Facility-Based Measurement in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System: A Potential Safety Net for Which Most Radiologists Will Be Eligible.

OBJECTIVE. The purpose of this study was to assess the percentage and characteristics of radiologists who meet criteria for facility-based measurement in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS). MATERIALS AND METHODS. The Provider Utilization and Payment Data: Physician and Other Supplier Public Use File was used to identify radiologists who bill 75% or more of their Medicare Part B claims in the facility setting. RESULTS. Among 31,217 included radiologists nationwide, 71.0% met the eligibility criteria for facility-based measurement as individuals in MIPS. The percentage of predicted eligibility was slightly higher for male than female radiologists (72.9% vs 64.5%). The percentage decreased slightly with increasing years in practice (from 78.8% for radiologists with < 10 years in practice to 67.3% for radiologists with ≥ 25 years in practice). The eligibility percentage was also higher for radiologists in rural as opposed to urban practices (81.6% vs 71.3%) and in academic as opposed to nonacademic practices (77.2% vs 70.3%). However, the percentages were similar across practices of varying sizes. There was also a greater degree of heterogeneity by state, ranging from 50.9% in Minnesota to 94.0% in West Virginia. By overall geographic region, the percentage of predicted eligibility was lowest in the Northeast (64.7%) and highest in the Midwest (78.3%). A higher percentage of generalists met the 75% facility-based threshold than did subspecialists (77.3% vs 65.4%). When stratified by subspecialty, however, facility-based eligibility was lowest for musculoskeletal radiologists (38.1%) and breast imagers (45.1%) and highest for cardiothoracic radiologists (85.1%). For other subspecialties, predicted eligibility ranged from 66.0% to 77.8%. CONCLUSION. Most radiologists will be eligible for facility-based reporting for MIPS in 2019, with some variation by demographic and specialty characteristics. The facility-based option provides a safety net for radiologists who face challenges accessing hospital data for reporting quality measures. In general, radiologists should not alter their current MIPS strategy but should instead consider facility-based measurement as a contingency plan that could result in a higher final score.

Exploring Attributes of High-Value Primary Care.

PURPOSE: Medicare's merit-based incentive payment system and narrowing of physician networks by health insurers will stoke clinicians' and policy makers' interest in care delivery attributes associated with value as defined by payers. METHODS: To help define these attributes, we analyzed 2009 to 2011 commercial health insurance claims data for more than 40 million preferred provider organization patients attributed to over 53,000 primary care practice sites. We identified sites ranking favorably on both quality and low total annual per capita health care spending ("high-value") and sites ranking near the median ("average-value"). Sites were selected for qualitative assessment from 64 high-value sites and 102 average-value sites with more than 1 primary care physician who delivered adult primary care and provided services to enough enrollees to permit meaningful spending and quality ranking. Purposeful sampling ensured regional diversity. Physicians experienced in primary care assessment and blinded to site rankings visited 12 high-value sites and 4 average-value sites to identify tangible attributes of care delivery that could plausibly explain a high ranking on value. RESULTS: Thirteen attributes of care delivery distinguished sites in the high-value cohort. Six attributes attained statistical significance: decision support for evidence-based medicine, risk-stratified care management, careful selection of specialists, coordination of care, standing orders and protocols, and balanced physician compensation. CONCLUSIONS: Awareness of care delivery attributes that distinguish their high-value peers may help physicians respond successfully to incentives from Medicare and private payers to lower annual health care spending and improve quality of care.

MACRA: A New Age for Physician Payments.

The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) of 2015 introduced a new system of physician payments in the United States. This legislation and the complex rules written to enact the law intend to force a shift away from volume-based payments and into so called value-based payments. Physicians and other clinicians will be graded via quality and cost metrics and payments will be adjusted based on performance. Robust use of certified electronic health records is required under MACRA. Physicians will follow one of two payment reform tracks known as the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) and the Alternative Payment Model (APM) pathways. Although there are rheumatology and other specialty specific quality measures in the MIPS program, there are no rheumatology specific APMs to date. A thorough understating of MACRA is required for medical practices to survive the new era of payment reform.

A Look at MACRA: What to Expect in 2017.

The Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) Reauthorization Act of 2015 fundamentally changes how physicians who care for Medicare patients will be paid. Although physicians won't see changes in their payments in 2017, they need to understand that their performance in 2017 will be the basis for the payments made to them starting in 2019. This article summarizes the two paths for determining future Medicare payments established by the law: the merit-based incentive payment system and advanced alternative payment models.

More than 800,000 docs get pass on MACRA compliance, for now.

CMS notified physicians that they won't have to comply with Merit-based Incentive Payment System reporting requirements in 2017.

Proactively Prepare for MIPS Now-Your Future Self Will Thank You.

The message is clear-the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 represents a complete paradigm shift in our healthcare system, and its implementation will span several years. Consider it the shift from paying doctors using a traditional fee-for-service reimbursement model to one that pays according to the value that they provide to their patients, where "value" is defined by participation in several health IT and quality reporting programs. For many providers, this shift in thinking and their way of practicing medicine will be one of the greatest challenges of their career. The best thing you can do is to proactively prepare for the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System now. Your future self will thank you.

Composite Measures of Health Care Provider Performance: A Description of Approaches.

CONTEXT: Since the Institute of Medicine's 2001 report Crossing the Quality Chasm, there has been a rapid proliferation of quality measures used in quality-monitoring, provider-profiling, and pay-for-performance (P4P) programs. Al-though individual performance measures are useful for identifying specific processes and outcomes for improvement and tracking progress, they do not easily provide an accessible overview of performance. Composite measures aggregate individual performance measures into a summary score. By reducing the amount of data that must be processed, they facilitate (1) benchmarking of an organization's performance, encouraging quality improvement initiatives to match performance against high-performing organizations, and (2) profiling and P4P programs based on an organization's overall performance. METHODS: We describe different approaches to creating composite measures,discuss their advantages and disadvantages, and provide examples of their use. FINDINGS: The major issues in creating composite measures are (1) whether to aggregate measures at the patient level through all-or-none approaches or the facility level, using one of the several possible weighting schemes; (2) when combining measures on different scales, how to rescale measures (using z scores,range percentages, ranks, or 5-star categorizations); and (3) whether to use shrinkage estimators, which increase precision by smoothing rates from smaller facilities but also decrease transparency. CONCLUSIONS: Because provider rankings and rewards under P4P programs may be sensitive to both context and the data, careful analysis is warranted before deciding to implement a particular method. A better understanding of both when and where to use composite measures and the incentives created by composite measures are likely to be important areas of research as the use of composite measures grows.

General practice after-hours incentive funding: a rationale for change.

After-hours incentive funding for general practice was introduced in 1998 through the introduction of the Practice Incentives Program (PIP). In 2010, a national audit of the PIP identified after-hours incentive funding as having the greatest levels of non-compliance across 12 PIP components. The audit specified the need for secondary data sources to ensure practice compliance. In this article, we examine the drivers of the 1998-2013 PIP mechanism to inform development of a fair, transparent and auditable after-hours incentive funding scheme for Tasmania. The PIP after-hours incentive funding mechanism paid, at diminishing levels, for anticipated burden of care (practice size), claimed method of providing care (stream) and remoteness of practice. Increasing remoteness rather than practice size or stream is the primary determinant of urgent after-hours attendances per practice in Tasmania; after-hours attendances to residential aged care facilities are unrelated to individual practice location or stream but concentrated in urban areas. The PIP after-hours incentive funding mechanism does not preferentially support practices that provide after-hours care and arguably led to perverse incentives. A new after-hours incentive funding mechanism embodying pre-specified objectives - such as support for (unavoidable) burden and/or provision of care to residential aged care facilities - is required. Claimed provision is considered an inappropriate funding determinant.

The use of financial incentives to help improve health outcomes: is the quality and outcomes framework fit for purpose? A systematic review.

BACKGROUND: The quality and outcomes framework (QOF) is one of the world's largest pay-for-performance schemes, rewarding general practitioners for the quality of care they provide. This review examines the evidence on the efficacy of the scheme for improving health outcomes, its impact on non-incentivized activities and the robustness of the clinical targets adopted in the scheme. METHODS: The review was conducted using six electronic databases, six sources of grey literature and bibliography searches from relevant publications. Studies were identified using a comprehensive search strategy based on MeSH terms and keyword searches. A total of 21,543 references were identified of which 32 met the eligibility criteria with 11 studies selected for the review. RESULTS: Findings provide strong evidence that the QOF initially improved health outcomes for a limited number of conditions but subsequently fell to the pre-existing trend. There was limited impact on non-incentivized activities with adverse effects for some sub-population groups. CONCLUSION: The QOF has limited impact on improving health outcomes due to its focus on process-based indicators and the indicators' ceiling thresholds. Further research is required to strengthen the quality of evidence available on the QOF's impact on population health to ensure that the incentive scheme is both clinically and cost-effective.

[Quality improvement in primary care. Financial incentives related to quality indicators in Europe]. / A minoség javításának lehetséges eszközei az alapellátásban. Minoségi indikátorokhoz kapcsolt anyagi ösztönzok Európában.

Quality improvement in primary care has been an important issue worldwide for decades. Quality indicators are increasingly used quantitative tools for quality measurement. One of the possible motivational methods for doctors to provide better medical care is the implementation of financial incentives, however, there is no sufficient evidence to support or contradict their effect in quality improvement. Quality indicators and financial incentives are used in the primary care in more and more European countries. The authors provide a brief update on the primary care quality indicator systems of the United Kingdom, Hungary and other European countries, where financial incentives and quality indicators were introduced. There are eight countries where quality indicators linked to financial incentives are used which can influence the finances/salary of family physicians with a bonus of 1-25%. Reliable data are essential for quality indicators, although such data are lacking in primary care of most countries. Further, improvement of indicator systems should be based on broad professional consensus.

Using financial incentives to improve value in orthopaedics.

BACKGROUND: A variety of reforms to traditional approaches to provider payment and benefit design are being implemented in the United States. There is increasing interest in applying these financial incentives to orthopaedics, although it is unclear whether and to what extent they have been implemented and whether they increase quality or reduce costs. QUESTIONS/PURPOSES: We reviewed and discussed physician- and patient-oriented financial incentives being implemented in orthopaedics, key challenges, and prerequisites to payment reform and value-driven payment policy in orthopaedics. METHODS: We searched the MEDLINE database using as search terms various provider payment and consumer incentive models. We retrieved a total of 169 articles; none of these studies met the inclusion criteria. For incentive models known to the authors to be in use in orthopaedics but for which no peer-reviewed literature was found, we searched Google for further information. RESULTS: Provider financial incentives reviewed include payments for reporting, performance, and patient safety and episode payment. Patient incentives include tiered networks, value-based benefit design, reference pricing, and value-based purchasing. Reform of financial incentives for orthopaedic surgery is challenged by (1) lack of a payment/incentive model that has demonstrated reductions in cost trends and (2) the complex interrelation of current pay schemes in today's fragmented environment. Prerequisites to reform include (1) a reliable and complete data infrastructure; (2) new business structures to support cost sharing; and (3) a retooling of patient expectations. CONCLUSIONS: There is insufficient literature reporting the effects of various financial incentive models under implementation in orthopaedics to know whether they increase quality or reduce costs. National concerns about cost will continue to drive experimentation, and all anticipated innovations will require improved collaboration and data collection and reporting.

Medicare program; changes to the electronic prescribing (eRx) incentive program. Final rule.

This final rule modifies the electronic prescribing (eRx) quality measure used for certain reporting periods in calendar year (CY) 2011; provides additional significant hardship exemption categories for eligible professionals and group practices to request an exemption during 2011 for the 2012 eRx payment adjustment due to a significant hardship; and extends the deadline for submitting requests for consideration for the two significant hardship exemption categories for the 2012 eRx payment adjustment that were finalized in the CY 2011 Medicare Physician Fee Schedule final rule with comment period.