Metabolism in the spotlight: Dr. Giles Yeo on the impact and challenges of science communication.

In this interview with Cell, Dr. Giles Yeo shares his journey into metabolism research, his strategies for engaging audiences, and the challenges of simplifying complex concepts. He also discusses the impact of social media, the advantages of podcasting, and the question he's most afraid of.

Harnessing social media to challenge scientific misinformation.

Ben Rein is a postdoctoral scholar at Stanford University and a science communicator on social media. In January, 2022, he and his colleagues wrote an open letter to Spotify to combat scientific misinformation. Here, Rein tells his story, sharing thoughts and lessons learned from publishing the open letter.

Scientific communication on TikTok.

Abbie Richards is an active scientific communicator on TikTok who posts videos to communicate climate science and to combat misinformation. Cell editor Jia Cheng chatted with Abbie Richards to get her viewpoint on scientific communication through social media. Annotated excerpts from this conversation are presented below, and the full conversation is available with the article online.

How to Boost the Impact of Scientific Conferences.

We can maximize the impact of scientific conferences by uploading all conference presentations, posters, and abstracts to highly trafficked public repositories for each content type. Talks can be hosted on sites like YouTube and Youku, posters can be published on Figshare, and papers and abstracts can become open access preprints.

Cancer misinformation on social media.

Social media is widely used globally by patients, families of patients, health professionals, scientists, and other stakeholders who seek and share information related to cancer. Despite many benefits of social media for cancer care and research, there is also a substantial risk of exposure to misinformation, or inaccurate information about cancer. Types of misinformation vary from inaccurate information about cancer risk factors or unproven treatment options to conspiracy theories and public relations articles or advertisements appearing as reliable medical content. Many characteristics of social media networks-such as their extensive use and the relative ease it allows to share information quickly-facilitate the spread of misinformation. Research shows that inaccurate and misleading health-related posts on social media often get more views and engagement (e.g., likes, shares) from users compared with accurate information. Exposure to misinformation can have downstream implications for health-related attitudes and behaviors. However, combatting misinformation is a complex process that requires engagement from media platforms, scientific and health experts, governmental organizations, and the general public. Cancer experts, for example, should actively combat misinformation in real time and should disseminate evidence-based content on social media. Health professionals should give information prescriptions to patients and families and support health literacy. Patients and families should vet the quality of cancer information before acting upon it (e.g., by using publicly available checklists) and seek recommended resources from health care providers and trusted organizations. Future multidisciplinary research is needed to identify optimal ways of building resilience and combating misinformation across social media.

Scientists in the Twitterverse.

More and more scientists are becoming active on Twitter and other social media platforms. Let's meet some of the top scientist twitterers.

Post-January 6th deplatforming reduced the reach of misinformation on Twitter.

The social media platforms of the twenty-first century have an enormous role in regulating speech in the USA and worldwide1. However, there has been little research on platform-wide interventions on speech2,3. Here we evaluate the effect of the decision by Twitter to suddenly deplatform 70,000 misinformation traffickers in response to the violence at the US Capitol on 6 January 2021 (a series of events commonly known as and referred to here as 'January 6th'). Using a panel of more than 500,000 active Twitter users4,5 and natural experimental designs6,7, we evaluate the effects of this intervention on the circulation of misinformation on Twitter. We show that the intervention reduced circulation of misinformation by the deplatformed users as well as by those who followed the deplatformed users, though we cannot identify the magnitude of the causal estimates owing to the co-occurrence of the deplatforming intervention with the events surrounding January 6th. We also find that many of the misinformation traffickers who were not deplatformed left Twitter following the intervention. The results inform the historical record surrounding the insurrection, a momentous event in US history, and indicate the capacity of social media platforms to control the circulation of misinformation, and more generally to regulate public discourse.

Persistent interaction patterns across social media platforms and over time.

Growing concern surrounds the impact of social media platforms on public discourse1-4 and their influence on social dynamics5-9, especially in the context of toxicity10-12. Here, to better understand these phenomena, we use a comparative approach to isolate human behavioural patterns across multiple social media platforms. In particular, we analyse conversations in different online communities, focusing on identifying consistent patterns of toxic content. Drawing from an extensive dataset that spans eight platforms over 34 years-from Usenet to contemporary social media-our findings show consistent conversation patterns and user behaviour, irrespective of the platform, topic or time. Notably, although long conversations consistently exhibit higher toxicity, toxic language does not invariably discourage people from participating in a conversation, and toxicity does not necessarily escalate as discussions evolve. Our analysis suggests that debates and contrasting sentiments among users significantly contribute to more intense and hostile discussions. Moreover, the persistence of these patterns across three decades, despite changes in platforms and societal norms, underscores the pivotal role of human behaviour in shaping online discourse.

The evolution of private reputations in information-abundant landscapes.

Reputations are critical to human societies, as individuals are treated differently based on their social standing1,2. For instance, those who garner a good reputation by helping others are more likely to be rewarded by third parties3-5. Achieving widespread cooperation in this way requires that reputations accurately reflect behaviour6 and that individuals agree about each other's standings7. With few exceptions8-10, theoretical work has assumed that information is limited, which hinders consensus7,11 unless there are mechanisms to enforce agreement, such as empathy12, gossip13-15 or public institutions16. Such mechanisms face challenges in a world where empathy, effective communication and institutional trust are compromised17-19. However, information about others is now abundant and readily available, particularly through social media. Here we demonstrate that assigning private reputations by aggregating several observations of an individual can accurately capture behaviour, foster emergent agreement without enforcement mechanisms and maintain cooperation, provided individuals exhibit some tolerance for bad actions. This finding holds for both first- and second-order norms of judgement and is robust even when norms vary within a population. When the aggregation rule itself can evolve, selection indeed favours the use of several observations and tolerant judgements. Nonetheless, even when information is freely accessible, individuals do not typically evolve to use all of it. This method of assessing reputations-'look twice, forgive once', in a nutshell-is simple enough to have arisen early in human culture and powerful enough to persist as a fundamental component of social heuristics.

Misunderstanding the harms of online misinformation.

The controversy over online misinformation and social media has opened a gap between public discourse and scientific research. Public intellectuals and journalists frequently make sweeping claims about the effects of exposure to false content online that are inconsistent with much of the current empirical evidence. Here we identify three common misperceptions: that average exposure to problematic content is high, that algorithms are largely responsible for this exposure and that social media is a primary cause of broader social problems such as polarization. In our review of behavioural science research on online misinformation, we document a pattern of low exposure to false and inflammatory content that is concentrated among a narrow fringe with strong motivations to seek out such information. In response, we recommend holding platforms accountable for facilitating exposure to false and extreme content in the tails of the distribution, where consumption is highest and the risk of real-world harm is greatest. We also call for increased platform transparency, including collaborations with outside researchers, to better evaluate the effects of online misinformation and the most effective responses to it. Taking these steps is especially important outside the USA and Western Europe, where research and data are scant and harms may be more severe.

Online searches to evaluate misinformation can increase its perceived veracity.

Considerable scholarly attention has been paid to understanding belief in online misinformation1,2, with a particular focus on social networks. However, the dominant role of search engines in the information environment remains underexplored, even though the use of online search to evaluate the veracity of information is a central component of media literacy interventions3-5. Although conventional wisdom suggests that searching online when evaluating misinformation would reduce belief in it, there is little empirical evidence to evaluate this claim. Here, across five experiments, we present consistent evidence that online search to evaluate the truthfulness of false news articles actually increases the probability of believing them. To shed light on this relationship, we combine survey data with digital trace data collected using a custom browser extension. We find that the search effect is concentrated among individuals for whom search engines return lower-quality information. Our results indicate that those who search online to evaluate misinformation risk falling into data voids, or informational spaces in which there is corroborating evidence from low-quality sources. We also find consistent evidence that searching online to evaluate news increases belief in true news from low-quality sources, but inconsistent evidence that it increases belief in true news from mainstream sources. Our findings highlight the need for media literacy programmes to ground their recommendations in empirically tested strategies and for search engines to invest in solutions to the challenges identified here.

Differences in misinformation sharing can lead to politically asymmetric sanctions.

In response to intense pressure, technology companies have enacted policies to combat misinformation1-4. The enforcement of these policies has, however, led to technology companies being regularly accused of political bias5-7. We argue that differential sharing of misinformation by people identifying with different political groups8-15 could lead to political asymmetries in enforcement, even by unbiased policies. We first analysed 9,000 politically active Twitter users during the US 2020 presidential election. Although users estimated to be pro-Trump/conservative were indeed substantially more likely to be suspended than those estimated to be pro-Biden/liberal, users who were pro-Trump/conservative also shared far more links to various sets of low-quality news sites-even when news quality was determined by politically balanced groups of laypeople, or groups of only Republican laypeople-and had higher estimated likelihoods of being bots. We find similar associations between stated or inferred conservatism and low-quality news sharing (on the basis of both expert and politically balanced layperson ratings) in 7 other datasets of sharing from Twitter, Facebook and survey experiments, spanning 2016 to 2023 and including data from 16 different countries. Thus, even under politically neutral anti-misinformation policies, political asymmetries in enforcement should be expected. Political imbalance in enforcement need not imply bias on the part of social media companies implementing anti-misinformation policies.

Online images amplify gender bias.

Each year, people spend less time reading and more time viewing images1, which are proliferating online2-4. Images from platforms such as Google and Wikipedia are downloaded by millions every day2,5,6, and millions more are interacting through social media, such as Instagram and TikTok, that primarily consist of exchanging visual content. In parallel, news agencies and digital advertisers are increasingly capturing attention online through the use of images7,8, which people process more quickly, implicitly and memorably than text9-12. Here we show that the rise of images online significantly exacerbates gender bias, both in its statistical prevalence and its psychological impact. We examine the gender associations of 3,495 social categories (such as 'nurse' or 'banker') in more than one million images from Google, Wikipedia and Internet Movie Database (IMDb), and in billions of words from these platforms. We find that gender bias is consistently more prevalent in images than text for both female- and male-typed categories. We also show that the documented underrepresentation of women online13-18 is substantially worse in images than in text, public opinion and US census data. Finally, we conducted a nationally representative, preregistered experiment that shows that googling for images rather than textual descriptions of occupations amplifies gender bias in participants' beliefs. Addressing the societal effect of this large-scale shift towards visual communication will be essential for developing a fair and inclusive future for the internet.

Like-minded sources on Facebook are prevalent but not polarizing.

Many critics raise concerns about the prevalence of 'echo chambers' on social media and their potential role in increasing political polarization. However, the lack of available data and the challenges of conducting large-scale field experiments have made it difficult to assess the scope of the problem1,2. Here we present data from 2020 for the entire population of active adult Facebook users in the USA showing that content from 'like-minded' sources constitutes the majority of what people see on the platform, although political information and news represent only a small fraction of these exposures. To evaluate a potential response to concerns about the effects of echo chambers, we conducted a multi-wave field experiment on Facebook among 23,377 users for whom we reduced exposure to content from like-minded sources during the 2020 US presidential election by about one-third. We found that the intervention increased their exposure to content from cross-cutting sources and decreased exposure to uncivil language, but had no measurable effects on eight preregistered attitudinal measures such as affective polarization, ideological extremity, candidate evaluations and belief in false claims. These precisely estimated results suggest that although exposure to content from like-minded sources on social media is common, reducing its prevalence during the 2020 US presidential election did not correspondingly reduce polarization in beliefs or attitudes.

Social capital I: measurement and associations with economic mobility.

Social capital-the strength of an individual's social network and community-has been identified as a potential determinant of outcomes ranging from education to health1-8. However, efforts to understand what types of social capital matter for these outcomes have been hindered by a lack of social network data. Here, in the first of a pair of papers9, we use data on 21 billion friendships from Facebook to study social capital. We measure and analyse three types of social capital by ZIP (postal) code in the United States: (1) connectedness between different types of people, such as those with low versus high socioeconomic status (SES); (2) social cohesion, such as the extent of cliques in friendship networks; and (3) civic engagement, such as rates of volunteering. These measures vary substantially across areas, but are not highly correlated with each other. We demonstrate the importance of distinguishing these forms of social capital by analysing their associations with economic mobility across areas. The share of high-SES friends among individuals with low SES-which we term economic connectedness-is among the strongest predictors of upward income mobility identified to date10,11. Other social capital measures are not strongly associated with economic mobility. If children with low-SES parents were to grow up in counties with economic connectedness comparable to that of the average child with high-SES parents, their incomes in adulthood would increase by 20% on average. Differences in economic connectedness can explain well-known relationships between upward income mobility and racial segregation, poverty rates, and inequality12-14. To support further research and policy interventions, we publicly release privacy-protected statistics on social capital by ZIP code at https://www.socialcapital.org .

Social capital II: determinants of economic connectedness.

Low levels of social interaction across class lines have generated widespread concern1-4 and are associated with worse outcomes, such as lower rates of upward income mobility4-7. Here we analyse the determinants of cross-class interaction using data from Facebook, building on the analysis in our companion paper7. We show that about half of the social disconnection across socioeconomic lines-measured as the difference in the share of high-socioeconomic status (SES) friends between people with low and high SES-is explained by differences in exposure to people with high SES in groups such as schools and religious organizations. The other half is explained by friending bias-the tendency for people with low SES to befriend people with high SES at lower rates even conditional on exposure. Friending bias is shaped by the structure of the groups in which people interact. For example, friending bias is higher in larger and more diverse groups and lower in religious organizations than in schools and workplaces. Distinguishing exposure from friending bias is helpful for identifying interventions to increase cross-SES friendships (economic connectedness). Using fluctuations in the share of students with high SES across high school cohorts, we show that increases in high-SES exposure lead low-SES people to form more friendships with high-SES people in schools that exhibit low levels of friending bias. Thus, socioeconomic integration can increase economic connectedness in communities in which friending bias is low. By contrast, when friending bias is high, increasing cross-SES interactions among existing members may be necessary to increase economic connectedness. To support such efforts, we release privacy-protected statistics on economic connectedness, exposure and friending bias for each ZIP (postal) code, high school and college in the United States at https://www.socialcapital.org .