TRICARE revision to CHAMPUS DRG-based payment system, pricing of hospital claims. Final rule.

This Final rule changes TRICARE's current regulatory provision for inpatient hospital claims priced under the DRG-based payment system. Claims are currently priced by using the rates and weights that are in effect on a beneficiary's date of admission. This Final rule changes that provision to price such claims by using the rates and weights that are in effect on a beneficiary's date of discharge.

The role of the staff MFF in distributing NHS funding: taking account of differences in local labour market conditions.

The National Health Service (NHS) in England distributes substantial funds to health-care providers in different geographical areas to pay for the health care required by the populations they serve. The formulae that determine this distribution reflect populations' health needs and local differences in the prices of inputs. Labour is the most important input and area differences in the price of labour are measured by the Staff Market Forces Factor (MFF). This Staff MFF has been the subject of much debate. Though the Staff MFF has operated for almost 30 years this is the first academic paper to evaluate and test the theory and method that underpin the MFF. The theory underpinning the Staff MFF is the General Labour Market method. The analysis reported here reveals empirical support for this theory in the case of nursing staff employed by NHS hospitals, but fails to identify similar support for its application to medical staff. The paper demonstrates the extent of spatial variation in private sector and NHS wages, considers the choice of comparators and spatial geography, incorporates vacancy modelling and illustrates the effect of spatial smoothing.

Physician organization in California: crisis and opportunity.

Many of the 250 physician organizations that provide care to California's sixteen million health maintenance organization enrollees are in a state of crisis, squeezed between constrained revenues, rising practice costs, and consumer sentiment that favors unconstrained choice over integrated delivery. Medical groups and independent practice associations are retrenching to their core geographic areas, reducing capitation for drug benefits and hospital services, and abandoning dreams of displacing health plans. Consolidation is accelerating in some areas, as medical groups join with hospitals to extract higher payment rates from insurers and employers. The conjunction of consumerism and premium inflation creates new opportunities for organizations that truly can manage health care, but the challenges roiling California's medical groups may preclude meaningful efforts to seize the initiative.

The critical role of ERISA in state health reform.

Despite prominent roles for employers and state regulation in the Clinton administration's Health Security Act, relatively little attention has been accorded to the impact of federal preemption of state legislation through the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). As interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, ERISA permits state regulation of insured employee health plans but otherwise preempts analogous regulation relating to self-insured benefit plans. This has prompted lower courts to find that hospital rate-setting legislation, regulation of preferred provider organizations (PPOs), and medical malpractice suits for utilization review decisions are preempted by ERISA. Several issues with major implications for health reform remain unresolved, such as the availability of ERISA preemption to self-insured health alliances and health maintenance organizations (HMOs).

Physician price fixing under the Sherman Act. An indirect test of the Maricopa issues.

The expression 'price fixing' usually indicates an attempt by competitors to put a floor under the minimum price they will charge. But a recent decision of the Supreme Court, Arizona v. Maricopa County, suggests that attempts to fix maximum prices are equally economically objectionable. In this paper I propose an explanation of simultaneous minimum and maximum price fixing. I also investigate empirically the distribution of physicians' fees in a closely related instance of alleged physician price fixing. The data reject any inference of successful price fixing, and instead conform to the usual predictions of the economics of costly market information.

Medicare physicians' services: the composition of spending and assignment rates.

Medicare spending for physicians' services, the second largest component of the Medicare program (24.5 percent), represents 1.3 percent of the Federal budget, 0.41 percent of the gross national product, and 19.4 percent of national spending for physicians' services. Interest in reforming the Medicare physician payment system is growing. Detailed information on patterns of Medicare spending for physicians' services and assignment rates according to physician specialty, place of service, type of service, and procedure are presented here.