapid system for TBVs surveillance in Europe and could be easily customized to assess viral emergence.

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) cases born after the total feed ban.

Sixty bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) cases of Classical or unknown type (BARB-60 cases) were born after the date of entry into force of the EU total feed ban on 1 January 2001. The European Commission has requested EFSA to provide a scientific opinion on the most likely origin(s) of these BARB-60 cases; whether feeding with material contaminated with the BSE agent can be excluded as the origin of any of these cases and, if so, whether there is enough scientific evidence to conclude that such cases had a spontaneous origin. The source of infection cannot be ascertained at the individual level for any BSE case, including these BARB-60 cases, so uncertainty remains high about the origin of disease in each of these animals, but when compared with other biologically plausible sources of infection (maternal, environmental, genetic, iatrogenic), feed-borne exposure is the most likely. This exposure was apparently excluded for only one of these BARB-60 cases. However, there is considerable uncertainty associated with the data collected through the field investigation of these cases, due to a time span of several years between the potential exposure of the animal and the confirmation of disease, recall difficulty, and the general paucity of documented objective evidence available in the farms at the time of the investigation. Thus, feeding with material contaminated with the BSE agent cannot be excluded as the origin of any of the BARB-60 cases, nor is it possible to definitively attribute feed as the cause of any of the BARB-60 cases. A case of disease is classified as spontaneous by a process of elimination, excluding all other definable possibilities; with regard to the BARB-60 cases, it is not possible to conclude that any of them had a spontaneous origin.

Vector-borne diseases.

After a request from the European Commission, EFSA's Panel on Animal Health and Welfare summarised the main characteristics of 36 vector-borne diseases (VBDs) in https://efsa.maps.arcgis.com/apps/PublicGallery/index.html?appid=dfbeac92aea944599ed1eb754aa5e6d1. The risk of introduction in the EU through movement of livestock or pets was assessed for each of the 36 VBDs individually, using a semiquantitative Method to INTegrate all relevant RISK aspects (MINTRISK model), which was further modified to a European scale into the http://www3.lei.wur.nl/mintrisk/ModelMgt.aspx. Only eight of the 36 VBD-agents had an overall rate of introduction in the EU (being the combination of the rate of entry, vector transmission and establishment) which was estimated to be above 0.001 introductions per year. These were Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus, bluetongue virus, West Nile virus, Schmallenberg virus, Hepatozoon canis, Leishmania infantum, Bunyamwera virus and Highlands J. virus. For these eight diseases, the annual extent of spread was assessed, assuming the implementation of available, authorised prevention and control measures in the EU. Further, the probability of overwintering was assessed, as well as the possible impact of the VBDs on public health, animal health and farm production. For the other 28 VBD-agents for which the rate of introduction was estimated to be very low, no further assessments were made. Due to the uncertainty related to some parameters used for the risk assessment or the instable or unpredictability disease situation in some of the source regions, it is recommended to update the assessment when new information becomes available. Since this risk assessment was carried out for large regions in the EU for many VBD-agents, it should be considered as a first screening. If a more detailed risk assessment for a specific VBD is wished for on a national or subnational level, the EFSA-VBD-RISK-model is freely available for this purpose.

Financial evaluation of different vaccination strategies for controlling the bluetongue virus serotype 8 epidemic in The Netherlands in 2008.

BACKGROUND: Bluetongue (BT) is a vector-borne disease of ruminants caused by bluetongue virus that is transmitted by biting midges (Culicoides spp.). In 2006, the introduction of BTV serotype 8 (BTV-8) caused a severe epidemic in Western and Central Europe. The principal effective veterinary measure in response to BT was believed to be vaccination accompanied by other measures such as movement restrictions and surveillance. As the number of vaccine doses available at the start of the vaccination campaign was rather uncertain, the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality and the Dutch agricultural industry wanted to evaluate several different vaccination strategies. This study aimed to rank eight vaccination strategies based on their efficiency (i.e. net costs in relation to prevented losses or benefits) for controlling the bluetongue virus serotype 8 epidemic in 2008. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: An economic model was developed that included the Dutch professional cattle, sheep and goat sectors together with the hobby farms. Strategies were evaluated based on the least cost - highest benefit frontier, the benefit-cost ratio and the total net returns. Strategy F, where all adult sheep at professional farms in The Netherlands would be vaccinated was very efficient at lowest costs, whereas strategy D, where additional to all adult sheep at professional farms also all adult cattle in the four Northern provinces would be vaccinated, was also very efficient but at a little higher costs. Strategy C, where all adult sheep and cattle at professional farms in the whole of The Netherlands would be vaccinated was also efficient but again at higher costs. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: This study demonstrates that a financial analysis differentiates between vaccination strategies and indicates important decision rules based on efficiency.

Review on the epidemiology and dynamics of BSE epidemics.

The paper describes how the comprehensive surveillance of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and studies carried out on these data has enhanced our knowledge of the epidemiology of BSE. Around 7, 000 BSE cases were detected through the screening of about 50 million cattle with rapid tests in Europe. It confirmed that the clinical surveillance had a poor capacity to detect cases, and also showed the discrepancy of this passive surveillance efficiency between regions and production types (dairy/beef). Other risk factors for BSE were being in a dairy herd (three times more than beef), having a young age at first calving (for dairy cattle), being autumn-born (dairy and beef), and being in a herd with a very high milk yield. These findings focus the risk on the feeding regimen of calves/heifers. Several epidemiological studies across countries suggest that the feedborne source related to meat and bone meal (MBM) is the only substantiated route of infection - even after the feed ban -, while it is not possible to exclude maternal transmission or milk replacers as a source of some infections. In most European countries, the average age of the cases is increasing over time and the prevalence decreasing, which reflects the effectiveness of control measures. Consistent results on the trend of the epidemic were obtained using back-calculation modelling, the R(0) approach and Age-Period-Cohort models. Furthermore, active surveillance also resulted in the finding of atypical cases. These are distinct from previously found BSE and classified in two different forms based on biochemical characteristics; their prevalence is very low (36 cases up to 1st September 2007), affected animals were old and some of them displayed clinical signs. The origin and possibility of natural transmission is unknown.

Analyzing BSE transmission to quantify regional risk.

As a result of consumer fears and political concerns related to BSE as a risk to human health, a need has arisen recently for more sensitive methods to detect BSE and more accurate methods to determine BSE incidence. As a part of the development of such methods, it is important to be able to identify groups of animals with above-average BSE risk. One of the well-known risk factors for BSE is age, as very young animals do not develop the disease, and very old animals are less likely to develop the disease. Here, we analyze which factors have a strong influence on the age distribution of BSE in a population. Building on that, we develop a simple set of calculation rules for classifying the BSE risk in a given cattle population. Required inputs are data on imports and on the BSE control measures in place over the last 10 or 20 years.

Quantitative risk assessment for bovine spongiform encephalopathy in low- or zero-prevalence countries: the example of Norway.

A predictive case-cohort model is applied to Norwegian data to analyze the interaction between challenge and stability factors for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) during the period 1980-2010. For each year, the BSE risk in cattle is estimated as the expected number of cases. The age distribution of expected cases as well as the relative impact of different challenges is estimated. The model consists of a simple, transparent, and practical deterministic spreadsheet calculation model, in which the following country-specific inputs are entered: (i) annual imports of live cattle and meat and bone meal, (ii) age distribution of native cattle, and (iii) estimated annual basic reproduction ratio (R(0)) for BSE. Results for Norway indicate that the highest risk of BSE cases was in 1989, when a total BSE risk of 0.13 cases per year was expected. After that date, the year-to-year decrease in risk ranged between 3% and 47%, except for a secondary peak in 1994 at 0.06 cases per year. The primary peak was almost entirely (99%) attributable to the importation of 11 cattle from the United Kingdom between 1982 and 1986. The secondary peak, in 1994, originated mainly from the recycling of the U.K. imported cattle (92%). In 2006, the remaining risk was 0.0003 cases per year, or 0.001 per million cows per year, with a maximal age-specific incidence of 0.03 cases per million per year in 10-year-old cattle. Only 15% of the cases were expected in imported cattle. The probability of having zero cases in Norway in 2006 was estimated to be 99.97%. The model and results are compared to previous risk assessments of Norway by the EU.

Comparison of the historic recycling risk for BSE in three European countries by calculating the basic reproduction ratio R0.

A deterministic model of BSE transmission is used to calculate the R(0) values for specific years of the BSE epidemics in the United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands (NL), and Switzerland (CH). In all three countries, the R(0) values decreased below 1 after the introduction of a ban on feeding meat and bone meal (MBM) to ruminants around the 1990s. A variety of additional measures against BSE led to further decrease of R(0) to about 0.06 in the years around 1998. The calculated R(0) values were consistent with the observations made on the surveillance results for UK, but were partially conflicting with the surveillance results for NL and CH. There was evidence for a dependency of the BSE epidemic in NL and CH from an infection source not considered in the deterministic transmission model. Imports of MBM and feed components can be an explanation for this discrepancy, and the importance of imports for these observations is discussed.

Evaluation of the effectiveness of selected measures against bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in Switzerland by use of the basic reproduction ratio R0.

The effectiveness of two measures against Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), the compulsory processing of animal by products to meat and bone meal (MBM) at 133 degrees C under 3 bars of pressure for 20 minutes in February 1993 and the exclusion of fallen stock, heads with eyes and spinal cord of cattle older than 30 month from MBM production in April 1996, was evaluated in a process model. The transmission of BSE by calculation of the basic reproduction ratio R0 was modelled. The results were verified by use of a cohort model, based on observed surveillance data. Prior to 1990, before the ban of feeding MBM to ruminants, R0, as calculated in the process model, was above 1, coherent with a slowly progressing BSE epidemic. Since 1991, values of R0 were low at 0.06. The corresponding R0 values derived from the cohort model were higher, the lowest value 0.13 calculated for 1996. Given such low R0 values, the epidemic should have died out. Additionally, no influence of the two measures was obvious at that time given the low level of R0. The discrepancy between the results of the two models is evidence for a dependency of the BSE epidemic from an infection source not considered in the process model. This infection source is most likely importation of feed ingredients and MBM.

Assessing interventions to reduce the risk of Campylobacter prevalence in broilers.

As part of a comprehensive risk assessment on the Campylobacter prevalence in the chicken production chain (from young born chicken till chicken fillet) in the Netherlands, we formulated a quantitative model on the transmission dynamics of Campylobacter at Dutch broiler farms. This model is used to quantify the risk of Campylobacter prevalence in broilers at the time that flocks leave the farm for processing. To this end, we assumed that the Campylobacter prevalence is primarily determined by two parameters, that is, the within- and between-flock transmission. The within-flock transmission was assessed fitting experimental data to a logistic growth model and the between-flock transmission was assessed fitting field data to a generalized linear model (GLM), which included three possible infection routes: (1) via an infected flock in the previous cycle, (2) via other infected flocks present on the farm, and (3) from other sources. This model was applied to assess the efficacy of three control scenarios; (1) a ban on other livestock on broiler farms, (2) a ban on thinning, and (3) a reduction of the between-flock transmission. In contrast to the other scenarios, the third one was shown to be most effective. Theoretically, this is accomplished by improved biosecurity. However, the impact of improved biosecurity cannot be specified into specific control measures, and therefore it is not clear what investments are needed. Finally, we also assessed the efficacy of scheduled treatment, that is, fresh meat production solely from test-negative flocks. We found that the reliability of negative test results, which is crucial, strongly depends on the length of time between testing and slaughter. The sensitivity and specificity of the test appeared to be of minor importance.