Management of human resources for health: implications for health systems efficiency in Kenya.

BACKGROUND: Human resources for health consume a substantial share of healthcare resources and determine the efficiency and overall performance of health systems. Under Kenya's devolved governance, human resources for health are managed by county governments. The aim of this study was to examine how the management of human resources for health influences the efficiency of county health systems in Kenya. METHODS: We conducted a case study using a mixed methods approach in two purposively selected counties in Kenya. We collected data through in-depth interviews (n = 46) with national and county level HRH stakeholders, and document and secondary data reviews. We analyzed qualitative data using a thematic approach, and quantitative data using descriptive analysis. RESULTS: Human resources for health in the selected counties was inadequately financed and there were an insufficient number of health workers, which compromised the input mix of the health system. The scarcity of medical specialists led to inappropriate task shifting where nonspecialized staff took on the roles of specialists with potential undesired impacts on quality of care and health outcomes. The maldistribution of staff in favor of higher-level facilities led to unnecessary referrals to higher level (referral) hospitals and compromised quality of primary healthcare. Delayed salaries, non-harmonized contractual terms and incentives reduced the motivation of health workers. All of these effects are likely to have negative effects on health system efficiency. CONCLUSIONS: Human resources for health management in counties in Kenya could be reformed with likely positive implications for county health system efficiency by increasing the level of funding, resolving funding flow challenges to address the delay of salaries, addressing skill mix challenges, prioritizing the allocation of health workers to lower-level facilities, harmonizing the contractual terms and incentives of health workers, and strengthening monitoring and supervision.

Development of village doctors in China: financial compensation and health system support.

BACKGROUND: Since 1968, China has trained about 1.5 million barefoot doctors in a few years' time to provide basic health services to 0.8 billion rural population. China's Ministry of Health stopped using the term of barefoot doctor in 1985, and changed policy to develop village doctors. Since then, village doctors have kept on playing an irreplaceable role in China's rural health, even though the number of village doctors has fluctuated over the years and they face serious challenges. United Nations declared Sustainable Development Goals in 2015 to achieve universal health coverage by 2030. Under this context, development of Community Health workers (CHWs) has become an emerging policy priority in many resource-poor developing countries. China's experiences and lessons learnt in developing and maintaining village doctors may be useful for these developing countries. METHODS: This paper aims to synthesis lessons learnt from the Chinese CHW experiences. It summarizes China's experiences in exploring and using strategic partnership between the community and the formal health system to develop CHWs in the two stages, the barefoot doctor stage (1968 -1985) and the village doctor stage (1985-now). Chinese and English literature were searched from PubMed, CNKI and Wanfang. The information extracted from the selected articles were synthesized according to the four partnership strategies for communities and health system to support CHW development, namely 1) joint ownership and design of CHW programmes; 2) collaborative supervision and constructive feedback; 3) a balanced package of incentives, both financial and non-financial; and 4) a practical monitoring system incorporating data from the health system and community. RESULTS: The study found that the townships and villages provided an institutional basis for barefoot doctor policy, while the formal health system, including urban hospitals, county health schools, township health centers, and mobile medical teams provided training to the barefoot doctors. But After 1985, the formal health system played a more dominant role in the CHW system including both selection and training of village doctors. China applied various mechanisms to compensate village doctors in different stages. During 1960s and 1970s, the main income source of barefoot doctors was from their villages' collective economy. After 1985 when the rural collective economy collapsed and barefoot doctors were transformed to village doctors, they depended on user fees, especially from drug sale revenues. In the new century, especially after the new round of health system reform in 2009, government subsidy has become an increasing source of village doctors' income. CONCLUSION: The barefoot doctor policy has played a significant role in providing basic human resources for health and basic health services to rural populations when rural area had great shortages of health resources. The key experiences for this great achievement are the intersection between the community and the formal health system, and sustained and stable financial compensation to the community health workers.

Examining multiple funding flows to public healthcare providers in low- and middle-income countries - results from case studies in Burkina Faso, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Tunisia and Vietnam.

Provider payment methods are traditionally examined by appraising the incentive signals inherent in individual payment mechanisms. However, mixed payment arrangements, which result in multiple funding flows from purchasers to providers, could be better understood by applying a systems approach that assesses the combined effects of multiple payment streams on healthcare providers. Guided by the framework developed by Barasa et al. (2021) (Barasa E, Mathauer I, Kabia E et al. 2021. How do healthcare providers respond to multiple funding flows? A conceptual framework and options to align them. Health Policy and Planning  36: 861-8.), this paper synthesizes the findings from six country case studies that examined multiple funding flows and describes the potential effect of multiple payment streams on healthcare provider behaviour in low- and middle-income countries. The qualitative findings from this study reveal the extent of undesirable provider behaviour occurring due to the receipt of multiple funding flows and explain how certain characteristics of funding flows can drive the occurrence of undesirable behaviours. Service and resource shifting occurred in most of the study countries; however, the occurrence of cost shifting was less evident. The perceived adequacy of payment rates was found to be the strongest driver of provider behaviour in the countries examined. The study results indicate that undesirable provider behaviours can have negative impacts on efficiency, equity and quality in healthcare service provision. Further empirical studies are required to add to the evidence on this link. In addition, future research could explore how governance arrangements can be used to coordinate multiple funding flows, mitigate unfavourable consequences and identify issues associated with the implementation of relevant governance measures.

How do healthcare providers respond to multiple funding flows? A conceptual framework and options to align them.

Provider payment methods are a key health policy lever because they influence healthcare provider behaviour and affect health system objectives, such as efficiency, equity, financial protection and quality. Previous research focused on analysing individual provider payment methods in isolation, or on the actions of individual purchasers. However, purchasers typically use a mix of provider payment methods to pay healthcare providers and most health systems are fragmented with multiple purchasers. From a health provider perspective, these different payments are experienced as multiple funding flows which together send a complex set of signals about where they should focus their effort. In this article, we argue that there is a need to expand the analysis of provider payment methods to include an analysis of the interactions of multiple funding flows and the combined effect of their incentives on the provision of healthcare services. The purpose of the article is to highlight the importance of multiple funding flows to health facilities and present a conceptual framework to guide their analysis. The framework hypothesizes that when healthcare providers receive multiple funding flows, they may find certain funding flows more favourable than others based on how these funding flows compare to each other on a range of attributes. This creates a set of incentives, and consequently, healthcare providers may alter their behaviour in three ways: resource shifting, service shifting and cost shifting. We describe these behaviours and how they may affect health system objectives. Our analysis underlines the need to align the incentives generated by multiple funding flows. To achieve this, we propose three policy strategies that relate to the governance of healthcare purchasing: reducing the fragmentation of health financing arrangements to decrease the number of multiple purchaser arrangements and funding flows; harmonizing signals from multiple funding flows; and constraining providers from responding to undesirable incentives.

International flow of Zambian nurses.

This commentary paper highlights changing patterns of outward migration of Zambian nurses. The aim is to discuss these pattern changes in the light of policy developments in Zambia and in receiving countries. Prior to 2000, South Africa was the most important destination for Zambian registered nurses. In 2000, new destination countries, such as the United Kingdom, became available, resulting in a substantial increase in migration from Zambia. This is attributable to the policy of active recruitment by the United Kingdom's National Health Service and Zambia's policy of offering Voluntary Separation Packages: early retirement lump-sum payments promoted by the government, which nurses used towards migration costs. The dramatic decline in migration to the United Kingdom since 2004 is likely to be due to increased difficulties in obtaining United Kingdom registration and work permits. Despite smaller numbers, enrolled nurses are also leaving Zambia for other destination countries, a significant new development. This paper stresses the need for nurse managers and policy-makers to pay more attention to these wider nurse migration trends in Zambia, and argues that the focus of any migration strategy should be on how to retain a motivated workforce through improving working conditions and policy initiatives to encourage nurses to stay within the public sector.

Strategic purchasing and health system efficiency: A comparison of two financing schemes in Thailand.

Strategic purchasing is an essential health financing function. This paper compares the strategic purchasing practices of Thailand's two tax-financed health insurance schemes, the Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS) and the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS), and identifies factors contributing to successful universal health coverage outcomes by analysing the relationships between the purchaser and government, providers and members. The study uses a cross-sectional mixed-methods design, including document review and interviews with 56 key informants. The Comptroller General Department (CGD) of Ministry of Finance manages CSMBS as one among civil servant welfare programmes. Their purchasing is passive. Fee for service payment for outpatient care has resulted in rapid cost escalation and overspending of their annual budget. In contrast, National Health Security Office (NHSO) manages purchasing for UCS, which undertakes a range of strategic purchasing actions, including applying closed ended provider payment, promoting primary healthcare's gate keeping functions, exercising collective purchasing power and engaging views of members in decision making process. This difference in purchasing arrangements resulted in expenditure per CSMBS member being 4 times higher than UCS in 2014. The governance of the purchaser organization, the design of the purchasing arrangements including incentives and use of information, and the institutional capacities to implement purchasing functions are essential for effective strategic purchasing which can improve health system efficiency as a whole.