Impact of payment model on the behaviour of specialist physicians: A systematic review.

Physician payment models are perceived to be an important strategy for improving health, access, quality, and the value of health care. Evidence is predominantly from primary care, and little is known regarding whether specialists respond similarly. We conducted a systematic review to synthesize evidence on the impact of specialist physician payment models across the domains of health care quality; clinical outcomes; utilization, access, and costs; and patient and physician satisfaction. We searched Medline, Embase, and six other databases from their inception through October 2018. Eligible articles addressed specialist physicians, payment models, outcomes of interest, and used an experimental or quasi-experimental design. Of 11,648 studies reviewed for eligibility, 11 articles reporting on seven payment reforms were included. Fee-for-service (FFS) was associated with increased desired utilization and fewer adverse outcomes (in the case of hemodialysis patients) and better access to care (in the case of emergency department services). Replacing FFS with capitation and salary models led to fewer elective surgical procedures (cataracts and tubal ligations) and, with an episode-based model, appeared to increase the use of less costly resources. Four of the seven reforms met their goals but many had unintended consequences. Payment model appears to affect utilization of specialty care, although the association with other outcomes is unclear due to mixed results or lack of evidence. Studies of salary and salary-based reforms point to specialists responding to some incentives differently than theory would predict. Additional research is warranted to improve the evidence driving specialist payment policy.

The association between payment model and specialist physicians' selection of patients with diabetes: a descriptive study.

BACKGROUND: As the number of people with chronic diseases increases, understanding the impact of payment model on the types of patients seen by specialists has implications for improving the quality and value of care. We sought to determine if there is an association between specialist physician payment model and the types of patients seen. METHODS: In this descriptive study, we used administrative data to compare demographic characteristics, illness severity and visit indication of patients with diabetes seen by fee-for-service and salary-based internal medicine and diabetes specialists in Calgary and Edmonton between April 2011 and September 2014. The study cohort included all newly referred adults with diabetes (no appointment with a specialist in prior 4 yr). Diabetes was identified using a validated algorithm that excludes gestational diabetes. RESULTS: Patients managed by salary-based physicians (n = 2736) were sicker than those managed by fee-for-service physicians (n = 21 218). Patients managed by salary-based specialists were more likely to have 5 or more comorbidities (23.0% [n = 628] v. 18.1% [n = 3843]) and to have been admitted to hospital or seen in an emergency department for an ambulatory care sensitive condition in the year before their index visit, probably reflecting poorer disease control or barriers to optimal outpatient care. A higher proportion of visits to salary-based physicians were for appropriate indications (65.2% [n = 744] v. 55.6% [n = 5553]; risk ratio 1.17, 95% confidence interval 1.09-1.27). INTERPRETATION: Salary-based specialists were more likely to see patients with a clear indication for a specialist visit, while fee-for-service specialists were more likely to see healthier patients. Future research is needed to determine if the differences in types of patients are attributable to payment model or other provider- or system-level factors.