Explaining illness with evil: pathogen prevalence fosters moral vitalism.

Pathogens represent a significant threat to human health leading to the emergence of strategies designed to help manage their negative impact. We examined how spiritual beliefs developed to explain and predict the devastating effects of pathogens and spread of infectious disease. Analysis of existing data in studies 1 and 2 suggests that moral vitalism (beliefs about spiritual forces of evil) is higher in geographical regions characterized by historical higher levels of pathogens. Furthermore, drawing on a sample of 3140 participants from 28 countries in study 3, we found that historical higher levels of pathogens were associated with stronger endorsement of moral vitalistic beliefs. Furthermore, endorsement of moral vitalistic beliefs statistically mediated the previously reported relationship between pathogen prevalence and conservative ideologies, suggesting these beliefs reinforce behavioural strategies which function to prevent infection. We conclude that moral vitalism may be adaptive: by emphasizing concerns over contagion, it provided an explanatory model that enabled human groups to reduce rates of contagious disease.

Ernest Everett Just: Egg and embryo as excitable systems.

Ernest Everett Just (1883-1941) was an African American embryologist of international standing whose research interests lay in the area of fertilization and early development in marine invertebrates. Perhaps best known for his discovery of the dynamical and structural blocks to polyspermy that sweep over the egg upon fertilization, E. E. Just also was the first to associate cell surface changes with stages of embryonic development. He was deeply familiar with the natural history of the animals whose eggs he studied, and his knowledge of natural settings led him to emphasize the importance of using laboratory conditions that closely match those in nature. Based on more than 30 years of work, he came to believe that it was the cell surface that played the most critical role in development, heredity, and evolution. He promoted a holistic view of cells and organisms in opposition to the gene-centric view that was becoming more prevalent with the rise of genetics, but rejected the vitalism espoused by some biologists of his era, calling instead for "a physics and chemistry in a new dimension …superimposed upon the now known physics and chemistry" to account for biological phenomena. Just's incisive critique of genetic reductionism finds echoes in contemporary multiscale, systems approaches in biology. His speculations on the relationship between developmental and evolutionary mechanisms resonate with today's evolutionary developmental biology. After a brief biographical sketch, this paper outlines and discusses some of Just's scientific contributions, and shows how his ideas remain relevant today.

A life dedicated to research and ideal: Johannes Müller between empirical universality and idealistic vitalism mirrored in lecture notes from 1851.

Until the mid-nineteenth century, "physiology" was a comprehensive theory of life, expounded and shaped by Johannes P. Müller (1801-1858). Biologists and medical doctors still refer to him today. In the summer term of 1851, Müller gave a lecture on the Comparative Anatomy of animals. This lecture was attended and recorded by Ernst Zeller (1830-1902), a future physician and zoologist, and has recently been published together with a German transcript. In this paper, we situate Johannes Müller within the intellectual history of his time. Through his "empirical idealism," we show how he opposed the speculative tendencies of the romantic understanding of nature, the emerging evolutionism, and the growing splits in the natural sciences. Müller focused on recognizing living nature as a whole and realizing ideal "phenomena" through his empirical research. He considered the notion of the soul of the world. Müller's lecture transcript serves as a poignant testament to German scientific culture in the mid-nineteenth century, a few years before the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species. It also provides valuable insights into the self-contained epistemological foundations of morphology.

Toward a Bio-Organon: A model of interdependence between energy, information and knowledge in living systems.

What is an organism? In the absence of a fundamental biological definition, what constitutes a living organism, whether it is a unicellular microbe, a multicellular being or a multi-organismal society, remains an open question. New models of living systems are needed to address the scale of this question, with implications for the relationship between humanity and planetary ecology. Here we develop a generic model of an organism that can be applied across multiple scales and through major evolutionary transitions to form a toolkit, or bio-organon, for theoretical studies of planetary-wide physiology. The tool identifies the following core organismic principles that cut across spatial scale: (1) evolvability through self-knowledge, (2) entanglement between energy and information, and (3) extrasomatic "technology" to scaffold increases in spatial scale. Living systems are generally defined by their ability to self-sustain against entropic forces of degradation. Life "knows" how to survive from the inside, not from its genetic code alone, but by utilizing this code through dynamically embodied and functionally specialized flows of information and energy. That is, entangled metabolic and communication networks bring encoded knowledge to life in order to sustain life. However, knowledge is itself evolved and is evolving. The functional coupling between knowledge, energy and information has ancient origins, enabling the original, cellular "biotechnology," and cumulative evolutionary creativity in biochemical products and forms. Cellular biotechnology also enabled the nesting of specialized cells into multicellular organisms. This nested organismal hierarchy can be extended further, suggesting that an organism of organisms, or a human "superorganism," is not only possible, but in keeping with evolutionary trends.

[The vitalism of Paul-Joseph Barthez (1734-1806)].

In The Logic of Life (1970), Francois Jacob (1920- ), Nobel Prize laureate in Physiology or Medicine (1965), proclaimed the end of vitalism based on the concept of life. More than two decades before this capital sentence condemning vitalism was pronounced, Georges Canguilhem (1904-1995), a French philosopher of medicine, already acknowledged that eighteenth-century vitalism was scientifically retrograde and politically reactionary or counter-revolutionary insofar as it was rooted in the animism of Georg Ernst Stahl (1660-1734). The negative preconception of the term 'vitalism' came to be established as an orthodox view, since Claude Bernard (1813-1878) unfairly criticized contemporary vitalism in order to propagate his idea of experimental medicine. An eminent evolutionary biologist like Ernst Mayr (1904-2005) still defended similar views in This is Biology (1997), arguing that if vitalists were decisive and convincing in their rejection of the Cartesian model (negative heuristics), however they were equally indecisive and unconvincing in their own explanatory endeavors (positive heuristics). Historically speaking, vitalists came to the forefront for their outstanding criticism of Cartesian mechanism and physicochemical reductionism, while their innovative concepts and theories were underestimated and received much less attention. Is it true that vitalism was merely a pseudo-science, representing a kind of romanticism or mysticism in biomedical science? Did vitalists lack any positive heuristics in their biomedical research? Above all, what was actually the so.called 'vitalism'? This paper aims to reveal the positive heuristics of vitalism defined by Paul.Joseph Barthez (1734-1806) who was the founder of the vitalist school of Montpellier. To this end, his work and idea are introduced with regard to the vying doctrines in physiology and medicine. At the moment when he taught at the medical school of Montpellier, his colleagues advocated the mechanism of Rene Descartes (1596-1650), the iatromechanism of Herman Boerhaave (1668-1738), the iatrochemistry of Jan Baptist van Helmont (1579-1644), the animism of Stahl, and the organicism of Theophile de Bordeu (1722-1776). On the contrary, Barthez devoted himself to synthesize diverse doctrines and his vitalism consequently illustrated an eclectic character. Always taking a skeptical standpoint regarding the capacity of biomedical science, he defined his famous concept of 'vital principle (principe vital)' as the 'x (unknown variable)' of physiology. He argued that the hypothetical concept of vital principle referred to the 'experimental cause (cause experimentale)' verifiable by positive science. Thus, the vital principle was not presupposed as an a priori regulative principle. It was an a posteriori heuristic principle resulting from several experiments. The 'positivist hypothetism' of Barthez demonstrates not only pragmatism but also positivism in his scientific terminology. Furthermore, Barthez established a guideline for clinical practice according to his own methodological principles. It can be characterized as a 'humanist pragmatism' for the reason that all sort of treatments were permitted as far as they were beneficial to the patient. Theoretical incoherence or incommensurability among different treatments did not matter to Barthez. His practical strategy for clinical medicine consisted of three principles: namely, the natural, analytic, and empirical method. This formulation is indebted to the 'analytic method (methode analytique)' of the French empiricist philosopher Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1714-1780). In conclusion, the eighteenth.century French vitalism conceived by Barthez pursued pragmatism in general, positivism in methodology, and humanism in clinics.

"Life-bearing molecules" versus "life-embodying systems": Two contrasting views on the what-is-life (WIL) problem persisting from the early days of molecular biology to the post-genomic cell- and organism-level biology.

"What is life?" is an ultimate biological quest for the principle that makes organisms alive. This 'WIL problem' is not, however, a simple one that we have a straightforward strategy to attack. From the beginning, molecular biology tried to identify molecules that bear the essence of life: the double helical DNA represented replication, and enzymes were micro-actuators of biological activities. A dominating idea behind these mainstream biological studies relies on the identification of life-bearing molecules, which themselves are models of life. Another, prevalent idea emphasizes that life resides in the whole system of an organism, but not in some particular molecules. The behavior of a complex system may be considered to embody the essence of life. The thermodynamic view of life system in the early 20th century was remodeled as physics of complex systems and systems biology. The two views contrast with each other, but they are no longer heritage of the historical dualism in biology, such as mechanism/materialism versus vitalism, or reductionism versus holism. These two views are both materialistic and mechanistic, and act as driving forces of modern biology. In reality, molecules function in a context of systems, whereas systems presuppose functional molecules. A key notion to reconcile this conflict is that subjects of biological studies are given before we start to study them. Cell- or organism-level biology is destined to the dialectic of molecules and systems, but this antagonism can be resolved by dynamic thinking involving biological evolution.

Worthy heir or treacherous patricide? Konrad Lorenz and Jakob v. Uexküll.

The biologist Jakob v. Uexküll is often seen as the preceptor of modern behavioral theory, who lastingly influenced Konrad Lorenz in particular. Nevertheless, Uexküll has been highly inadequately received by the school Lorenz founded. This neglect of Uexküll's works resulted because Lorenz and Uexküll came into contact at a time when the biological sciences were sundered by a deep ideological division. On the one side stood the Darwin-rejecting Neo-Vitalists (for example Uexküll), on the other side were the Neo-Darwinists (for example Lorenz). After Vitalism was overcome as a consequence of the Evolutionary Synthesis, Darwinists who had taken an intermittent interest in Vitalists and their theories could now only distance themselves completely from earlier ideas. This went not only for biologists and behavioral researchers, but also for medical scientists. The emancipation from the starting points of their own science was so complete that, even decades later, when the earlier debates about Mechanism and Vitalism were long since historically outdated, behavioral research never investigated its own history.

Ontogeny of somatostatin-immunoreactive systems in the brain of the brown trout (Teleostei).

The development of somatostatin-immunoreactive neurons and fibres was studied, using immunocytochemistry, in the brain of the brown trout. Somatostatinergic perikarya were found in many regions including several telencephalic areas, the preoptic nucleus, anterior tuberal and lateral tuberal nuclei, the lateral recess nucleus, dorsal tuberal nucleus, the pre- and pseudoglomerular nuclei, central thalamic nucleus, optic tectum, interpeduncular nucleus, several isthmal and reticular nuclei and the solitary fascicle nucleus. The ventrolateral area of the telencephalon and the nucleus lateralis tuberis are the first immunoreactive nuclei to appear in ontogeny, and cells of some telencephalic areas and of the lateral optic recess nucleus, the latest. Somatostatin-immunoreactive fibre tracts innervate the hypophysis and different regions of the brain. The most richly innervated areas in adults are the dorsolateral telencephalic area and the organon vasculosum laminae terminalis. Two patterns of production of somatostatinergic cells were observed: that of populations in which cell numbers increase over the lifetime of the fish, and that of populations whose cell number is established early in development or even diminishes in adulthood. These results provide interesting contrasts to those previously reported in birds and mammals.

The marginalization of hormesis.

Despite the substantial development and publication of highly reproducible toxicological data, the concept of hormetic dose-response relationships was never integrated into the mainstream of toxicological thought. Review of the historical foundations of the interpretation of the bioassay and assessment of competitive theories of dose-response relationships lead to the conclusion that multiple factors contributed to the marginalization of hormesis during the middle and subsequent decades of the 20th century. These factors include: (a) the close-association of hormesis with homeopathy lead to the hostility of modern medicine toward homeopathy thereby creating a guilt by association framework, and the carry-over influence of that hostility in the judgements of medically-based pharmacologists/ toxicologists toward hormesis; (b) the emphasis of high dose effects linked with a lack of appreciation of the significance of the implications of low dose stimulatory effects; (c) the lack of an evolutionary-based mechanism(s) to account for hormetic effects; and (d) the lack of appropriate scientific advocates to counter aggressive and intellectually powerful critics of the hormetic perspective.