Consumer Cost-Sharing in Marketplace vs. Employer Health Insurance Plans, 2015.

Using data from 49 states and Washington, D.C., we analyzed changes in cost-sharing under health plans offered to individuals and families through state and federal exchanges from 2014 to 2015. We examined eight vehicles for cost-sharing, including deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and out-of-pocket limits, and compared findings with cost-sharing under employer-based insurance. We found cost-sharing under marketplace plans remained essentially unchanged from 2014 to 2015. Stable premiums during that period do not reflect greater costs borne by enrollees. Further, 56 percent of enrollees in marketplace plans attained cost-sharing reductions in 2015. However, for people without cost-sharing reductions, average copayments, deductibles, and out-of-pocket limits under catastrophic, bronze, and silver plans are considerably higher than under employer-based plans on average, while cost-sharing under gold plans is similar employer-based plans on average. Marketplace plans are far more likely than employer-based plans to require enrollees to meet deductibles before they receive coverage for prescription drugs.

Do "Consumer-Directed" health plans bend the cost curve over time?

"Consumer-Directed" Health Plans (CDHPs), those with high deductibles and personal medical accounts, are intended to reduce health care spending through greater patient cost exposure. Prior research agrees that in the first year, CDHPs reduce spending. There is little research and in it results are mixed regarding the impact of CDHPs over the longer term. We add to this literature with an intent-to-treat, difference-in-differences analysis of health care spending over up to three years post CDHP offer among 13 million person-years of data from 54 large US firms, half of which offered CDHPs. To strengthen the identification, we balance observables over time within firm, by developing weights through a machine learning algorithm, generalized boosted regression. We find that spending is reduced for those in firms offering CDHPs in all three years post offer relative to firms continuing to offer lower-deductible plans. The reductions are driven by spending decreases in outpatient care and pharmaceuticals, with no evidence of increases in emergency department or inpatient care over the three-year window.

Did the Great Recession influence retirement plans?

The recent recession constitutes one of the macro forces that may have influenced workers' retirement plans. We evaluate a multilevel model that addresses the influence of macro-, meso-, and micro-level factors on retirement plans, changes in these plans, and expected retirement age. Using data from Waves 8 and 9 of the Health and Retirement Study (N=2,618), we find that individuals with defined benefit plans are more prone to change toward plans to stop work before the stock market declined, whereas the opposite trend holds for those without pensions. Debts, ability to reduce work hours, and firm unionization also influenced retirement plans. Findings suggest retirement planning education may be particularly important for workers without defined pensions, especially in times of economic volatility.

Renewed emphasis on consumer cost sharing in health insurance benefit design.

Purchasers and health plans are reemphasizing deductibles, coinsurance, and other consumer incentives in response to renewed inflation and the continuing backlash against managed care. This paper explores the partial convergence of cost sharing and benefit design for preferred provider and health maintenance products and highlights experiments that foster price-conscious choice among benefit configurations, provider networks, systems of care, drugs, medical devices, and clinicians. Health insurance is evolving from comprehensive coverage for a restricted set of choices to limited coverage for a broader set of choices. Diverse benefit designs and increased consumer cost sharing challenge conventional policy wisdom but may counteract some of the pernicious features of the health care status quo.

Consumer-driven health plans: are they more than talk now?

This paper reports marketplace developments for consumer-driven health plans in spring 2002. Findings are from interviews with executives from start-up and health insurance firms, benefit consultants, employee benefit managers, Wall Street analysts, consumer organizations, thought leaders, and policymakers. We detail available evidence about the performance of consumer-driven health plans concerning access to care, risk selection, cost containment, use of information, and legal issues. We find that these health plans are now a central pillar of health insurers' business strategy and that an estimated 1.5 million persons are enrolled in them.

Gaps in employer coverage: lack of supply or lack of demand?

According to data from the May 1988 Current Population Survey, 18 percent of workers are in firms that do not offer health insurance. The question explored here is whether the absence of insurance in these firms is related to lack of supply (that is, a failure of the firm to offer the benefit because the price it faces is too high or the benefit too low) or lack of demand (that is, employees in these firms would not purchase the insurance even if it were offered). Characteristics hypothesized to affect the supply of insurance by firms (size, rate of turnover, and union status) are found to distinguish whether or not firms offer insurance. The data show near-universal acceptance of group insurance among employees offered the opportunity to participate. Both of these factors suggest a failure of supply. However, employees in firms that do not offer insurance are young, low-wage earners who work part time. These are also characteristics of workers who do not purchase group insurance even when it is offered, suggesting that many of the workers who are not offered group insurance would not participate in a plan even if the supply failure were corrected. These findings have implications for the effectiveness of voluntary strategies to improve access, but they also raise concern over the fairness to workers of mandates requiring that they purchase coverage.

Making a case for employer-enforced individual mandates.

An employer-enforced individual mandate has some substantial advantages over the mixed employer and individual mandate embodied in the Clinton administration's proposed health plan. Economic reasoning strongly suggests that almost all of the cost of an employer mandate will fall on workers and that in any case the incidence of an individual mandate is the same as that of an employer mandate. However, an individual mandate is easier for voters to understand, avoids administrative complexities and inequities, and eliminates the chance of adverse employment effects of mandated employer coverage.

The economics of employer versus individual mandates.

This paper reviews the economic implications of employer and individual health insurance mandates. Although the cost of meeting an employer mandate is nominally paid by employers, in the long run much of the cost may be shifted backward to employees in the form of lower wages. We also compare the consequences of hypothetical employer and individual health insurance mandates for families with different income levels. Depending on their structure, an employer mandate may be more or less progressive than an individual mandate.

Implementing employer and individual mandates.

As is true of automobile insurance, a strong case can be made for a mandate that requires individuals to purchase health insurance rather than shifting costs to others. A mandate by itself, however, is likely to be regressive. By dealing with individual needs through the back door, an employer mandate generally keeps costs hidden and raises employment problems, while an employer subsidy will be poorly targeted. An individual mandate, in turn, raises other difficult administrative issues of collection and enforcement. No employer mandate is sufficient without an individual mandate, and millions of Americans will fall outside of any mandated system.

Multiple choice health insurance: the lessons and challenge to employers.

This paper offers a second opinion on the issues discussed by Stanley B. Jones in his paper, "Multiple Choice Health Insurance: The Lessons and Challenge to Private Insurers" in the Summer 1990 issue of Inquiry. Multiple choice of health plans is not containing costs of health care or insurance premiums because employers have not yet tried price competition with cost-conscious consumer choice. HMOs in multiple choice arrangements have not saved employers money because of the way employers manage competition. Effective management of competition must be an active process employing an array of tools to create incentives that reward production of high quality economical care.

Private employers don't need formal risk adjustment.

This paper lays down a set of hypotheses to explain why private employers do not use formal risk adjustment. The theme running through these hypotheses is simple: private employers don't need formal adjustment because they have better tools for dealing with adverse selection than formal risk adjustment provides. Open enrollment provisions, premium negotiations, and restricting employees' choices of health plans are mechanisms superior to formal risk adjustment for dealing with problems caused by adverse selection.

Health plans and selection: formal risk adjustment vs. market design and contracts.

In this paper, we explore the demand for risk adjustment by health plans that contract with private employers by considering the conditions under which plans might value risk adjustment. Three factors reduce the value of risk adjustment from the plans' point of view. First, only a relatively small segment of privately insured Americans face a choice of competing health plans. Second, health plans share much of their insurance risk with payers, providers, and reinsurers. Third, de facto experience rating that occurs during the premium negotiation process and management of coverage appear to substitute for risk adjustment. While the current environment has not generated much demand for risk adjustment, we reflect on its future potential.

Government-managed healthcare. More for less or less for more?

According to Cato Institute chairman William A. Niskanen, government-mandated managed competition will fail to control healthcare costs and will pose a serious threat to the quality of American medical care. Mr Niskanen elaborates on this viewpoint in the following remarks, which were originally delivered in a speech.

Consumer-centered vs. job-centered health insurance.

Most employees and their dependents in the United States have health insurance provided by the employer or labor-management health and welfare fund. In this system, employees and their families lose their health insurance when the breadwinner loses his or her job while, at the same time, a Medicaid beneficiary can lose Medicaid eligibility by getting a job, even a poorly paid one. Most health insurance pays the doctor on the basis of fee-for-service and the hospital on the basis of cost-reimbursement, rewarding both with more revenue for providing more and more costly services. The insured employee has little or no incentive to seek out a less costly provider. There are no rewards for economy in this system. It should be little wonder, then, that health care costs are out of control. There are alternative financing and delivery systems with built-in incentives to use resources economically, but, the author of this article asserts, their ability to compete and attract patients with their superior economic efficiency is blocked by many laws and government programs. The author believes that the most effective and acceptable way to get costs under control, and at the same time achieve universal coverage, would be through a system of fair economic competition. He discusses his Consumer Choice Health Plan proposal and describes how one of the main barriers to competition is today's system of job-linked health insurance.

Medicare program; physician fee schedule conversion factor for calendar year 1998 and sustainable growth rate for fiscal year 1998--HCFA. Final notice.

This final notice announces the calendar year 1998 Medicare physician fee schedule conversion factor and the fiscal year 1998 sustainable growth rate for expenditures for physicians' services under the Medicare Supplementary Medical Insurance (Part B) program as required by sections 1846(d) and (f), respectively, of the Social Security Act. The 1998 Medicare physician fee schedule conversion factor is $36,6873. The sustainable growth rate for fiscal year 1998 is 1.5 percent.

Kentucky physicians and politics.

Approximately 19% of Kentucky Physicians are KEMPAC members or contribute to state legislative and Gubernatorial candidates. This limited study of political activity indicates that a small percentage of physicians participate in the political process. Despite the small number of contributors to state legislative candidates, KMA's legislative and lobbying effort is highly effective and members receive high quality service and representation in the political arena.

[Priority health care finances and joint control by the population and the state (Pikine - Senegal) 1975-1981]. / Soins de santé prioritaires financés et contrôlés conjointement par les populations et par l'état (Pikine - Sénégal) 1975-1981.

Where the government cannot meet wide-ranging health needs of the population and when people are given the opportunity to manage their own affairs and to be involved in decision-making, they can become very efficient. This was demonstrated by an experiment in a senegalese town (450 000 inh.) between 1975 and 1981. A strategy for priority health care with the active participation of the local community was developed to provide a network of acceptable and accessible health services. This was with government support. --The government provides the basic structure of its health services to which the community contributes. It provides the medical staff, technical guidance and logistic support and helps the community volunteers to develop sound accounting procedures. --The community contributes financial and human resources to improve the coverage of the health units. Based on a self-financing system controlled by a health committee per each health unit, communities are in decision making concerning the utilization and management of the community's resources. Procedures to control the community's financial contribution are especially well detailed in the paper. In view of this successful experiment, the minister of public health with the agreement of the government, has recommended that community participation in financing health care services be extended to all regions of the country.

Controlling group medical costs.

Benefit costs can be managed effectively, but they are not just the human resource or benefit manager's responsibility. It requires a team approach, with top management involvement and commitment. Cost management is an ongoing process, quite different from cost fixing, which is just a short-term bandage. This article deals with group medical and life plans. Subsequent articles will discuss long-term disability, retirement plans, and other benefit programs.