Polonium-210 poisoning: a first-hand account.

BACKGROUND: Polonium-210 ((210)Po) gained widespread notoriety after the poisoning and subsequent death of Mr Alexander Litvinenko in London, UK, in 2006. Exposure to (210)Po resulted initially in a clinical course that was indistinguishable from infection or exposure to chemical toxins, such as thallium. METHODS: A 43-year-old man presented to his local hospital with acute abdominal pain, diarrhoea, and vomiting, and was admitted to the hospital because of dehydration and persistent gastrointestinal symptoms. He was initially diagnosed with gastroenteritis and treated with antibiotics. Clostridium difficile toxin was subsequently detected in his stools, which is when he first raised the possibility of being poisoned and revealed his background and former identity, having been admitted under a new identity with which he had been provided on being granted asylum in the UK. Within 6 days, the patient had developed thrombocytopenia and neutropenia, which was initially thought to be drug induced. By 2 weeks, in addition to bone marrow failure, he had evidence of alopecia and mucositis. Thallium poisoning was suspected and investigated but ultimately dismissed because blood levels of thallium, although raised, were lower than toxic concentrations. The patient continued to deteriorate and within 3 weeks had developed multiple organ failure requiring ventilation, haemofiltration, and cardiac support, associated with a drop in consciousness. On the 23rd day after he first became ill, he suffered a pulseless electrical activity cardiorespiratory arrest from which he could not be resuscitated and was pronounced dead. FINDINGS: Urine analysis using gamma-ray spectroscopy on day 22 showed a characteristic 803 keV photon emission, raising the possibility of (210)Po poisoning. Results of confirmatory analysis that became available after the patient's death established the presence of (210)Po at concentrations about 10(9)-times higher than normal background levels. Post-mortem tissue analyses showed autolysis and retention of (210)Po at lethal doses in several organs. On the basis of the measured amounts and tissue distribution of (210)Po, it was estimated that the patient had ingested several 1000 million becquerels (a few GBq), probably as a soluble salt (eg, chloride), which delivered very high and fatal radiation doses over a period of a few days. INTERPRETATION: Early symptoms of (210)Po poisoning are indistinguishable from those of a wide range of chemical toxins. Hence, the diagnosis can be delayed and even missed without a high degree of suspicion. Although body surface scanning with a standard Geiger counter was unable to detect the radiation emitted by (210)Po, an atypical clinical course prompted active consideration of poisoning with radioactive material, with the diagnosis ultimately being made with gamma-ray spectroscopy of a urine sample. FUNDING: UK NHS, Public Health England, and the UK Department of Health.

The polonium-210 poisoning of Mr Alexander Litvinenko.

Mr Litvinenko died on 23 November 2006 after having been poisoned with polonium-210 on 1 November. Measurements of the polonium-210 content of post-mortem tissue samples and samples of urine and blood showed the presence of large amounts of 210Po. Autoradiography of hair samples showed two regions of 210Po activity, providing evidence of an earlier poisoning attempt during October 2006, resulting in absorption to blood of about one-hundredth of that estimated for 1 November. Intake by ingestion on 1 November was estimated to be around 4 GBq, assuming 10% absorption to blood, and the resulting organ doses reached estimated values that were generally in a range from about 20 Gy to over 100 Gy. Comparison with estimates of protracted alpha particle doses required to cause irreversible organ damage supported the conclusion that death was the inevitable consequence of multiple organ failure, with destruction of the haemopoietic bone marrow, as well as damage to kidneys and liver, being important contributors. If the earlier poisoning during October 2006 had not been followed by a second major intake on 1 November, it is possible that the earlier intake of around 40 MBq, with absorption of 4 MBq to blood, might have caused irreversible kidney damage over a prolonged period of months or years, with doses of approaching 3 Gy.

Collateral contamination concomitant to the polonium-210 poisoning of Mr Alexander Litvinenko.

Mr Litvinenko died on 23 November 2006, having been poisoned with polonium-210 on 1 November, with evidence of a previous poisoning attempt during October 2006. Measurements of 210Po in urine samples were made for a large number of people to determine whether they may have been contaminated. In the majority of cases, measured levels were attributable to the presence of 210Po from normal dietary sources. For a small number of cases, elevated levels provided evidence of direct contamination associated with the poisonings. For one individual, while estimated doses were below thresholds for irreversible organ damage, a notably increased risk of cancer can be inferred. The use of the chelating agent, unithiol, to increase 210Po excretion in this case was only moderately effective in reducing doses received.

Murder by radiation poisoning: implications for public health.

On November 23, 2006, former Russian military intelligence officer Alexander Litvinenko died in a London hospital. Authorities determined he was deliberately poisoned with the radionuclide Polonium-210 (210Po). Police subsequently discovered that those involved in this crime had--apparently inadvertently--spread 210Po over many locations in London. The United Kingdom Health Protection Agency (HPA) contacted many persons who might have been exposed to 210Po and provided voluntary urine testing. Some of those identified as potentially exposed were U.S. citizens, whom the HPA requested that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) assist in contacting. CDC also provided health care professionals and state and local public health officials with guidance as to how they might respond should a Litvinenko-like incident occur in the U.S. This guidance has resulted in the identification of a number of lessons that can be useful to public health and medical authorities in planning for radiological incidents. Eight such lessons are discussed in this article.

The international follow-up of individuals potentially exposed to polonium-210 in London 2006.

OBJECTIVES: Following a death from polonium-210 ((210)Po), contamination was found at several sites in London. This paper describes the UK Health Protection Agency's follow-up and assessment of individuals resident overseas who were potentially exposed to (210)Po. STUDY DESIGN: Descriptive follow-up study. METHODS: Individuals were classified into three exposure groups (higher, lower and unknown). Presence and degree of internal contamination were measured by 24-h urinary (210)Po activity (mBq/day). Results over 30mBq/day were taken to indicate probable contact with (210)Po in this incident. Dose assessments were conducted to determine degree of exposure and to identify individuals requiring further follow-up. RESULTS: Overall, 664 potentially exposed persons from 52 countries and territories were identified. Of these, 157 (24%) were in the higher exposure category, and urinary measurements were reported for 31% (48/157). Results for 19% (9/48) of those at higher exposure were more than 30mBq/day. For those at lower exposure, the percentage was 4% (3/68). Results above 30mBq/day were significantly more likely to be reported for the higher exposure category than the lower exposure category (Fisher's exact test P=0.010). Reported dose assessments suggested that identified individuals were not at increased health risk in the long term. Challenges and practical lessons were identified during the investigation. CONCLUSION: The results suggest that it is unlikely that any overseas resident had significant internal contamination with (210)Po. However, this incident clearly demonstrated the scale of international involvement likely to be necessary in other public health emergencies in large cities. The lessons identified have implications for the international health community, particularly with regard to the follow-up of individuals exposed to radiation in one country who then travel to another.

Assessing public health risk in the London polonium-210 incident, 2006.

OBJECTIVES: Mr Alexander Litvinenko died in a London hospital on 23 November 2006, allegedly from poisoning with the radionuclide polonium-210 ((210)Po). Associated circumstances required an integrated response to investigate the potential risk of internal contamination for individuals exposed to contaminated environments. STUDY DESIGN: Descriptive study. METHODS: Contaminated locations presenting a potential risk to health were identified through environmental assessment by radiation protection specialists. Individuals connected with these locations were identified and assessed for internal contamination with (210)Po. RESULTS: In total, 1029 UK residents were identified, associated with the 11 most contaminated locations. Of these, 974 were personally interviewed and 787 were offered urine tests for (210)Po excretion. Overall, 139 individuals (18%) showed evidence of probable internal contamination with (210)Po arising from the incident, but only 53 (7%) had assessed radiation doses of 1mSv or more. The highest assessed radiation dose was approximately 100mSv. CONCLUSIONS: Although internal contamination with (210)Po was relatively frequent and was most extensive among individuals associated with locations judged a priori to pose the greatest risk, a high degree of assurance could be given to UK and international communities that the level of health risk from exposure to the radionuclide in this incident was low.

Death by polonium-210: lessons learned from the murder of former Soviet spy Alexander Litvinenko.

The medical response to radiation--whether the result of radiological warfare, terrorist deployment of improvised radiation dispersal weapons, political assassination, occupational or industrial accidents or the medically radiated patient remains one of the least taught among all disciplines within medical education. In the aftermath of 9/11 among medical vulnerabilities to toxicant threats, of all the categories of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)--whether using the CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive) or NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) acronym--radiation is the least taught in professional schools, responder cultures or civil preparedness organizations. To date, few health care professionals (HCP) possess the fundamental knowledge or skills to identify and diagnose, let alone treat a radiation victim; this vulnerability made even more obvious in the aftermath of the high profile assassination of former Russian agent Alexander Litvinenko. He was poisoned with Polonium210. Radioactive substances are ubiquitous with radiation sources being in or transported through virtually every region nationwide. It is essential to increase preparedness among community and rural health care facilities as well as urban and university hospitals. Managing radiation injuries effectively requires access to specialized equipment and expertise. Radiation sickness is progressive and may require acute, critical and long-term care throughout the course of illness. Regardless of the source, preparedness rests upon acknowledging a threat exists and dedicating the resources to address the risks including the enhancement of training and equipment. Mass or individual exposures to radiation present unique challenges to the entire response continuum from law enforcement, first responders and emergency medical care. Increased education about and practice in responding to radiological threats is essential to enhance preparedness.

Polonium-210 poisoning in London: hypochondriasis and public health.

INTRODUCTION: In November 2006, a Russian dissident died from radioactive Polonium-210 (210Po) poisoning in London. Providing reassuring messages during a public health incident may be ineffective for individuals with high health anxiety (hypochondriasis). METHODS: Members of the public who called a 24-hour telephone helpline were offered a follow-up call by a health protection specialist for reassurance. A psychiatrist attempted to contact those callers who were unable to be reassured by the health protection specialist. RESULTS: Of 872 individuals contacted for reassurance, seven (0.6%) could not be reassured. The psychiatrist contacted four of these individuals. Three had a history of health-related anxiety and two attributed somatic symptoms to 210Po exposure. CONCLUSIONS: For individuals with hypochondriasis, reassurance during major public health incidents may be ineffective. Having a psychiatrist available was helpful in managing individuals with excessive health anxiety.

(210)Po poisoning as possible cause of death: forensic investigations and toxicological analysis of the remains of Yasser Arafat.

The late president of the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat, died in November 2004 in Percy Hospital, one month after having experienced a sudden onset of symptoms that included severe nausea, vomiting, diarrhoea and abdominal pain and which were followed by multiple organ failure. In spite of numerous investigations performed in France, the pathophysiological mechanisms at the origin of the symptoms could not be identified. In 2011, we found abnormal levels of polonium-210 ((210)Po) in some of Arafat's belongings that were worn during his final hospital stay and which were stained with biological fluids. This finding led to the exhumation of Arafat's remains in 2012. Significantly higher (up to 20 times) activities of (210)Po and lead-210 ((210)Pb) were found in the ribs, iliac crest and sternum specimens compared to reference samples from the literature (p-value <1%). In all specimens from the tomb, (210)Po activity was supported by a similar activity of (210)Pb. Biokinetic calculations demonstrated that a (210)Pb impurity, as identified in a commercial source of 3MBq of (210)Po, may be responsible for the activities measured in Arafat's belongings and remains 8 years after his death. The absence of myelosuppression and hair loss in Mr Arafat's case compared to Mr Litvinenko's, the only known case of malicious poisoning with (210)Po, could be explained by differences in the time delivery-scheme of intake. In conclusion, statistical Bayesian analysis combining all the evidence gathered in our forensic expert report moderately supports the proposition that Mr Arafat was poisoned by (210)Po.

Prevalence of and risks for internal contamination among hospital staff caring for a patient contaminated with a fatal dose of polonium-210.

BACKGROUND: Alexander Litvinenko died on November 23, 2006, from acute radiation sickness syndrome caused by ingestion of polonium-210 (²¹°Po). OBJECTIVE: The objective was to assess the prevalence of and risk factors for internal contamination with ²¹°Po in healthcare workers (HCWs) caring for the contaminated patient. SETTING: Hospital. PARTICIPANTS: HCWs who had direct contact with the patient. METHODS: We interviewed 43 HCWs and enquired about their activities and use of personal protective equipment (PPE). Internal contamination was defined as urinary ²¹°Po excretion above 20 mBq within 24 hours. We obtained risk ratios (RRs) for internal contamination using Poisson regression. RESULTS: Thirty-seven HCWs (86%) responded, and 8 (22%) showed evidence of internal contamination, all at very low levels that were unlikely to cause adverse health outcomes. Daily care of the patient (washing and toileting the patient) was the main risk factor (RR, 3.6 [95% confidence interval (CI), 1.1-11.6]). In contrast, planned invasive procedures were not associated with a higher risk. There was some evidence of a higher risk associated with handling blood samples (RR, 3.5 [95% CI, 0.8-15.6]) and changing urine bags and/or collecting urine samples (RR, 2.7 [95% CI, 0.8-9.5]). There was also some evidence that those who reported not always using standard PPE were at higher risk than were others (RR, 2.5 [95% CI, 0.8-8.1]). CONCLUSIONS: The sensitive quantitative measurement enabled us to identify factors associated with contamination, which by analogy to other conditions with similar transmission mechanisms may help improve protection and preparedness in staff dealing with an ill patient who experiences an unknown illness.

[Toxicological effects of weapons of mass destruction and noxious agents in modern warfare and terrorism]. / Toksikoloske posljedice oruzja za masovno unistavanje i noksa u suvremenom ratovanju i terorizmu.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) best portray the twisted use of technological achievements against the human species. Despite arm control efforts, WMD threat continues to exist and even proliferate. This in turn calls for improvement in defensive measures against this threat. The modern soldier is exposed to a number of chemical, biological, and radiological agents in military and peace operations, while civilians are mainly exposed to terrorist attacks. Regardless of origin or mode of action, WMDs and other noxious agents aim for the same - to make an organism dysfunctional. Because their effects are often delayed, these agents are hard to spot on time and treat. This review presents a biomedical aspect of agents used in warfare and terrorism, including polonium-210, depleted uranium, salmonella, anthrax, genetically modified bacteria, cobweb-like polymer fibre, sarin, and mustard gas.

Health Canada's approach to manage risks to populations at risk during a radiological emergency.

The approach that Health Canada uses to manage risks to individuals and to populations who might be exposed to ionising radiation is based upon the risk management paradigm. The paradigm differs little between an emergency and a non-emergency situations. In both events, technical experts assess the risk by determining the exposure to the source of radiation. They usually calculate the radiation dose and then assess the potential for any health effects. The initial technical assessments often use scoping calculations. The calculations for children recognise that they are smaller and have different metabolic rates and different behaviour from adults. However, most rigorous quantitative models for dosimetry do not differentiate between children and adults. The risk assessments that were conducted to evaluate the contamination of Canadians who were in London during the Litvenenko poisoning are a good example to illustrate this general approach. The scoping risk assessment concluded that the risks to children and adults were low. No Canadian children were exposed to polonium during this event and, to date, there have been no radiation emergencies in Canada where children have been exposed to a significant source of radiation. Therefore, the comparisons between theory and practice are very limited and conclusions are drawn from international experience and other incidents or sources of radiation exposure such as radon and medical exposures.