RESUMEN
The Affordable Care Act allows commercial insurers participating in the Marketplaces to vary the size of their provider networks as long as the providers are "sufficient" in numbers and types. Concerns have been growing over the increasing use of restricted-provider or narrow networks in Marketplace plans because of their implications for reduced access to care, but little is known about the breadth and stability of these networks over time or what types of enrollees choose such plans. Using national data, we found that in 2016, 60 percent of provider networks in plans offered in the federally facilitated Marketplaces included at least one-quarter of local-area physicians, and that consumers' access to broad-network plans remained stable between 2015 and 2016. Hispanic and low-income people made up a disproportionate share of enrollees in smaller-network plans (those with fewer than one-quarter of local-area physicians). It will be important to monitor the impact of narrow networks on access to and quality of care as well as on health outcomes.
Asunto(s)
Intercambios de Seguro Médico/estadística & datos numéricos , Accesibilidad a los Servicios de Salud/estadística & datos numéricos , Aseguradoras/estadística & datos numéricos , Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act/economía , Médicos/provisión & distribución , Ahorro de Costo , Humanos , Cobertura del Seguro , Pobreza , Estados UnidosRESUMEN
In 2015 Medicare launched the Physician Value-Based Payment Modifier program, the largest US ambulatory care pay-for-performance program to date and a precursor to the forthcoming Merit-based Incentive Payment System. In its first year, the program included practices with a hundred or more clinicians. We found that 1,010 practices met this criterion, 899 of which had at least one attributed beneficiary. Of these latter practices, 263 (29.3 percent) failed to report performance data and received a 1 percent reporting-based penalty. Of the 636 practices that reported performance data, those that elected quality tiering-voluntarily receiving performance-based penalties or bonuses-and those with high use of electronic health records had better performance on quality and costs than other practices. Practices with a primary care focus had better quality than other practices but similar costs. These findings translated into differences in the receipt of penalties and bonuses and may have implications for performance patterns under the Merit-based Incentive Payment System.