Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; exchange and insurance market standards for 2015 and beyond. Final rule.

This final rule addresses various requirements applicable to health insurance issuers, Affordable Insurance Exchanges (``Exchanges''), Navigators, non-Navigator assistance personnel, and other entities under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (collectively referred to as the Affordable Care Act). Specifically, the rule establishes standards related to product discontinuation and renewal, quality reporting, non-discrimination standards, minimum certification standards and responsibilities of qualified health plan (QHP) issuers, the Small Business Health Options Program, and enforcement remedies in Federally-facilitated Exchanges. It also finalizes: A modification of HHS's allocation of reinsurance collections if those collections do not meet our projections; certain changes to allowable administrative expenses in the risk corridors calculation; modifications to the way we calculate the annual limit on cost sharing so that we round this parameter down to the nearest $50 increment; an approach to index the required contribution used to determine eligibility for an exemption from the shared responsibility payment under section 5000A of the Internal Revenue Code; grounds for imposing civil money penalties on persons who provide false or fraudulent information to the Exchange and on persons who improperly use or disclose information; updated standards for the consumer assistance programs; standards related to the opt-out provisions for self-funded, non-Federal governmental plans and related to the individual market provisions under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 including excepted benefits; standards regarding how enrollees may request access to non-formulary drugs under exigent circumstances; amendments to Exchange appeals standards and coverage enrollment and termination standards; and time-limited adjustments to the standards relating to the medical loss ratio (MLR) program. The majority of the provisions in this rule are being finalized as proposed.

The welfare gain from replacing the health insurance tax exclusion with lump-sum tax credits.

This paper analyzes the welfare gain from replacing the tax exclusion of employer-provided health insurance with a lump-sum tax credit. It differs from earlier studies in that we look at the welfare cost of health insurance tax exclusion as coming directly from excessive health insurance rather than from overconsumption of medical care and that we account for the labor market effect of the tax exclusion on welfare. Both differences work to produce a smaller tax reform welfare gain. For a set of mid-range parameter values, the welfare gain is about 21% of current health insurance tax expenditures. In addition, government tax expenditures would fall by 38%, and health insurance spending would fall by 77% after the reform.

Quality of care in Medicaid managed care and commercial health plans.

CONTEXT: In contrast to the commercially insured population, the proportion of Medicaid beneficiaries enrolling in health maintenance organizations continues to increase. OBJECTIVE: To compare quality of care within and between the Medicaid and commercial populations in 3 types of managed care plans: Medicaid-only plans (serving predominantly Medicaid enrollees), commercial-only plans (serving predominantly commercial enrollees), and Medicaid/commercial plans (serving substantial numbers of both types of enrollees). DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: All 383 health plans that reported quality-of-care data to the National Committee for Quality Assurance for 2002 and 2003, including 204 commercial-only plans, 142 Medicaid/commercial plans (plans reported data for the Medicaid and commercial populations separately); and 37 Medicaid-only plans. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Eleven quality indicators from the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS) applicable to the Medicaid population. RESULTS: Among Medicaid enrollees, performance on the 11 measures observed in this study were comparable for Medicaid-only plans and Medicaid/commercial plans. Similarly, among commercial enrollees, there was virtually no difference in performance between health plans that served only the commercial population and those that also served the Medicaid population. Overall across all health plan types, the performance for the commercial population exceeded the performance for the Medicaid population on all measures except 1, ranging from a difference of 4.9% for controlling hypertension (58.4% for commercial vs 53.5% for Medicaid; P = .002) to 24.5% for rates of appropriate postpartum care (77.2% for commercial vs 52.7% for Medicaid; P = .001). Differences of similar magnitude were observed for commercial and Medicaid populations treated within the same health plan. CONCLUSIONS: Medicaid managed care enrollees receive lower-quality care than that received by commercial managed care enrollees. There were no differences in quality of care for the Medicaid population between Medicaid-only plans and commercial plans that also served the Medicaid population.

Responsible health insurance revisited: pouring liberal wine into a conservative bottle.

In 1991, an article appeared proposing a plan for "Responsible National Health Insurance" (RHI) that contained three crucial elements supported by economists affiliated with two conservative policy institutions (the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation). The central purpose of this article is to revisit RHI in light of developments over the past decade, and to make the case that liberals, rather than reject RHI, now should support it, provided conservatives agree to sufficient funding. In this article, I recommend "pouring liberal wine into this conservative bottle."

Choosing a health plan: do large employers use the data?

Significant private and public resources go into the production of various types of performance measures: from patient satisfaction with nonclinical service to clinical outcomes. While recent investigations have focused on the effect of clinical outcomes information on clinical practice, almost no work examines its effect on purchasers' decisions. This study examines how large employers use performance information, including clinical outcomes, in purchasing decisions. Representatives of thirty-three large employers that purchase for 1.8 million covered lives were interviewed in early 1997. Findings suggest that purchasers are not always aware of clinical outcomes data and that measures do not meet their decision-making needs. Further, the variety and amount of performance information to process for purchasing decisions is a barrier to effective decision making. Recommendations for supporting purchasers' use of performance information, especially clinical outcomes data, are included.

Building on the job-based health care system: what would it take?

Recent surveys indicate widespread public support for reforming health care by building on our mixed public/private system. The authors present a blueprint for such reform, along with design choices and their implications, that would improve access, cost control, and quality. Requiring employers to provide coverage, or at least to help workers obtain group insurance, combined with income-based premium subsidies, expanded public programs, and backup "insurance exchanges," would make affordable coverage available to nearly everyone. Cost control and quality improvement would be achieved mainly through pressures applied on the health care system by multiple, large purchasers that wield much buying power.

Expanding employment-based health insurance: is small group reform the answer?

Nearly two-thirds of all uninsured workers are employed in firms with 100 or fewer employees. Making insurance more affordable and available to small groups is high on the political agenda. Efforts to reform the small group market include making insurance more available by restricting the use of medical underwriting to deny access, and compressing rates to make it more affordable for high-risk groups. Other reforms pursued at the state level have focused on reducing the price of insurance facing all small employers. My analysis suggests that these proposals will have limited success in reducing the number of uninsured. Short of compulsory insurance, significant changes will occur only when insurance is organized around larger purchasing groups and not small employers.

Federal Employees Health Benefits Program improving carrier performance; conforming changes--OPM. Proposed rulemaking.

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is proposing to issue a regulation that would amend the Federal Employees Health Benefits Acquisition Regulation (FEHBAR) to underscore accountability for customer service and contractual compliance among the Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) Program community-rated carriers. The regulation would enable OPM to better manage carriers' performance over key contract areas, including customer service measures, information and reporting requirements, and significant events that might affect service to enrollees. Accurate and timely performance by carriers will facilitate the Program meeting its customer service standards.

Federal Employees Health Benefits Program improving carrier performance; conforming changes--OPM. Final rule.

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is issuing a final regulation that implements OPM's initiative to ensure high quality customer service to its enrollees in the Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) Program by establishing a performance evaluation program that will hold community-rated carriers accountable for their performance. The regulation would enable OPM to better manage carriers' performance in key contract areas, including customer service measures, information and reporting requirements, and significant events that might affect service to enrollees.

Federal employees health benefits program: limitation on physician charges and FEHB Program payments--Office of Personnel Management. Final rule.

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is making final its interim regulation that amends current Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) Program regulations. The final regulation requires that the charges and FEHB fee-for-service plans' benefit payments for certain physician services furnished to retired enrolled individuals do not exceed the limits on charges and payments established under the Medicare fee schedule for physician services.

Medical consultant key to dealing effectively with insurance fraud and abuse.

An unexpected, but everpresent, by-product of the development of the health care insurance industry is the tendency of those using the industry's services to "game" the system. While fraud and abuse in the claiming of insurance benefits are not the only or the most significant cause of steeply rising health care costs, they certainly contribute to the problem. Payers are advised to maintain a sharp eye for potential fraud and abuse and to observe some simple rules for detecting and eliminating them.

ERISA and health plans.

This Issue Brief is designed to provide a basic understanding of the relationship of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to health plans. It is based, in part, on an Employee Benefit Research Institute-Education and Research Fund (EBRI-ERF) educational briefing held in March 1995. This report includes a section by Peter Schmidt of Arnold & Porter, a section about multiemployer plans written by Judy Mazo of The Segal Company; and a section about ERISA and state health reform written by Kala Ladenheim of the Intergovernmental Health Policy Project. Starting in the late 1980s, three trends converged to make ERISA a critical factor in state health reforms: increasingly comprehensive state health policy experimentation; changes in the makeup of the insurance market (including the rise in self-insurance and the growth of managed care); and increasingly expansive interpretations of ERISA by federal courts. The changing interpretations of ERISA's relationship to three categories of state health initiatives--insurance mandates, medical high risk pools, and uncompensated care pools--illustrate how these forces are playing out today. ERISA does have a very broad preemptive effect. Federal statutes do not need to say anything about preemption in order to preempt state law. For example, if there is a direct conflict, it would be quite clear under the Supremacy Clause [of the U.S. Constitution] that ERISA, or any federal statue, would preempt a directly conflicting state statute. States can indirectly regulate health care plans that provide benefits through insurance contracts by establishing the terms of the contract. And they also raise money by imposing premium taxes. But they cannot do the same with respect to self-funded plans. That is one of the factors that has caused a great rise in the number of self-funded plans. State regulation [of employee benefits] can create three kinds of problems: cost of taxes, fees, or other charges; cost of dealing with substantive, possibly inconsistent, benefit standards; and cost of identifying, understanding, and complying with the regulations themselves.

Count on quality.

Determined to put the brakes on high health care costs, General Motors discovered quality. From Anderson, Ind., to Hershey, Pa., corporate America finally realizes that the best bang for its buck comes from helping doctors and hospitals reengineer the way they care for patients.