The method of 'principlism': a critique of the critique.
J Med Philos
; 17(5): 487-510, 1992 Oct.
Article
em En
| MEDLINE
| ID: mdl-1431666
ABSTRACT
Several scholars have recently criticized the dominant emphasis upon mid-level principles in bioethics best exemplified by Beauchamp and Childress's Principles of Biomedical Ethics. In Part I of this essay, I assess the fairness and cogency of three broad criticisms raised against 'principlism' as an approach:
(1) that principlism, as an exercise in applied ethics, is insufficiently attentive to the dialectical relations between ethical theory and mortal practice; (2) that principlism fails to offer a systematic account of the principles of non-maleficence, beneficence, respect for autonomy, and justice; and (3) that principlism, as a version of moral pluralism, is fatally flawed by its theoretical agnosticism. While acknowledging that Beauchamp and Childress's reliance upon Ross's version of intuitionism is problematic, I conclude that the critics of principlism have failed to make a compelling case against its theoretical or practical adequacy as an ethical approach. In Part II, I assess the moral theory developed by Bernard Gert in Mortality A New Justification of the Moral Rules, because Gert has recommended his approach as a systematic alternative to principlism. I judge Gert's theory to be seriously incomplete and, in contrast to principlism, unable to generate coherent conclusions about cases of active euthanasia and paternalism.Palavras-chave
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Base de dados:
MEDLINE
Assunto principal:
Filosofia Médica
/
Análise Ética
/
Teoria Ética
/
Ética Baseada em Princípios
/
Ética Médica
/
Princípios Morais
Limite:
Humans
Idioma:
En
Ano de publicação:
1992
Tipo de documento:
Article