Physiology, Vitalism, and the Contest for Body and Soul in the Antebellum United States.

In the early nineteenth century, physiology became an increasingly popular and powerful science in the United States. Religious controversy over the nature of human vitality animated much of this interest. On one side of these debates stood Protestant apologists who wedded an immaterialist vitalism to their belief in an immaterial, immortal soul - and therefore to their dreams of a Christian republic. On the other side, religious skeptics argued for a materialist vitalism that excluded anything immaterial from human life, aspiring thereby to eliminate religious interference in the progress of science and society. Both sides hoped that by claiming physiology for their vision of human nature they might direct the future of religion in the US. Ultimately, they failed to realize these ambitions, but their contest posed a dilemma late nineteenth-century physiologists felt compelled to solve: how should they comprehend the relationship between life, body, and soul? Eager to undertake laboratory work and leave metaphysical questions behind, these researchers solved the problem by restricting their work to the body while leaving spiritual matters to preachers. In attempting to escape the vitalism and soul questions, late nineteenth-century Americans thus created a division of labor that shaped the history of medicine and religion for the following century.

Vitalism, Holism, and Metaphorical Dynamics of Hans Spemann's "Organizer" in the Interwar Period.

This paper aims to provide a fresh historical perspective on the debates on vitalism and holism in Germany by analyzing the work of the zoologist Hans Spemann (1869-1941) in the interwar period. Following up previous historical studies, it takes the controversial question about Spemann's affinity to vitalistic approaches as a starting point. The focus is on Spemann's holistic research style, and on the shifting meanings of Spemann's concept of an organizer. It is argued that the organizer concept unfolded multiple layers of meanings (biological, philosophical, and popular) during the 1920s and early 1930s. A detailed analysis of the metaphorical dynamics in Spemann's writings sheds light on the subtle vitalistic connotations of his experimental work. How Spemann's work was received by contemporary scientists and philosophers is analyzed briefly, and Spemann's holism is explored in the broader historical context of the various issues about reductionism and holism and related methodological questions that were so prominently discussed not only in Germany in the 1920s.

Locating hygienic medicine within the intellectual history of hygiene: cases of E. W. Lane and T. R. Allinson.

Nineteenth century hygiene might be a confusing concept. On the one hand, the concept of hygiene was gradually becoming an important concept that was focused on cleanliness and used interchangeably with sanitation. On the other hand, the classical notions of hygiene rooted in the Hippocratic teachings remained influential. This study is about two attempts to newly theorise such a confusing concept of hygiene in the second half of the century by Edward. W. Lane and Thomas R. Allinson. Their works, standing on the borders of self-help medical advice and theoretical treatises on medical philosophies, were not exactly scholarly ones, but their medical thoughts - conceptualised as hygienic medicine - show a characteristically holistic medical view of hygiene, a nineteenth-century version of the reinterpretation of the nature cure philosophy and vitalism. However, the aim of this study is to properly locate their conceptualisations of hygienic medicine within the historical context of the second half of the nineteenth century rather than to simply introduce the medical ideas in their books. Their views of hygiene were distinguished not only from the contemporary sanitary approach but also from similar attempts by contemporary orthodox and unorthodox medical doctors. Through a chronological analysis of changes in the concept of hygiene and a comparative analysis of these two authors' and other medical professionals' views of hygiene, this paper aims to help understand the complicated picture of nineteenth-century hygiene, particularly during the second half of the century, from the perspective of medical holism and reductionism.

From Organismic Biology as History and Philosophy to the History and Philosophy of Biology-the Work of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger in the German Context.

In this paper, I ask about the broader context of the history and philosophy of biology in the German-speaking world as the place in which Hans-Jörg Rheinberger began his work. Three German philosophical traditions-neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, and Lebensphilosophie-were interested in the developments and conceptual challenges of the life sciences in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Their reflections were taken up by life scientists under the terms theoretische Biologie (theoretical biology) and allgemeine Biologie (general biology), i. e., for theoretical and methodological reflections. They used historical and philosophical perspectives to develop vitalistic, organicist, or holistic approaches to life. In my paper, I argue that the resulting discourse did not come to an end in 1945. Increasingly detached from biological research, it formed an important context for the formation of the field of history and philosophy of biology. In Rheinberger's work, we can see the "Spalten" and "Fugen"-the continuities and discontinuities-that this tradition left there.

Instrumental causes and the natural origin of souls in Antonio Ponce Santacruz's theory of animal generation.

This article studies the theory of animal seeds as purely material entities in the early seventeenth-century medical writings of Antonio Ponce Santacruz, royal physician to the Spanish king Philipp IV. Santacruz adopts the theory of the eduction of substantial forms from the potentiality of matter, according to which new kinds of causal powers can arise out of material composites of a certain complexity. Santacruz stands out among the late Aristotelian defenders of eduction theory because he applies the concept of an instrument of direction developed by the medieval Avicenna commentator Gentile da Foligno and gives a novel turn to this concept by interpreting animal seeds as separate instruments. The article situates Santacruz's theory in the context of early modern debates about the concept of the eduction of forms, as well as in the context of early modern debates about the concept of separate instruments. Particular attention is paid to Santacruz's responses to the biological views of Julius Caesar Scaliger and Thomas Feyens. Santacruz's response to Scaliger turns out to be central for his explication of the eduction relation, and Santacruz's response to Feyens turns out to be central for his explication of the nature of instrumental causation.

A Vital Mediation: The Sanatorium, before and after Antibiotics.

As drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis spread across India, commentators have warned that we are returning to the sanatorium era. Such concerns might be symptomatically read in terms of loss; however, prophecies of return might also signal that there is something to be regained. Rather than lamenting the end of the antibiotic era, I shift the focus to ask about the sanatorium, not simply as a technology of the past, but as a technology of an imminent future. In examining late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century conversations about treating tuberculosis in India, I demonstrate how the the sanatorium was figured as a therapeutic technology that mediated the relationship between the body and its colonial milieu. In this light, I argue that contemporary prophecies of a future past register not simply the loss of antibiotic efficacy, but also a desire to return to a therapeutics that foregrounds issues of vitality, mediation, and environment.

Teleomechanism redux? Functional physiology and hybrid models of life in early modern natural philosophy.

The distinction between 'mechanical' and 'teleological' has been familiar since Kant; between a fully mechanistic, quantitative science of Nature and a teleological, qualitative approach to living beings, namely 'organisms' understood as purposive or at least functional entities. The beauty of this distinction is that it apparently makes intuitive sense and maps onto historico-conceptual constellations in the life sciences, regarding the status of the body versus that of the machine. I argue that the mechanism-teleology distinction is imprecise and flawed using examples including the 'functional' features present even in Cartesian physiology, the Oxford Physiologists' work on circulation and respiration, the fact that the model of the 'body-machine' is not a mechanistic reduction of organismic properties to basic physical properties but is focused on the uniqueness of organic life; and the concept of 'animal economy' in vitalist medicine, which I present as a 'teleomechanistic' concept of organism (borrowing a term of Lenoir's which he applied to nineteenth-century embryology)--neither mechanical nor teleological.

["Purified empiricism": Johann Christian Reil's (1759-1813) attempts at a foundation of medicine in relation to its tradition, kantianism, and speculative philosophy]. / "Geläuterte Empirie": Johann Christian Reils (1759-1813) Versuche zur Grundlegung der Medizin im Spannungsfeld von Tradition, Kantianismus und spe- kulativer Philosophie.

Johann Christian Reil's (1759-1813) importance lies in his theoretical approach to medicine. Following Kant in his early work, he attempts to combine medical experience with an underlying conceptual structure. This attempt is directed against both the chaotic empiricism of traditional medicine and speculative theories such as vitalism. The paper starts from his early reflections on the concept of a life force, which he interprets in the way of a non-reductive materialism. In the following, the basic outlines of his Theory of Fever will be shown. The Theory is a systematic attempt at finding a new foundation for diagnosis and therapy on the basis of the concept of fever, which is understood as modification of vital processes. The paper ends with a discussion of his later work, which has remained controversial so far. It shows that the combination of practical empiricism and scientific theory remained rather unstable in this early phase of the development of modern medicine.

The third-way third wave and the enduring appeal of bioexceptionalism.

We may induce from a longue durée examination of Anglo-American History of Biology that the impulse to reject reduc - tionism persists and will continue to percolate cyclically. This impulse I deem "bioexceptionalism": an intuition, stance, attitude, or activating metaphor that the study of living beings requires explanations in addition to exclusively bottom-up causal explanations and the research programs constructed upon that bottom-up philosophical foundation by non-organismal biologists, biochemists, and biophysicists - the explanations, in other words, that Wadding - ton (1977) humorously termed the "Conventional Wisdom of the Dominant Group, or cowdung." Bioexceptionalism might indicate an ontological assertion, like vitalism. Yet most often in the last century, it has been defined by a variety of methodological or even sociological positions. On three occasions in the interval from the late nineteenth century to the present, a small but significant group of practicing biologists and allies in other research disciplines in the UK and US adopted a species of bioexceptionalism, rejecting the dominant explanatory philosophy of reductionistic mechanism. Yet they also rejected the vitalist alternative. We can refer to their subset of bioexceptionalism as a "Third-Way" approach, though participants at the time called it by a variety of names, including "organicism." Today's appeals to a Third-Way are but the latest eruption of this older dissensus and retain at least heuristic value apart from any explanatory success.

Historical notes on immaturity. Part 1: measures of viability.

The interest in the limit of viability originated from various sources, including legal requirements, the rejection of mechnical life support, competition for resources, concerns about handicaps, and proximity to the fetus with its limited rights. Gestational age was determined from menstrual history by Hippocratic writers, who established the tenacious idea that 7-, but not 8-month infants could survive. Naegele's rule, already published by Boerhaave in 1744, was correct when applied to the last day of menstruation. Birth weight and length were not measured until the end of the 18(th) century. This remarkable disinterest resulted from superstition, grossly inaccurate measurements by the authorities Mauriceau and Smellie, and the conversion chaos of the pre-metric era. A table is provided with historic mass and length units allowing to determine birth weight and body length in the older literature. The idea of viability is a remnant of vitalism, a medical doctrine popularized in 1780 by Brown. Many short-lived statements defined its limit, but until now what was meant by viability remained nebulous.

[The vitalism of Paul-Joseph Barthez (1734-1806)].

In The Logic of Life (1970), Francois Jacob (1920- ), Nobel Prize laureate in Physiology or Medicine (1965), proclaimed the end of vitalism based on the concept of life. More than two decades before this capital sentence condemning vitalism was pronounced, Georges Canguilhem (1904-1995), a French philosopher of medicine, already acknowledged that eighteenth-century vitalism was scientifically retrograde and politically reactionary or counter-revolutionary insofar as it was rooted in the animism of Georg Ernst Stahl (1660-1734). The negative preconception of the term 'vitalism' came to be established as an orthodox view, since Claude Bernard (1813-1878) unfairly criticized contemporary vitalism in order to propagate his idea of experimental medicine. An eminent evolutionary biologist like Ernst Mayr (1904-2005) still defended similar views in This is Biology (1997), arguing that if vitalists were decisive and convincing in their rejection of the Cartesian model (negative heuristics), however they were equally indecisive and unconvincing in their own explanatory endeavors (positive heuristics). Historically speaking, vitalists came to the forefront for their outstanding criticism of Cartesian mechanism and physicochemical reductionism, while their innovative concepts and theories were underestimated and received much less attention. Is it true that vitalism was merely a pseudo-science, representing a kind of romanticism or mysticism in biomedical science? Did vitalists lack any positive heuristics in their biomedical research? Above all, what was actually the so.called 'vitalism'? This paper aims to reveal the positive heuristics of vitalism defined by Paul.Joseph Barthez (1734-1806) who was the founder of the vitalist school of Montpellier. To this end, his work and idea are introduced with regard to the vying doctrines in physiology and medicine. At the moment when he taught at the medical school of Montpellier, his colleagues advocated the mechanism of Rene Descartes (1596-1650), the iatromechanism of Herman Boerhaave (1668-1738), the iatrochemistry of Jan Baptist van Helmont (1579-1644), the animism of Stahl, and the organicism of Theophile de Bordeu (1722-1776). On the contrary, Barthez devoted himself to synthesize diverse doctrines and his vitalism consequently illustrated an eclectic character. Always taking a skeptical standpoint regarding the capacity of biomedical science, he defined his famous concept of 'vital principle (principe vital)' as the 'x (unknown variable)' of physiology. He argued that the hypothetical concept of vital principle referred to the 'experimental cause (cause experimentale)' verifiable by positive science. Thus, the vital principle was not presupposed as an a priori regulative principle. It was an a posteriori heuristic principle resulting from several experiments. The 'positivist hypothetism' of Barthez demonstrates not only pragmatism but also positivism in his scientific terminology. Furthermore, Barthez established a guideline for clinical practice according to his own methodological principles. It can be characterized as a 'humanist pragmatism' for the reason that all sort of treatments were permitted as far as they were beneficial to the patient. Theoretical incoherence or incommensurability among different treatments did not matter to Barthez. His practical strategy for clinical medicine consisted of three principles: namely, the natural, analytic, and empirical method. This formulation is indebted to the 'analytic method (methode analytique)' of the French empiricist philosopher Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1714-1780). In conclusion, the eighteenth.century French vitalism conceived by Barthez pursued pragmatism in general, positivism in methodology, and humanism in clinics.

Vitalism in contemporary chiropractic: a help or a hinderance?

BACKGROUND: Chiropractic emerged in 1895 and was promoted as a viable health care substitute in direct competition with the medical profession. This was an era when there was a belief that one cause and one cure for all disease would be discovered. The chiropractic version was a theory that most diseases were caused by subluxated (slightly displaced) vertebrae interfering with "nerve vibrations" (a supernatural, vital force) and could be cured by adjusting (repositioning) vertebrae, thereby removing the interference with the body's inherent capacity to heal. DD Palmer, the originator of chiropractic, established chiropractic based on vitalistic principles. Anecdotally, the authors have observed that many chiropractors who overtly claim to be "vitalists" cannot define the term. Therefore, we sought the origins of vitalism and to examine its effects on chiropractic today. DISCUSSION: Vitalism arose out of human curiosity around the biggest questions: Where do we come from? What is life? For some, life was derived from an unknown and unknowable vital force. For others, a vital force was a placeholder, a piece of knowledge not yet grasped but attainable. Developments in science have demonstrated there is no longer a need to invoke vitalistic entities as either explanations or hypotheses for biological phenomena. Nevertheless, vitalism remains within chiropractic. In this examination of vitalism within chiropractic we explore the history of vitalism, vitalism within chiropractic and whether a vitalistic ideology is compatible with the legal and ethical requirements for registered health care professionals such as chiropractors. CONCLUSION: Vitalism has had many meanings throughout the centuries of recorded history. Though only vaguely defined by chiropractors, vitalism, as a representation of supernatural force and therefore an untestable hypothesis, sits at the heart of the divisions within chiropractic and acts as an impediment to chiropractic legitimacy, cultural authority and integration into mainstream health care.

A non-metaphysical evaluation of vitalism in the early twentieth century.

In biology the term "vitalism" is usually associated with Hans Driesch's doctrine of the entelechy: entelechies were nonmaterial, bio-specific agents responsible for governing a few peculiar biological phenomena. Since vitalism defined as such violates metaphysical materialism (or physicalism), the received view refutes the doctrine of the entelechy as a metaphysical heresy. But in the early twentieth century, a different, non-metaphysical evaluation of vitalism was endorsed by some biologists and philosophers, which finally led to a logical refutation of the doctrine of the entelechy. In this non-metaphysical evaluation, first, vitalism was not treated as a metaphysical heresy but a legitimate response to the inadequacy of mechanistic explanations in biology. Second, the refutation of vitalism was logically rather than metaphysically supported by contemporary biological knowledge. The entelechy was not a valid concept, because vitalists could neither formulate vital laws (to attribute determinate consequences to the entelechy), nor offer convincing examples of experimental indeterminism (to confirm the perpetual inadequacy of mechanistic explanations).

Revisiting the Pouchet-Pasteur controversy over spontaneous generation: understanding experimental method.

Louis Pasteur's defeat of belief in spontaneous generation has been a classical rationalist example of how the experimental approach of modern science can reveal superstition. Farley and Geison (Bull Hist Med 48:161-198, 1974) told a counter-story of how Pasteur's success was due to political and ideological support rather than superior experimental science. They claimed that Pasteur violated proper norms of scientific method, and that the French Academy of Science did not see this, or did not want to. Farley and Geison argued that Pouchet's experiments were as valid as those of Pasteur. In this paper I argue that the core of the scientific debate was not general theories for or against spontaneous generation but the outcome of specific experiments. It was on the conduct of these experiments that the Academy made judgements favorable to Pasteur. Claude Bernard was a colleague of Pasteur, supportive and sometimes critical. I argue that Bernard's fact-oriented methodology of "experimental medicine" is a better guide to explaining the controversy than the hypothetic-deductive view of scientific method typical of logical empiricism.

Introduction: sketches of a conceptual history of epigenesis.

This is an introduction to a collection of articles on the conceptual history of epigenesis, from Aristotle to Harvey, Cavendish, Kant and Erasmus Darwin, moving into nineteenth-century biology with Wolff, Blumenbach and His, and onto the twentieth century and current issues, with Waddington and epigenetics. The purpose of the topical collection is to emphasize how epigenesis marks the point of intersection of a theory of biological development and a (philosophical) theory of active matter. We also wish to show that the concept of epigenesis existed prior to biological theorization and that it continues to permeate thinking about development in recent biological debates.

The schism in chiropractic through the eyes of a 1st year chiropractic student.

Since its inception, the chiropractic profession has been divided along ideological fault lines. These divisions have led to a profession wide schism, which has limited mainstream acceptance, utilisation, social authority and integration. The authors explore the historical origins of this schism, taking time to consider historical context, religiosity, perpetuating factors, logical fallacies and siege mentality. Evidence is then provided for a way forward, based on the positioning of chiropractors as mainstream partners in health care.

The personal and scientific feud between Ernst Brücke and Josef Hyrtl.

OBJECTIVE: To describe the events surrounding the personal and professional feud between Josef Hyrtl and Ernst Brücke and its impact on early investigations into the function of the semicircular canals of the inner ear. DATA SOURCES: Published data in scientific journals and news media, documents at the Vienna Institute for the History of Medicine, published personal letters, and an interview with Brücke's great-grandson, Dr. Thomas Brücke. CONCLUSION: Although Hyrtl was instrumental in recruiting Brücke to the University of Vienna, the two professors soon became embroiled in a feud that persisted throughout their academic careers. The difference in approach of these two giants in their field is well illustrated by their views on the function of the semicircular canals of the inner ear. Based on their shape, Hyrtl concluded that they were important for directional hearing, whereas based on animal experiments, Brücke concluded that they were sense organs for equilibrium.

Laws of organization and chemical analysis: Blainville and Müller.

When "general physiology" emerged as a basic field of research within biology in the early nineteenth century, Henri Ducrotay de Blainville (1777-1850) on the one hand and Johannes Peter Müller (1801-1858) on the other appealed to chemical analysis to account for the properties and operations of organisms that were observed to differ from what was found in inorganic compounds. Their aim was to establish laws of vital organization that would be based on organic chemical processes, but would also be of use to explain morphological and functional differences among life forms. The intent of this paper is to specify for each of these leading physiologists the different presuppositions that provided theoretical frameworks for their interpretation of what they conceived of as laws of organization underpinning the dynamics of vital phenomena. Blainville presumed that the properties of organic compounds depended on the chemical properties of their constitutive molecules, but combined according to patterns of functional development, and that the latter could only be inferred from an empirical survey of modes of organization across the spectrum of life forms. For Müller, while all vital processes involved chemical reactions, in the formative and functional operations of organisms, these reactions would result from the action of life forces that were responsible for the production of organic combinations and thus for vital and animal functions. As both physiologists set significant methodological patterns for their many disciples and followers, their respective quasi-reductionist and anti-reductionist positions need to be accounted for.

100 years of virology: from vitalism via molecular biology to genetic engineering.

The identification of the causative agent of tobacco mosaic disease as a novel pathogen by the Dutch microbiologist Beijerinck is now acknowledged as being the foundation of virology as a discipline distinct from bacteriology. However, as this was contrary to the prevailing theories of the time, it took many years for virology to become firmly established as a separate discipline. The history of virology illustrates how accepted concepts in science evolve by trial and error and the need for a balanced approach when manipulating natural systems.

Worthy heir or treacherous patricide? Konrad Lorenz and Jakob v. Uexküll.

The biologist Jakob v. Uexküll is often seen as the preceptor of modern behavioral theory, who lastingly influenced Konrad Lorenz in particular. Nevertheless, Uexküll has been highly inadequately received by the school Lorenz founded. This neglect of Uexküll's works resulted because Lorenz and Uexküll came into contact at a time when the biological sciences were sundered by a deep ideological division. On the one side stood the Darwin-rejecting Neo-Vitalists (for example Uexküll), on the other side were the Neo-Darwinists (for example Lorenz). After Vitalism was overcome as a consequence of the Evolutionary Synthesis, Darwinists who had taken an intermittent interest in Vitalists and their theories could now only distance themselves completely from earlier ideas. This went not only for biologists and behavioral researchers, but also for medical scientists. The emancipation from the starting points of their own science was so complete that, even decades later, when the earlier debates about Mechanism and Vitalism were long since historically outdated, behavioral research never investigated its own history.