Financing Thresholds for Sustainability of Community Health Worker Programs for Patients Receiving Medicaid Across the United States.

States have turned to novel Medicaid financing to pay for community health worker (CHW) programs, often through fee-for-service or capitated payments. We sought to estimate Medicaid payment rates to ensure CHW program sustainability. A microsimulation model was constructed to estimate CHW salaries, equipment, transportation, space, and benefits costs across the U.S. Fee-for-service rates per 30-min CHW visit (code 98960) and capitated rates were calculated for financial sustainability. The mean CHW hourly wage was $23.51, varying from $15.90 in Puerto Rico to $31.61 in Rhode Island. Overhead per work hour averaged $43.65 nationwide, and was highest for transportation among other overhead categories (65.1% of overhead). The minimum fee-for-service rate for a 30-min visit was $53.24 (95% CI $24.80, $91.11), varying from $40.44 in South Dakota to $70.89 in Washington D.C. The minimum capitated rate was $140.18 per member per month (95% CI $105.94, $260.90), varying from $113.55 in South Dakota to $176.58 in Washington D.C. Rates varied minimally by metro status but more by panel size. Higher Medicaid fee-for-service and capitated rates than currently used may be needed to support financial viability of CHW programs. A revised payment estimation approach may help state officials, health systems and plans discussing CHW program sustainability.

The impact of the 2008/2009 financial crisis on specialist physician activity in Canada.

Fee-for-service physicians are responsible for planning for their retirements, and there is no mandated retirement age. Changes in financial markets may influence how long they remain in practice and how much they choose to work. The 2008 crisis provides a natural experiment to analyze elasticity in physician service supply in response to dramatic financial market changes. We examined quarterly fee-for-service data for specialist physicians over the period from 1999/2000 to 2013/2014 in Canada. We used segmented regression to estimate changes in the number of physicians receiving payments, per-physician service counts, and per-physician payments following the 2008 financial crisis and explored whether patterns differed by physician age. The number of specialist physicians increased more rapidly in the period since 2008 than in earlier years, but increases were largest within the youngest age group, and we observed no evidence of delayed retirement among older physicians. Where changes in service volume and payments were observed, they occurred across all ages and not immediately following the 2008 financial crisis. We conclude that any response to the financial crisis was small compared with demographic shifts in the physician population and changes in payments per service over the same time period.

Payment system of urban family physician programme in the Islamic Republic of Iran: is it appropriate?

BACKGROUND: The payment system is pivotal in implementing policies in the health sector. Equitable access to healthcare is the main principle of the payment system. AIMS: This study aimed to investigate aspects of the payment system in the urban family physician programme (FPP) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. METHODS: This was a qualitative study. We obtained data from key informants and both formal and grey literature. We used content analysis for data analysis. RESULTS: A range of concepts was explored related to the payment system of the FPP. By merging similar expressions, we categorized the findings into four main themes including: payment method, payment criteria and incentives, payment process and amount of payment. CONCLUSIONS: FPP is required to follow convenient implementation methods. The mechanisms of payment in the health sector are weak and have no transparency. A blurred combination of criteria makes an unclear process for determining the payment mechanisms. It is recommended that the opinions of key stakeholders be taken into consideration prior to developing payment mechanisms and financial incentives.

Pathway to pharmacist medical provider status in Washington State.

OBJECTIVES: To describe Washington State's successful legal and legislative efforts to gain pharmacist medical provider status and major medical compensation and to compare those efforts with similar efforts in other states to identify key lessons learned. SUMMARY: Washington State Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 5557 was enacted in 2015, securing pharmacists as medical providers and requiring compensation under major medical insurance for pharmacists providing health services (Revised Code of Washington 48.43.715). Other states have passed, or attempted to pass, pharmacist provider status bills, but none have achieved both pharmacist medical provider status and mandatory major medical compensation. CONCLUSION: Pharmacist medical provider status ideally should include recognition as a medical provider and compensation through major medical health insurance as a clinical decision maker rather than an "incident-to" provider. Both elements should be sought as part of a complete legislative package to ensure sustainable patient access to needed health care services.

Physician Payment Contracts in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Theory and Its Application in Ontario.

We develop a stylized principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection to provide a unified framework for understanding some of the most salient features of the recent physician payment reform in Ontario and its impact on physician behavior. These features include the following: (i) physicians can choose a payment contract from a menu that includes an enhanced fee-for-service contract and a blended capitation contract; (ii) the capitation rate is higher, and the cost-reimbursement rate is lower in the blended capitation contract; (iii) physicians sort selectively into the contracts based on their preferences; and (iv) physicians in the blended capitation model provide fewer services than physicians in the enhanced fee-for-service model. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Getting value from health spending: going beyond payment reform.

It is widely held that fee-for-service (FFS) payment systems reward volume and intensity of services, contributing to overall cost inflation, while doing little to reward quality, efficiency, or care coordination. Recently, The National Commission on Physician Payment Reform (sponsored by SGIM) has recommended that payers "should largely eliminate stand-alone fee-for-service payment to medical practices because of its inherent inefficiencies and problematic financial incentives." As the current and former Chief Medical Officers of a large national insurer, we agree that payment reform is a critical component of health care modernization. But calls to transform payment simultaneously go too far, and don't go far enough. Based on our experience, we believe there are several critical ingredients that are either missing or under-emphasized in most payment reform proposals, including: health care is local so no one size fits all; upgrading performance measures; monitoring/overcoming unintended consequences; using a full toolbox to achieve transformation; and ensuring that the necessary components for successful delivery reform are in place. Thinking holistically and remembering that healthcare is a complex adaptive system are crucial to achieving better results for patients and the health system.

What determines the income gap between French male and female GPs - the role of medical practices.

BACKGROUND: In many OECD countries, the gender differences in physicians' pay favour male doctors. Due to the feminisation of the doctor profession, it is essential to measure this income gap in the French context of Fee-for-service payment (FFS) and then to precisely identify its determinants. The objective of this study is to measure and analyse the 2008 income gap between males and females general practitioners (GPs). This paper focuses on the role of gender medical practices differentials among GPs working in private practice in the southwest region of France. METHODS: Using data from 339 private-practice GPs, we measured an average gender income gap of approximately 26% in favour of men. Using the decomposition method, we examined the factors that could explain gender disparities in income. RESULTS: The analysis showed that 73% of the income gap can be explained by the average differences in doctors' characteristics; for example, 61% of the gender income gap is explained by the gender differences in workload, i.e., number of consultations and visits, which is on average significantly lower for female GPs than for male GPs. Furthermore, the decomposition method allowed us to highlight the differences in the marginal returns of doctors' characteristics and variables contributing to income, such as GP workload; we found that female GPs have a higher marginal return in terms of earnings when performing an additional medical service. CONCLUSIONS: The findings of this study help to understand the determinants of the income gap between male and female GPs. Even though workload is clearly an essential determinant of income, FFS does not reduce the gender income gap, and there is an imperfect relationship between the provision of medical services and income. In the context of feminisation, it appears that female GPs receive a lower income but attain higher marginal returns when performing an additional consultation.

AMCP Pay-for-Performance Principles: Performance-Based Reimbursement and Direct and Indirect Remuneration (DIR) Fees.

DISCLOSURE: At the direction of its Board of Directors, the AMCP Public Policy and Professional Practice committees developed these principles for pay-for-performance to promote the use of these arrangements that lead to improved patient outcomes. This document was first released on the AMCP website on December 14, 2021.

An economic history of Medicare part C.

CONTEXT: Twenty-five years ago, private insurance plans were introduced into the Medicare program with the stated dual aims of (1) giving beneficiaries a choice of health insurance plans beyond the fee-for-service Medicare program and (2) transferring to the Medicare program the efficiencies and cost savings achieved by managed care in the private sector. METHODS: In this article we review the economic history of Medicare Part C, known today as Medicare Advantage, focusing on the impact of major changes in the program's structure and of plan payment methods on trends in the availability of private plans, plan enrollment, and Medicare spending. Additionally, we compare the experience of Medicare Advantage and of employer-sponsored health insurance with managed care over the same time period. FINDINGS: Beneficiaries' access to private plans has been inconsistent over the program's history, with higher plan payments resulting in greater choice and enrollment and vice versa. But Medicare Advantage generally has cost more than the traditional Medicare program, an overpayment that has increased in recent years. CONCLUSIONS: Major changes in Medicare Advantage's payment rules are needed in order to simultaneously encourage the participation of private plans, the provision of high-quality care, and to save Medicare money.

Drivers of Medicare Spending: A 15-Year Review of Radiation Oncology Charges Allowed by the Medicare Physician/Supplier Fee-for-Service Program Compared With Other Specialties.

PURPOSE: In 2019, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services proposed a new radiation oncology alternative payment model aimed at reducing expenditures. We examined changes in aggregate physician Medicare charges allowed per specialty to provide contemporary context to proposed changes and hypothesize that radiation oncology charges remained stable through 2017. METHODS AND MATERIALS: Medicare physician/supplier utilization, program payments, and balance billing for original Medicare beneficiaries, by physician specialty, were analyzed from 2002 to 2017. Total allowed charges under the physician/supplier fee-for-service program, inflation-adjusted charges, and percent of total charges billed per specialty were examined. We adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index for medical care from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. RESULTS: Total allowed charges increased from $83 billion in 2002 to $138 billion in 2017. The specialties accounting for the most charges billed to Medicare were internal medicine and ophthalmology. Radiation oncology charges accounted for 1.2%, 1.6%, and 1.4% of total charges allowed by Medicare in 2002, 2012, and 2017, respectively. Radiation oncology charges allowed increased 44% from 2002 to 2012 ($987.6 million to $1.42 billion) but decreased by 19% from 2012 to 2017 ($1.15 billion), adjusted for inflation. Total charges allowed by internal medicine decreased 2% from 2002 to 2012 ($8.53 to $8.36 billion), adjusted for inflation, and decreased 16% from 2012 to 2017 ($7.05 billion). When adjusting for inflation, ophthalmology charges increased 18% from 2002 to 2012 ($4.53 to $5.36 billion) and increased 3% from 2012 to 2017 ($5.5 billion). CONCLUSIONS: Radiation oncology physician charges represent a small fraction of total Medicare expenses and are not a driver for Medicare spending. Aggregate inflation-adjusted charges by radiation oncology have dramatically declined in the past 5 years and represent a stable fraction of total Medicare charges. The need to target radiation oncology with cost-cutting measures may be overstated.

Carving Out Financial Success: The Power of Insurance Carve-Outs in a Private Plastic Surgery Practice.

BACKGROUND: Since the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was signed into law, there has been a push away from fee-for-service payment models. The rise of bundled payments has drastically impacted plastic surgeons' incomes, especially nonsalaried surgeons in private practice. As a result, physicians must now attempt to optimize contractual reimbursement agreements (carve-outs) with insurance providers. The aim of this article is to explain the economics behind negotiating carve-outs and to offer a how-to guide for plastic surgeons to use in such negotiations. METHODS: Based on work relative value units, Medicare reimbursement, overhead expenses, physician workload, and desired income, the authors present an approach that allows surgeons to evaluate the reimbursement they receive for various procedures. The authors then review factors that influence whether a carve-out can be pursued. Finally, the authors consider relevant nuances of negotiating with insurance companies. RESULTS: Using tissue expander insertion (CPT 19357) as an example, the authors review the mathematics, thought process required, and necessary steps in determining whether a carve-out should be pursued. Strategies for negotiation with insurance companies were identified. The presented approach can be used to potentially negotiate a carve-out for any reconstructive procedure that meets appropriate financial criteria. CONCLUSIONS: Understanding practice costs will allow plastic surgeons to evaluate the true value of insurance reimbursements and determine whether a carve-out is worth pursuing. Plastic surgeons must be prepared to negotiate adequate reimbursement carve-outs whenever possible. Ultimately, by aligning the best quality patient care with insurance companies' financial motivations, plastic surgeons have the opportunity to improve reimbursement for some reconstructive procedures.

Care patterns in Medicare and their implications for pay for performance.

BACKGROUND: Two assumptions underpin the implementation of pay for performance in Medicare: that with the use of claims data, patients can be assigned to a physician or to a practice that will have primary responsibility for their care, and that a meaningful fraction of the care physicians deliver is for patients for whom they have primary responsibility. METHODS: We analyzed Medicare claims from 2000 through 2002 for 1.79 million fee-for-service beneficiaries treated by 8604 respondents to the Community Tracking Study Physician Survey in 2000 and 2001. In separate analyses, we assigned each patient to the physician or primary care physician with whom the patient had had the most visits. We determined the number of physicians and practices seen annually, the percentage of care received from the assigned physician or practice, the stability of assignments over time, and the percentage of physicians' Medicare patients who were their assigned patients. RESULTS: Beneficiaries saw a median of two primary care physicians and five specialists working in four different practices. A median of 35% of beneficiaries' visits each year were with their assigned physicians; for 33% of beneficiaries, the assigned physician changed from one year to another. On the basis of all visits to any physician, a primary care physician's assigned patients accounted for a median of 39% of the physician's Medicare patients and 62% of Medicare visits. For medical specialists, the respective percentages were 6% and 10%. On the basis of visits to primary care physicians only, 79% of beneficiaries could be assigned to a physician, and a median of 31% of beneficiaries' visits were with that assigned primary care physician. CONCLUSIONS: In fee-for-service Medicare, the dispersion of patients' care among multiple physicians will limit the effectiveness of pay-for-performance initiatives that rely on a single retrospective method of assigning responsibility for patient care.

Prices for Physicians' Services in Medicare Advantage and Commercial Plans.

The prices that insurers pay physicians ultimately affect beneficiaries' health insurance premiums. Using 2014 claims data from three major insurers, we analyzed the prices insurers paid in their Medicare Advantage (MA) and commercial plans for 20 physician services, in and out of network, and compared those prices with estimated amounts that Medicare's fee-for-service (FFS) program would pay for the same service. MA prices paid by those insurers were close to Medicare FFS prices, varied minimally, and were similar in and out of network. In contrast, commercial prices paid by the same insurers were substantially higher than FFS, varied widely, and were up to three times higher out of network than in network. Those results suggest that insurers can use statutory limits on out-of-network charges in MA to negotiate lower in-network prices in those plans. In contrast, without those limits on out-of-network prices, in-network prices in commercial plans are much higher.