The working memory costs of a central attentional bottleneck in multitasking.

When two (or more) tasks, each requiring a rapid response, are performed at the same time then serial processing may occur at certain processing stages, such as the response selection. There is accumulating evidence that such serial processing involves additional control processes, such as inhibition, switching, and scheduling (termed the active scheduling account). The present study tested whether the existence of serial processing in multitasking leads to a requirement for processes that coordinate processing in this way (active scheduling account) and, furthermore, whether such control processes are linked to the executive functions (EF) of working memory (WM). To test this question, we merged the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm with a WM task, creating a complex WM span task. Participants were presented with a sequence of letters to remember, followed by a processing block in which they had to perform either a single task or a dual task, and finally were asked to recall the letters. Results showed that WM performance, i.e. the amount of letters recalled in the correct order, decreased when performing a dual task as compared to performing a single task during the retention interval. Two further experiments supported this finding using manipulations of the dual task difficulty. We conclude that the existence of serial processing in multitasking demands additional control processes (active scheduling) and that these processes are strongly linked to the executive functions of working memory.

Investigating limits of task prioritization in dual-tasking: evidence from the prioritized processing and the psychological refractory period paradigms.

Dual-tasking often requires prioritizing one task over the other. For example, in the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm, participants are instructed to initially respond to Task 1 (T1) and only then to Task 2 (T2). Furthermore, in the prioritized processing paradigm (PP), participants are instructed to perform T2 only if T1 was a no-go trial-requiring even more prioritization. The present study investigated the limits of task prioritization. Two experiments compared performance in the PRP paradigm and the PP paradigm. To manipulate task prioritization, tasks were rewarded differently (e.g., high reward for T1, low reward for T2, and vice versa). We hypothesized (a) that performance will improve for the highly rewarded task (Experiments 1 and 2) and (b) that there are stronger reward effects for T1 in the PRP than in the PP paradigm (Experiment 2). Results showed an influence of reward on task prioritization: For T1, high reward (compared to low reward) caused a speed-up of responses that did not differ between the two paradigms. However, for T2, reward influenced response speed selectively in the PP paradigm, but not in the PRP paradigm. Based on paradigm-specific response demands, we propose that the coordination of two motor responses plays a crucial role in prioritizing tasks and might limit the flexibility of the allocation of preparatory capacity.

Electrophysiological examination of response-related interference while dual-tasking: is it motoric or attentional?

The possibility that interference between motor responses contributes to dual-task costs has long been neglected, yet is supported by several recent studies. There are two competing hypotheses regarding this response-related interference. The motor-bottleneck hypothesis asserts that the motor stage of Task 1 triggers a refractory period that delays the motor stage of Task 2. The response-monitoring hypothesis asserts that monitoring of the Task-1 motor response delays the response-selection stage of Task 2. Both hypotheses predict lengthening of Task-2 response time (RT2) when Task 1 requires motor processing relative to when it does not. However, they assume different loci for the response-related bottleneck, and therefore make different predictions regarding (a) the interaction between Task-1 motor requirement and the Task-2 difficulty effect as measured by RT2 and (b) the premotoric durations and motoric durations of Task 2 as measured by lateralized readiness potentials (LRPs). To test these predictions, we conducted two experiments manipulating the Task-1 motor requirement (Go vs. NoGo) and Task-2 response-selection difficulty, as well as the stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA). Task-1 motor processing significantly lengthened RT2, suggesting response-related interference. Importantly, the Task-1 motor response reduced the Task-2 difficulty effect at the short SOA, indicating postponement of the Task-2 motor stage, consistent with the motor-bottleneck hypothesis. Further consistent with the motor-bottleneck hypothesis, the Task-2 LRP indicated a consistent premotoric duration of Task 2 regardless of Task-1 motor requirement. These results are difficult to reconcile with the response-monitoring hypotheses, which places the response-related bottleneck before the response-selection stage of Task 2. The results also have important implications regarding use of locus-of-slack logic in PRP studies.

Parallel and serial task processing in the PRP paradigm: a drift-diffusion model approach.

Even after a long time of research on dual-tasking, the question whether the two tasks are always processed serially (response selection bottleneck models, RSB) or also in parallel (capacity-sharing models) is still going on. The first models postulate that the central processing stages of two tasks cannot overlap, producing a central processing bottleneck in Task 2. The second class of models posits that cognitive resources are shared between the central processing stages of two tasks, allowing for parallel processing. In a series of three experiments, we aimed at inducing parallel vs. serial processing by manipulating the relative frequency of short vs. long SOAs (Experiments 1 and 2) and including no-go trials in Task 2 (Experiment 3). Beyond the conventional response time (RT) analyses, we employed drift-diffusion model analyses to differentiate between parallel and serial processing. Even though our findings were rather consistent across the three experiments, they neither support unambiguously the assumptions derived from the RSB model nor those derived from capacity-sharing models. SOA frequency might lead to an adaptation to frequent time patterns. Overall, our diffusion model results and mean RTs seem to be better explained by participant's time expectancies.

Introspection about backward crosstalk in dual-task performance.

The present study investigated participants' ability to introspect about the effect of between-task crosstalk in dual tasks. In two experiments, participants performed a compatibility-based backward crosstalk dual task, and additionally provided estimates of their RTs (introspective reaction times, IRTs) after each trial (Experiment 1) or after each pair of prime and test trials (Experiment 2). In both experiments, the objective performance showed the typical backward crosstalk effect and its sequential modulation depending on compatibility in the previous trial. Very similar patterns were observed in IRTs, despite the typical unawareness of the PRP effect. In sum, these results demonstrate the reliability of between-task crosstalk in dual tasks and that people's introspection about the temporal processing demands in this complex dual-task situation is intriguingly accurate and severely limited at the same time.

Dual-task interference and response strategies in simulated car driving: impact of first-task characteristics on the psychological refractory period effect.

Presentation of a task T1 typically delays the response to a subsequent task T2, more so with high temporal task overlap than with low temporal overlap. This so-called "psychological refractory period effect" (PRP effect) has been observed even if T1 required not a choice between distinct stimulus-response pairs, but rather between a given stimulus-response pair occurring once or twice. We explored which response strategy participants use for responding to such an unusual type of T1 and how such a T1 interacts with T2 performance. In a driving simulator, participants followed a lead car and had to honk when that car's rear window changed color (T1). In condition "pure", the color always changed once and required a single honk; in condition "mixed", the color changed once and required a single honk on some trials, but on other trials, it changed twice 200 ms apart and required a double honk. Participants also had to brake when the lead car braked (T2). On dual-task trials, T1 preceded T2 with a varying stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 50-1200 ms. Reaction time to the first T1 stimulus was similar in "pure" and "mixed" and it was comparable with the reaction time to the second T1 stimulus. Reaction time to the T2 stimulus increased as SOA decreased from 350 to 50 ms, confirming the existence of a PRP effect. Furthermore, reaction time to the T2 stimulus was similar in "pure" and in "mixed" with one T1 stimulus, but was higher in "mixed" with two T1 stimuli. This pattern of findings is compatible with the view that presentation of the first T1 stimulus triggers a single response, which is amended into a double response, if a second T1 stimulus is displayed. The amendment does not need to wait until central processing of the original response is completed, and it therefore begins with no delay beyond the regular reaction time. Our findings further suggest that the mere possibility of a second T1 stimulus being presented does not increase the PRP effect on T2, probably because response amendments are not equivalent to classical response choices. However, the actual presentation of a second T1 stimulus indeed does increase the PRP effect on T2, probably because amendments start 200 ms later than the original response, and therefore prolong central processing of T1.

Global-local processing and dispositional bias interact with emotion processing in the psychological refractory period paradigm.

The reciprocal link between scope of attention and emotional processing is an important aspect of the relationship between emotion and attention. Larger scope of attention or global processing has been linked to positive emotions and narrow scope of attention or local processing has been linked to negative emotions. The nature of this relationship in the context of central capacity limitations and individual differences in attentional processing has not been studied in detail so far. To investigate such a relationship, here we used the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm, in which we manipulated the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA: 150 ms, 300 ms, 900 ms) of stimuli corresponding to two tasks in a sequence. The first task was identifying a number at the global or local level; the second task was recognizing the emotional expression (happy or angry). Additionally, predisposition towards local or global perceptual dimension was measured with the global-local task. Results indicated that global precedence modulated PRP effect and that response accuracy was impaired by the combination of local-angry task modalities. Interestingly, interference between simultaneous tasks was modulated by the predisposition to different perceptual levels resulting in different cognitive strategies for performing simultaneous tasks: locally biased subjects tended more towards serial processing, meanwhile globally biased ones were performing tasks in a parallel manner. This result suggest that individual differences may play a role in the choice of dual-task performing strategies.

Investigating dual-task interference in children versus young adults with the overlapping task paradigm.

Previous studies demonstrated that dual-task impairments (i.e., dual-task costs) are higher in children than in young adults. However, these studies did not specify the mechanisms explaining higher dual-task costs and did not assess the specific task processes that particularly impair simultaneous task performance in children. We assessed sources of higher dual-task costs in children (n = 32) as compared with young adults (n = 32) by combining auditory (Task 1) and visual (Task 2) sensorimotor tasks into dual tasks of the psychological refractory period (PRP) type. Both tasks are separated by a varying stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). In Visual Task 2, we manipulated task difficulty at the perceptual stage (contrast manipulation) and response selection stage (mapping manipulation) in order to identify age-related changes in capacity limitations during dual-task performance. The results showed that the response selection manipulation and SOA yielded additive effects in children and young adults, providing evidence for interference at response selection processes in both age groups. In contrast, the perceptual stage manipulation and SOA resulted in underadditive effects in young adults and additive effects in children. This age-related difference is consistent with the assumption that limitations in central processing are present in both age groups, whereas perceptual interference between tasks seems to be larger in children than in young adults.

The attentional blink: why does Lag-1 sparing occur when the dependent measure is accuracy, but Lag-1 deficit when it is RT?

Perception of the second of two targets (T1, T2) displayed in rapid sequence is impaired if it comes shortly after the first (attentional blink, AB). In an exception, known as Lag-1 sparing, T2 is virtually unimpaired if it is presented directly after T1. Three experiments examined the seemingly inconsistent findings that Lag-1 sparing occurs in accuracy but Lag-1 deficit occurs in RT. Experiment 1 pointed to masking of T2 as the critical factor. When T2 was not masked, the results replicated the conventional findings. The novel finding was that Lag-1 sparing occurred in RT, provided that T2 was masked. An account was provided by a psychological refractory period-based model in which processing was said to occur in two broadly sequential stages: stimulus selection and response planning. Experiments 2 and 3 tested predictions from the PRP-based model regarding Lag-1 sparing/Lag-1 deficit. In Experiment 2, we increased T2 salience, notionally reducing the duration of the T2 selection stage, with corresponding reduction in Lag-1 sparing. In Experiment 3, we manipulated the compatibility between the T1 stimulus and the response to notionally decrease/increase the duration of the T1 response-planning stage with corresponding increment/decrement in Lag-1 sparing. The results of both experiments confirmed predictions from the PRP-based model.

The role of feedback delay in dual-task performance.

Doing two things at once is hard, and it is probably hard for various reasons. Here we aim to demonstrate that one so far barely considered reason is the monitoring of sensory action feedback, which detracts from processing of other concurrent tasks. To demonstrate this, we engaged participants in a psychological refractory period paradigm. The responses in the two tasks produced visual action effects. These effects occurred either immediately or they were delayed for the first of the two responses. We assumed that delaying these effects would engage a process of monitoring visual feedback longer, and delay a concurrent task more, as compared to immediate effects. This prediction was confirmed in two experiments. We discuss the reasons for feedback monitoring and its possible contribution to dual tasking.

The role of the dorsal medial frontal cortex in central processing limitation: a transcranial magnetic stimulation study.

When humans perform two tasks simultaneously, responses to the second task are increasingly delayed as the interval between the two tasks decreases (psychological refractory period). This delay of the second task is thought to reflect a central processing limitation at the response selection stage. However, the neural mechanisms underlying this central processing limitation remain unclear. Using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), we examined the role of the dorsal medial frontal cortex (dMFC) in a dual-task paradigm in which participants performed an auditory task 1 and a visual task 2. We found that dMFC TMS, relative to control conditions, reduced the psychological refractory period for task 2 processing, whereas we observed no dMFC TMS effects on task 1 processing. This suggests a causal role of the dMFC in coordinating response selection processes at the central bottleneck.

Distorted subjective reports of stimulus onsets under dual-task conditions: Delayed conscious perception or estimation bias?

We investigated whether selecting a response for one task delays the conscious perception of another stimulus (delayed conscious perception hypothesis). In two experiments, participants watched a revolving clock hand while performing two tasks in close succession (i.e. a dual-task). Two stimuli were presented with varying stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). After each trial, participants separately estimated the onsets of the two stimuli on the clock face. Across two experiments and four conditions, we manipulated response requirements and assessed their impact on perceived stimulus onsets. Results showed that (a) providing speeded responses to the stimuli did lead to greater SOA-dependent misperceptions of both stimulus onsets as compared to a solely perceptual condition, and (b) that response grouping reduced these misperceptions. Overall, the results provide equivocal evidence for the delayed conscious perception hypothesis. They rather suggest that participants' estimates of the two stimulus onsets are biased by the interval between their responses.

Introspective reports of reaction times in dual-tasks reflect experienced difficulty rather than timing of cognitive processes.

Reports of introspective reaction times (iRTs) have been used to investigate conscious awareness during dual-task situations. Previous studies showed that dual-task costs in RTs (the psychological refractory period, PRP, effect) are not reflected in participants' introspective reports. This finding has been attributed to conscious awareness of Task 2 being delayed while Task 1 is centrally processed. Here, we test this Temporal model and compare it to an alternative that assumes participants base their iRTs on experienced difficulty. We collected iRTs and difficulty estimates after each trial of a PRP paradigm in which the perceptual difficulty of either Task 2 (Experiment 1) or Task 1 (Experiment 2) was manipulated. Our results largely support the difficulty-based account, suggesting that in a dual-task situation, iRTs do not reflect timing of cognitive processes but are strongly influenced by the experience of difficulty.

Multitasking and aging: do older adults benefit from performing a highly practiced task?

UNLABELLED: BACKGROUND/STUDY CONTEXT: The present study examined the effect of training on age differences in performing a highly practiced task using the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm (Pashler, 1984, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 10, 358-377). Earlier training studies have concentrated on tasks that are not already overlearned. The present question of interest is whether task dual-task integration will be more efficient when single-task performance is approaching asymptotic levels. METHODS: Task 1 was red/green signal discrimination (green = "go" and red = "wait"; analogous to pedestrian signals) and Task 2 was tone discrimination (white noise vs. a horn "honk"; analogous to traffic sound). The stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between Task 1 and Task 2 was varied (50, 150, 600, and 1000 ms). All individuals participated in eight sessions spread over 8 weeks (one session per week). Participants completed a dual-task pretest (Week 1), followed by 6 weeks of single-task testing (Weeks 2-7), followed by a dual-task posttest (Week 8). RESULTS AND CONCLUSION: Although older adults showed larger overall dual-task costs (i.e., PRP effects), they were able to reduce the costs with practice as much as younger adults. However, even when training on Task 1 results in asymptotic performance, this still did not lead to an appreciable reduction in dual-task costs. Also, older adults, but not younger adults, responded more rapidly to green stimuli than to red stimuli in the Task 1 training latency data. The authors confirmed this green/go bias using diffusion modeling, which takes into account response time and error rates at the same time. This green/go bias is potentially dangerous at crosswalks, especially when combined with large dual-task interference, and might contribute to the high rate of crosswalk accidents in the elderly.

General cognitive ability and the psychological refractory period: individual differences in the mind's bottleneck.

Identifying the precise locus of general cognitive ability (g) in the flow of information between perception and action is an important goal of differential psychology. To localize the negative correlation between g and reaction time to a specific processing stage, we administered a speeded number-comparison task to two groups differing in average g. The participants had to respond to two stimuli in each trial, which produced the well-known slowing of the second reaction time known as the psychological refractory period. The difference in the second reaction time favoring the high-g group doubled as the stimulus onsets became very close together. This finding affirms that the faster reaction times of higher-g individuals reflect an advantage exclusively in the serial bottleneck of central processing and not in the parallel peripheral stages.

Freedom and rules in human sequential performance: a refractory period in eye-hand coordination.

In action sequences, the eyes and hands ought to be coordinated in precise ways. The mechanisms governing the architecture of encoding and action of several effectors remain unknown. Here we study hand and eye movements in a sequential task in which letters have to be typed while they move down through the screen. We observe a strict refractory period of about 200 ms between the initiation of manual and eye movements. Subjects do not initiate a saccade just after typing and do not type just after making the saccade. This refractory period is observed ubiquitously in every subject and in each step of the sequential task, even when keystrokes and saccades correspond to different items of the sequence-for instance when a subject types a letter that has been gazed at in a preceding fixation. These results extend classic findings of dual-task paradigms, of a bottleneck tightly locked to the response selection process, to unbounded serial routines. Interestingly, while the bottleneck is seemingly inevitable, better performing subjects can adopt a strategy to minimize the cost of the bottleneck, overlapping the refractory period with the encoding of the next item in the sequence.

Prolonged Processing Time for Manual and Vocal Responses in Parkinson Disease: A Psychological Refractory Period Paradigm Study.

PURPOSE: The purpose of this study was to examine a potential increased cognitive processing bottleneck within Parkinson disease (PD) by extending a previous overlapping task methodology. Additionally, this study extends previous overlapping task methodology in PD to examine the influence of modality (vocal vs. manual) on response delays in overlapping tasks in PD. METHOD: This study used the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm (overlapping-task paradigm) to study processing limitations as participants complete two tasks that increasingly overlap in time. Three levels of temporal overlap of tasks were utilized to vary cognitive demands on manual and vocal response time tasks. Ten participants with PD (PwPD) and 12 participants without PD were included in this study. RESULTS: Participants with PD demonstrated response time delays across temporal overlap conditions (likely indicating motor deficits) along with a larger increase in response delays in the most overlapped, cognitively taxing condition (likely indicating longer central processing bottleneck). Additionally, modality did not influence response times differently in overlapping task conditions or within participant groups. CONCLUSION: An extension of previous overlapping task methodologies within a complex task was successful in demonstrating an increased central processing deficit across manual and vocal response delays in PD, regardless of modality of response.

A shared cortical bottleneck underlying Attentional Blink and Psychological Refractory Period.

Doing two things at once is difficult. When two tasks have to be performed within a short interval, the second is sharply delayed, an effect called the Psychological Refractory Period (PRP). Similarly, when two successive visual targets are briefly flashed, people may fail to detect the second target (Attentional Blink or AB). Although AB and PRP are typically studied in very different paradigms, a recent detailed neuromimetic model suggests that both might arise from the same serial stage during which stimuli gain access to consciousness and, as a result, can be arbitrarily routed to any other appropriate processor. Here, in agreement with this model, we demonstrate that AB and PRP can be obtained on alternate trials of the same cross-modal paradigm and result from limitations in the same brain mechanisms. We asked participants to respond as fast as possible to an auditory target T1 and then to a visual target T2 embedded in a series of distractors, while brain activity was recorded with magneto-encephalography (MEG). For identical stimuli, we observed a mixture of blinked trials, where T2 was entirely missed, and PRP trials, where T2 processing was delayed. MEG recordings showed that PRP and blinked trials underwent identical sensory processing in visual occipito-temporal cortices, even including the non-conscious separation of targets from distractors. However, late activations in frontal cortex (>350 ms), strongly influenced by the speed of task-1 execution, were delayed in PRP trials and absent in blinked trials. Our findings suggest that PRP and AB arise from similar cortical stages, can occur with the same exact stimuli, and are merely distinguished by trial-by-trial fluctuations in task processing.

Electrodermal responses to sources of dual-task interference.

There is a response selection bottleneck that is responsible for dual-task interference. How the response selection bottleneck operates was addressed in three dual-task experiments. The overlap between two tasks (as indexed by the stimulus onset asynchrony [SOA]) was systematically manipulated, and both reaction time and electrodermal activity were measured. In addition, each experiment also manipulated some aspect of the difficulty of either task. Both increasing task overlap by reducing SOA and increasing the difficulty of either task lengthened reaction times. Electrodermal response was strongly affected by task difficulty but was only weakly affected by SOA, and in a different manner from reaction time. A fourth experiment found that the subjectively perceived difficulty of a dual-task trial was affected both by task difficulty and by SOA, but in different ways than electrodermal activity. Overall, the results were not consistent with a response selection bottleneck that involves processes of voluntary, executive attention. Instead, the results converge with findings from neural network modeling to suggest that the delay of one task while another is being processed reflects the operation of a routing mechanism that can process only one stream of information for action at a time and of a passive, structural store that temporarily holds information for the delayed task. The results suggest that conventional blocked or event-related neuroimaging designs may be inadequate to identify the mechanism of operation of the response selection bottleneck.

The cost of serially chaining two cognitive operations.

As Turing (1936, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society) noted, a fundamental process in human cognition is to effect chained sequential operations in which the second operation requires an input from the preceding one. Although a great deal is known about the costs associated with 'independent' (unrelated) operations, e.g., from the classic psychological refractory period paradigm, far less is known about those operations to which Turing referred. We present the results of two behavioural experiments, where participants were required to perform two speeded sequential tasks that were either chained or independent. Both experiments reveal the reaction time cost of chaining, over and above classical dual-task serial costs. Moreover, the chaining operation significantly altered the distribution of reaction times relative to the Independent condition in terms of an increased mean and variance. These results are discussed in terms of the cognitive architecture underlying the serial chaining of cognitive operations.