The impact of professional and organizational identification on the relationship between hospital-physician exchange and customer-oriented behaviour of physicians.

BACKGROUND: Hospitals face increasingly competitive market conditions. In this challenging environment, hospitals have been struggling to build high-quality hospital-physician relationships. In the literature, two types of managerial strategies for optimizing relationships have been identified. The first focuses on optimizing the economic relationship; the second focuses on the noneconomic dimension and emphasizes the cooperative structure and collaborative nature of the hospital-physician relationship. We investigate potential spillover effects between the perceptions of physicians of organizational exchange and their customer-oriented behaviors. METHODS: A cross-sectional study was conducted on 130 self-employed physicians practicing at six Belgian hospitals. Economic exchange was measured using the concept of distributive justice (DJ); noneconomic exchange was measured by the concept of perceived organizational support (POS). Our outcomes consist of three types of customer-oriented behaviours: internal influence (II), external representation (ER), and service delivery (SD). RESULTS: Our results show a positive relationship between DJ and II (adjusted R(2) = 0.038, t = 2.35; p = 0.028) and ER (adjusted R(2) = 0.15, t = 4.59; p < 0.001) and a positive relationship between POS and II (adjusted R(2) = 0.032, t = 2.26; p = 0.026) and ER (adjusted R(2) = 0.22, t = 5.81; p < 0.001). No relationship was present between DJ (p = 0.54) or POS (p = 0.57) and SD. Organizational identification positively moderates the relationship between POS and ER (p = 0.045) and between DJ and ER (p = 0.056). The relationships between POS and II (p = 0.54) and between DJ and II (p = 0.99) were not moderated by OI. Professional identification did not moderate the studied relationships. CONCLUSION: Our results demonstrate that both perceptions of economic and noneconomic exchange are important to self-employed physicians' customer-oriented behaviours. Fostering organizational identification could enhance this reciprocity dynamic.

Provider accountability as a driving force towards physician-hospital integration: a systematic review.

BACKGROUND: Hospitals and physicians lie at the heart of our health care delivery system. In general, physicians provide medical care and hospitals the resources to deliver health care. In the past two decades many countries have adopted reforms in which provider financial risk bearing is increased. By making providers financially accountable for the delivered care integrated care delivery is stimulated. PURPOSE: To assess the evidence base supporting the relationship between provider financial risk bearing and physician-hospital integration and to identify the different types of methods used to measure physician-hospital integration to evaluate the functional value of these integrative models. RESULTS: Nine studies met the inclusion criteria. The evidence base is mixed and inconclusive. Our methodological analysis of previous research shows that previous studies have largely focused on the formal structures of physician-hospital arrangements as an indicator of physician-hospital integration. CONCLUSION: The link between provider financial risk bearing and physician-hospital integration can at this time be supported merely on the basis of theoretical insights of agency theory rather than empirical research. Physician-hospital integration measurement has concentrated on the prevalence of contracting vehicles that enables joint bargaining in a managed care environment but without realizing integration and cooperation between hospital and physicians. Therefore, we argue that these studies fail to shed light on the impact of risk shifting on the hospital-physician relationship accurately.

How to govern physician-hospital exchanges: contractual and relational issues in Belgian hospitals.

OBJECTIVE: Our aim was to investigate contractual mechanisms in physician-hospital exchanges. The concepts of risk-sharing and the nature of physician-hospital exchanges - transactional versus relational - were studied. METHODS: Two qualitative case studies were performed in Belgium. Hospital executives and physicians were interviewed to develop an in-depth understanding of contractual and relational issues that shape physician-hospital contracting in acute care hospitals. The underlying theoretical concepts of agency theory and social exchange theory were used to analyse the data. RESULTS: Our study found that physician-hospital contracting is highly complex. The contract is far more than an economic instrument governing financial aspects. The effect of the contract on the nature of exchange - whether transactional or relational - also needs to be considered. While it can be argued that contractual governance methods are increasingly necessary to overcome the difficulties that arise from the fragmented payment framework by aligning incentives and sharing financial risk, they undermine the necessary relational governance. Relational qualities such as mutual trust and an integrative view on physician-hospital exchanges are threatened, and may be difficult to sustain, given the current fragmentary payment framework. CONCLUSIONS: Since health care policy makers are increasing the financial risk borne by health care providers, it can be argued that this also increases the need to share financial risk and to align incentives between physician and hospital. However, our study demonstrates that while economic alignment is important in determining physician-hospital contracts, the corresponding impact on working relationships should also be considered. Moreover, it is important to avoid a relationship between hospital and physician predominantly characterized by transactional exchanges thereby fostering an unhealthy us-and-them divide and mentality. Relational exchange is a valuable alternative to contractual exchange, stimulating an integrated hospital-physician relationship. Unfortunately, the fragmented payment framework characterized by unaligned incentives is perceived as an obstacle to realize effective collaboration.