"What is Dead May Not Die": Locating Marginalized Concepts Among Ordinary Biologists.

Historians and biologists identify the debate between mechanists and vitalists over the nature of life itself with the arguments of Driesch, Loeb, and other prominent voices. But what if the conversation was broader and the consequences deeper for the field? Following the suspicions of Joseph Needham in the 1930s and Francis Crick in the 1960s, we deployed tools of the digital humanities to an old problem in the history of biology. We analyzed over 31,000 peer-reviewed scientific papers and learned that bioexceptionalism participated in a robust discursive landscape throughout subfields of the life sciences, occupied even by otherwise unknown biologists.

From Organismic Biology as History and Philosophy to the History and Philosophy of Biology-the Work of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger in the German Context.

In this paper, I ask about the broader context of the history and philosophy of biology in the German-speaking world as the place in which Hans-Jörg Rheinberger began his work. Three German philosophical traditions-neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, and Lebensphilosophie-were interested in the developments and conceptual challenges of the life sciences in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Their reflections were taken up by life scientists under the terms theoretische Biologie (theoretical biology) and allgemeine Biologie (general biology), i. e., for theoretical and methodological reflections. They used historical and philosophical perspectives to develop vitalistic, organicist, or holistic approaches to life. In my paper, I argue that the resulting discourse did not come to an end in 1945. Increasingly detached from biological research, it formed an important context for the formation of the field of history and philosophy of biology. In Rheinberger's work, we can see the "Spalten" and "Fugen"-the continuities and discontinuities-that this tradition left there.

The biological sciences section program at the 60th Annual Meeting of the Gerontological Society of America.

In this era of genomics and other exciting technical advances, research on the biology of aging is undergoing a renaissance. This report summarizes 10 cutting-edge areas of research covered in symposia that spanned such topics as stem cells, novel vaccine strategies, nutritional sensing, new concepts of Parkinson's disease, high throughput screening for aging interventions, manipulating telomerase in cancer and immunodeficiency, synergy between aging and HIV disease, and epigenetic influences on aging. Novel animal models, including those showing no evidence of aging, as well as ethical and political implications of embryonic stem cells and alternative medicine are also discussed.

Mechanism, vitalism and organicism in late nineteenth and twentieth-century biology: the importance of historical context.

The term 'mechanism' has been used in two quite different ways in the history of biology. Operative, or explanatory mechanism refers to the step-by-step description or explanation of how components in a system interact to yield a particular outcome (as in the 'mechanism of enzyme action' or the 'mechanism of synaptic transmission'). Philosophical Mechanism, on the other hand, refers to a broad view of organisms as material entities, functioning in ways similar to machines--that is, carrying out a variety of activities based on known chemical and physical processes. In the early twentieth century philosophical Mechanism became the foundation of a 'new biology' that sought to establish the life sciences on the same solid and rigorous foundation as the physical sciences, including a strong emphasis on experimentation. In the context of the times this campaign was particularly aimed at combating the reintroduction of more holistic, non-mechanical approaches into the life sciences (organicism, vitalism). In so doing, Mechanists failed to see some of the strong points of non-vitalistic holistic thinking. The two approaches are illustrated in the work of Jacques Loeb and Hans Spemann.

Scientism and Pseudoscience: A Philosophical Commentary.

The term "scientism" is used in a variety of ways with both negative and positive connotations. I suggest that some of these uses are inappropriate, as they aim simply at dismissing without argument an approach that a particular author does not like. However, there are legitimate negative uses of the term, which I explore by way of an analogy with the term "pseudoscience." I discuss these issues by way of a recent specific example provided by a controversy in the field of bioethics concerning the value, or lack thereof, of homeopathy. I then frame the debate about scientism within the broader context of C.P. Snow's famous essay on the "two cultures."

Chemical versus biological explanations: interdisciplinarity and reductionism in the 19th century life sciences.

This paper analyzes four controversies in the 19th century life sciences: the nature of fermentation, the nature of infectious diseases, the generation of life from inanimate matter, and vitalism. All these controversies appear to concern chemical versus biological explanations, suggesting that reduction of biology to chemistry was the common underlying issue. My analysis rejects such interpretations, including the labels for explanation, and instead points out sophisticated forms of interdisciplinarity between chemistry, medicine, and biology in the first three debates. I argue that the philosophically favored perspective on reductionism, historically induced by a few physicians in the fourth debate, leads us astray from understanding interdisciplinary research.

The organism as ontological go-between: hybridity, boundaries and degrees of reality in its conceptual history.

The organism is neither a discovery like the circulation of the blood or the glycogenic function of the liver, nor a particular biological theory like epigenesis or preformationism. It is rather a concept which plays a series of roles--sometimes overt, sometimes masked--throughout the history of biology, and frequently in very normative ways, also shifting between the biological and the social. Indeed, it has often been presented as a key-concept in life science and the 'theorization' of Life, but conversely has also been the target of influential rejections: as just an instrument of transmission for the selfish gene, but also, historiographically, as part of an outdated 'vitalism'. Indeed, the organism, perhaps because it is experientially closer to the 'body' than to the 'molecule', is often the object of quasi-affective theoretical investments presenting it as essential, sometimes even as the pivot of a science or a particular approach to nature, while other approaches reject or attack it with equal force, assimilating it to a mysterious 'vitalist' ontology of extra-causal forces, or other pseudo-scientific doctrines. This paper does not seek to adjudicate between these debates, either in terms of scientific validity or historical coherence; nor does it return to the well-studied issue of the organism-mechanism tension in biology. Recent scholarship has begun to focus on the emergence and transformation of the concept of organism, but has not emphasized so much the way in which organism is a shifting, 'go-between' concept-invoked as 'natural' by some thinkers to justify their metaphysics, but then presented as value-laden by others, over and against the natural world. The organism as go-between concept is also a hybrid, a boundary concept or an epistemic limit case, all of which partly overlap with the idea of 'nomadic concepts'. Thereby the concept of organism continues to function in different contexts--as a heuristic, an explanatory challenge, a model of order, of regulation, etc.--despite having frequently been pronounced irrelevant and reduced to molecules or genes. Yet this perpetuation is far removed from any 'metaphysics of organism', or organismic biology.

Vital forces and organization: philosophy of nature and biology in Karl Friedrich Kielmeyer.

The historical literature on German life science at the end of the 18th century has tried to rehabilitate eighteenth century vitalism by stressing its difference from Naturphilosophie. Focusing on the work of Karl Friedrich Kielmeyer this paper argues that these positions are based on a historiographical bias and that the clear-cut boundary between German vitalism and Naturphilosophie is historically unattested. On the contrary, they both belong to the process of conceptual genealogy that contributed to the project of a general biology. The latter emerged as the science concerned with the laws that regulate the organization of living nature as a whole. The focus on organization was, at least partially, the result of the debate surrounding the notion of "vital force", which originated in the mid-eighteenth century and caused a shift from a regulative to a constitutive understanding of teleology.

Alchemy as studies of life and matter: reconsidering the place of vitalism in early modern chemistry.

Early modern alchemy studied both matter and life, much like today's life sciences. What material life is and how it comes about intrigued alchemists. Many found the answer by assuming a vital principle that served as the source and cause of life. Recent literature has presented important cases in which vitalist formulations incorporated corpuscular or mechanical elements that were characteristic of the New Science and other cases in which vitalist thinking influenced important figures of the Scientific Revolution. Not merely speculative, vitalist ideas also motivated chymical practice. The unity of life science and material science that is found in many formulations of Renaissance alchemy disintegrated in Georg Ernst Stahl's version of post-Cartesian vitalism.

Scientific foundations of hormesis. Part 2. Maturation, strengths, limitations, and possible applications in toxicology, pharmacology, and epidemiology.

The notion of hormesis has undergone numerous modifications in the course of the 20th century. Because of its unfortunate association with homeopathy, hormesis did not gain acceptance among biomedical professionals. The lack of a plausible mechanism for its occurrence may have contributed much to the rejection of this concept. This treatise outlines the conceptual struggle for an understanding of the widespread occurrence of low dose effects that appear to be opposite to those caused by high doses as also seen in hormesis. An incomplete conceptualization of time as a fundamental variable of effects (in addition to dose) is identified as one of the major reasons why hermetic responses were not observed more frequently than was reported by Calabrese and Baldwin. The definition of hormesis as an (over)compensation response to an inhibitory signal lacks a designation for (over)compensation responses to stimulatory signals in the other direction. Hormoligosis, which was coined by Luckey for all low-dose stimulatory responses of toxins, is suggested as a suitable term for generalizing the latter types of effects. Both types of effects are recognized as originating in a homeostatic overcompensation response that optimizes the ability of an organism to meet challenges beyond the limits of normal (unexercised) adaptation. Thus, repeated biochemical/physiologic/immunological, etc. exercises like physical exercise make an organism more fit and hence both hormetic and hormoligotic effects will have life-prolonging consequences. A more complete generalization was developed by linking hormesis/hormoligosis with the vast literature on Selye's general adaptation syndrome to stress. According to this broader view, stress is just one type of homeostatic exercise making organisms more fit for future biochemical/physiological/immunological, etc.challenges. Therefore, both hormesis and hormoligosis are manifestations of two nonmutational evolutionary principles--homeostasis and optimization.

Além do mecanicismo e do vitalismo: a normatividade da vida em Georges Canguilhem / Beyond mechanism and vitalism: the normativity of life according to Georges Canguilhem

Discutimos a epistemologia das ciências da vida e das ciências da saúde de Georges Canguilhem, revendo sua crítica à concepção mecanicista da normalidade e da patologia e seu posicionamento frente ao vitalismo. Sugerimos que, enfatizando o conceito de "normatividade da vida", Canguilhem teria apontado para uma superação da oposição entre mecanicismo e vitalismo. Para tal, fazemos uma breve comparação da "normatividade da vida" com o conceito contemporâneo de auto-organização de Michel Debrun, argumentando que a emergência da norma vital se situa num estágio secundário de um processo de (auto-)organização da vida e, portanto, tal normatividade não teria a conotação vitalista, erroneamente atribuída a Canguilhem.

We discuss the epistemology of the sciences of life and health elaborated by Georges Canguilhem. First we review his criticism to mechanicist concepts of normality and pathology, and his position regarding vitalism. We suggest that, when emphasizing the concept of "normativity of life", Canguilhem goes beyond the dichotomy of mechanism and vitalism. We make a brief comparison of his concept of "normativity of life" with the contemporary concept of "self-organization" proposed by Michel Debrun, arguing that the emergency of the vital norm occurs on the second stage of the process of life self-organization and therefore such normativity does not have the vitalist connotation erroneously attributed to Canguilhem.

Los estudios de lo complejo y las ciencias de la vida / The study of the complex and the life sciences

Las características del fenómeno no se enmarcan dentro de la cosmovisión mecanicista y son similares a las características propias a los seres vivos: 1) Relación no mecánica entre el todo y las partes. 2) Emergencias de cualidades globales que no se reducen a las interacciones locales. 3) Combinación entre azar y necesidad. 4) Irreversibilidad esencial. 5) Evolución, dimensión histórica del fenómeno. Vemos entonces la emergencia de un lenguaje similar al lenguaje típico de la biología para describir comportamientos de sistemas físicos y quimicos conocidos como comportamientos complejos. La complejidad abre entonces el camino para disolver la vieja polémica entre el reduccioniismo mecanicista y el vitalismo mediante la creación de un marco conceptual común tanto a la física como a la biología

Considerações sobre os animais de laboratório / Considerations about laboratory animals

o presente trabalho, o autor faz considerações sobre a importância do biotério nos laboratórios científicos; menciona uma série de espécies animais e os principais serviços técnicos em que elas são utilizadas. Discute o conceito de animal de experiência, e, finalmente analisa a importância das condições somáticas e imunológicas nas provas "in anima vili" (AU).

La introducción del sujeto en las ciencias naturales o la rehabilitación del vitalismo / The incorporation of the subject in natural sciences or the revival of vitalism

The incorporaction of the subject in natural sciences or the revival of vitalism: the two classical rationalities Known as mechanistic and vitalist are examined according to the localization of the observers. Thus, the mechanistic approach is equated with an externalist perspective, while vitalism is shown to be congruent with an internalist outlook. The existence of natural internal observers , or agents that blong to the same scale of the observed objects, explanins the appearance of vialis approaches. Furthermore, an epistemological analysis of (form) is persented in order to explain the prevalence of the (formal cause) over the other aristotelian causes. The (formal cause) that explain an internal activity is recuperated as one examines the development of natural sciences.