Social cognition and trust: Exploring the role of theory of mind and hostile attribution bias in children's skepticism of inaccurate informants.

A growing body of research has examined the role of individual differences in children's selective trust. The current study was designed to explore how individual differences in theory of mind and hostile attribution bias affect children's trust. Four- and five-year-old children took part in a standard selective trust paradigm in which they had the choice between a previously inaccurate informant and an unfamiliar informant. They were also asked to interpret why the previously inaccurate informant had provided incorrect information in the past. Finally, children completed a hostile attribution bias task and a theory of mind task. Children with better theory of mind ability were more likely to defer to the unfamiliar informant on the selective trust task. Children with greater hostile attribution bias were more likely to interpret previous inaccuracy as a result of "being tricky" rather than having "made a mistake." However, these interpretations did not influence children's choices on the selective trust task. Therefore, although there is reason to believe that establishing selective trust involves both cognitive and social processes, the current study raises questions about the nature of this relationship and how children draw on different sociocognitive skills when establishing epistemic trust.

Success inhibits preschoolers' ability to establish selective trust.

A number of studies have shown that preschoolers make inferences about potential informants based on the informants' past behavior, selectively trusting an informant who has been helpful in the past, for example, over one who has been unhelpful. Here we used a hiding game to show that 4- and 5-year-olds' selective trust can also be influenced by inferences they make about their own abilities. Children do not prefer a previously helpful informant over a previously unhelpful one when informant helpfulness is decoupled from children's success in finding hidden objects (Studies 1 and 3). Indeed, children do not seem to track informant helpfulness when their success at finding hidden objects has never depended on it (Study 2). A single failure to find a hidden object when offered information by the unhelpful informant can, however, lead them to selectively trust the previously helpful one later (Study 4). Children's selective trust is based not only on differences between informants but also on their sense of illusory control-their inferences about whether they need assistance from those informants in the first place.

Can't stop believing: inhibitory control and resistance to misleading testimony.

Why are some young children consistently willing to believe what they are told even when it conflicts with first-hand experience? In this study, we investigated the possibility that this deference reflects an inability to inhibit a prepotent response. Over the course of several trials, 2.5- to 3.5-year-olds (N = 58) heard an adult contradict their report of a simple event they had both witnessed, and children were asked to resolve this discrepancy. Those who repeatedly deferred to the adult's misleading testimony had more difficulty on an inhibitory control task involving spatial conflict than those who responded more skeptically. These results suggest that responding skeptically to testimony that conflicts with first-hand experience may be challenging for some young children because it requires inhibiting a normally appropriate bias to believe testimony.

Pointing Disrupts Preschoolers' Ability to Discriminate Between Knowledgeable and Ignorant Informants.

By 4 years of age, children have been reinforced repeatedly for searching where they see someone point. In two studies, we asked whether this history of reinforcement could interfere with young children's ability to discriminate between a knowledgeable and an ignorant informant. Children watched as one informant hid a sticker while another turned around, and then both informants indicated where they though the sticker was, either by pointing or by using a less practiced means of reference. Children failed to discriminate between the two informants when they pointed, but they chose the location indicated by the knowledgeable informant when the informants used a cue other than pointing. Pointing can disrupt as basic an understanding as the link between seeing and knowing.

Looking smart: Preschoolers' judgements about knowledge based on facial appearance.

Preschoolers use others' behaviours to make inferences about what traits they possess (Harris et al., 2018, Ann. Rev. Psychol., 69, 251). The current study examined whether 4- and 5-year-olds also associate others' behaviour with how they appear on the surface. Specifically, we asked whether children's sensitivity to different face-traits (e.g., Cogsdill et al., 2014, Psychol. Sci., 25, 1132) would bias them to associate knowledgeable behaviours with faces that adults rate as highly competent- or trustworthy-looking. We find that preschoolers expect puppets with trustworthy-looking faces to be knowledgeable about the functions of familiar objects. In contrast, children did not match a puppet's knowledge to facial features that adults rate as varying in competence. These data suggest that children, like adults, are biased to associate facial appearance and behaviour. Furthermore, this bias appears to be rooted in a response to the same facial features that have been found to govern judgements of trustworthiness across development (e.g., Jessen & Grossmann, 2016, J. Cogn. Neurosci., 28, 1728). Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? Preschoolers selectively trust others using epistemic and non-epistemic cues (Harris et al., 2018). Preschoolers associate specific faces with trustworthiness and competence (Cogsdill et al., 2014). What the present study adds? Preschoolers infer that trustworthy-looking characters will behave knowledgeably. Preschoolers do not infer that competent-looking characters will behave knowledgeably. Children's reliability judgements are influenced by others' appearance.

Visualization instructions enhance preschoolers' spatial problem-solving.

This study explores whether verbal instructions to visualize an event can improve children's ability to make predictions about a difficult spatial problem. Three-year-olds (N = 48) were introduced to two intertwined tubes, and prior to predicting how a ball would travel through a given tube, one group of children was told to imagine the ball rolling down the tube, one group was told an explicit rule about where the ball would land, and a third group was given no instructions. Children were prevented from interacting with the apparatus to investigate the effect of the different verbal instructions alone on their problem-solving. Children in the imagine condition made more correct predictions than both children who received no instructions and those who were told an explicit rule (but were not told to visualize). These results suggest that verbal instructions to imagine an event are enough to help children solve difficult spatial problems, likely by visualizing the outcome prior to making a prediction. Statement of Contribution What is already known on this subject? Preschoolers exhibit a gravity bias when predicting how objects will travel through several intertwined tubes (Hood, 1995, Cogn. Dev., 10, 577). Preschoolers can overcome this gravity bias when they are first told to look at (Bascandziev & Harris, , Cogn. Dev., 25, 233) or visualize (Joh et al., 2011, Child Dev., 82, 744) the tubes. This work emphasized the role of visualization in improving children's ability to solve this difficult spatial problem. What does this study add? Previous work typically allowed children to interact directly with the apparatus during familiarization or while making predictions. Previous work did not consider whether a synergy between physical interaction and visualization instructions improved predictions. The current study shows that visualization instructions alone can improve children's ability to overcome the gravity bias.

Concepts and theories, methods and reasons: Why do the children (pretend) play? Reply to Weisberg, Hirsh-Pasek, and Golinkoff (2013); Bergen (2013); and Walker and Gopnik (2013).

We greatly appreciate the astute comments on Lillard et al. (2013) and the opportunity to reply. Here we point out the importance of keeping conceptual distinctions clear regarding play, pretend play, and exploration. We also discuss methodological issues with play research. We end with speculation that if pretend play did not emerge because it was naturally selected (due to helping causal reasoning or some other developmentally important skill), perhaps it emerged as a by-product of 2 other selected behaviors: play fighting and language.

The impact of pretend play on children's development: a review of the evidence.

Pretend play has been claimed to be crucial to children's healthy development. Here we examine evidence for this position versus 2 alternatives: Pretend play is 1 of many routes to positive developments (equifinality), and pretend play is an epiphenomenon of other factors that drive development. Evidence from several domains is considered. For language, narrative, and emotion regulation, the research conducted to date is consistent with all 3 positions but insufficient to draw conclusions. For executive function and social skills, existing research leans against the crucial causal position but is insufficient to differentiate the other 2. For reasoning, equifinality is definitely supported, ruling out a crucially causal position but still leaving open the possibility that pretend play is epiphenomenal. For problem solving, there is no compelling evidence that pretend play helps or is even a correlate. For creativity, intelligence, conservation, and theory of mind, inconsistent correlational results from sound studies and nonreplication with masked experimenters are problematic for a causal position, and some good studies favor an epiphenomenon position in which child, adult, and environment characteristics that go along with play are the true causal agents. We end by considering epiphenomenalism more deeply and discussing implications for preschool settings and further research in this domain. Our take-away message is that existing evidence does not support strong causal claims about the unique importance of pretend play for development and that much more and better research is essential for clarifying its possible role.