ABSTRACT
Aphantasia is a condition that is often characterized as the impaired ability to create voluntary mental images. Aphantasia is assumed to selectively affect voluntary imagery mainly because even though aphantasics report being unable to visualize something at will, many report having visual dreams. We argue that this common characterization of aphantasia is incorrect. Studies on aphantasia are often not clear about whether they are assessing voluntary or involuntary imagery, but some studies show that several forms of involuntary imagery are also affected in aphantasia (including imagery in dreams). We also raise problems for two attempts to show that involuntary images are preserved in aphantasia. In addition, we report the results of a study about afterimages in aphantasia, which suggest that these tend to be less intense in aphantasics than in controls. Involuntary imagery is often treated as a unitary kind that is either present or absent in aphantasia. We suggest that this approach is mistaken and that we should look at different types of involuntary imagery case by case. Doing so reveals no evidence of preserved involuntary imagery in aphantasia. We suggest that a broader characterization of aphantasia, as a deficit in forming mental imagery, whether voluntary or not, is more appropriate. Characterizing aphantasia as a volitional deficit is likely to lead researchers to give incorrect explanations for aphantasia, and to look for the wrong mechanisms underlying it.
Subject(s)
Imagery, Psychotherapy , Imagination , Humans , VolitionABSTRACT
The verbal overshadowing effect refers to the phenomenon that the verbal description of a past complex stimulus impairs its subsequent recognition. Theoretical explanations range from interference between different mental representations to the activation of different processing orientations or a provoked shift in the recognition criterion. In our study, 61 participants with aphantasia (= lack of mental imagery) and 70 controls participated in a verbal overshadowing paradigm. The verbal overshadowing effect did not occur in people with aphantasia, although the effect was replicated in controls. We speculate that this is either due to the lack of visual representations in people with aphantasia that verbal descriptions could interfere with, or to the absence of a shift in processing orientation during verbalisation. To rule out criterion-based explanations, further research is needed to distinguish between discriminability and response bias in people with aphantasia. Finally, data indicated that the verbal overshadowing effect may even be reversed in individuals with aphantasia, partly due to a lower memory performance in the no verbalisation condition. Effects of further variables are discussed, such as mental strategies, memory confidence, and difficulty, quantity and quality of verbalisation.
Subject(s)
Cognition , Recognition, Psychology , Humans , Cognition/physiology , Recognition, Psychology/physiology , Imagination/physiologyABSTRACT
Mental imagery enables people to simulate experiences in their minds without the presence of an external stimulus. The underlying biochemical mechanisms are poorly understood but there is vague evidence that dopamine may play a significant role. A better understanding at the biochemical level could help to unravel the mechanisms of mental imagery and related phenomena such as aphantasia (= lack of voluntary mental imagery), but also opens up possibilities for interventions to enhance or restore mental imagery. To test the hypothesis that acute dopamine depletion leads to a decrease in the strength of mental imagery, N = 22 male participants will be administered an amino acid mixture containing branched-chain amino acids (BCAAs) and tryptophan (TRP) to transiently reduce dopamine synthesis and further N = 22 male participants will receive a placebo. Plasma prolactin (PRL) levels are determined as a peripheral marker of brain dopamine function. The strength of mental imagery will be measured before and after ingestion of the BCAA/TRP mixture using the method of mental imagery priming. Additional exploratory analyses will use genetic data to investigate possible effects of variations on dopaminergic gene loci (e.g., DAT1) on dopamine levels and strength of mental imagery. The results show [ ].
Subject(s)
Amino Acids , Dopamine , Humans , Male , Dopamine/metabolism , Tryptophan/metabolism , Amino Acids, Branched-ChainABSTRACT
Previous research demonstrated effects of visual imagery on search speed in visual search paradigms. However, these effects were rather small, questioning their ecological validity. Thus, our present study aimed to generalize these effects to more naturalistic material (i.e., a paradigm that allows for top-down strategies in highly complex visual search displays that include overlapping stimuli while simultaneously avoiding possibly confounding search instructions). One hundred and four participants with aphantasia (= absence of voluntary mental imagery) and 104 gender and age-matched controls were asked to find hidden objects in several hidden object pictures with search times recorded. Results showed that people with aphantasia were significantly slower than controls, even when controlling for age and general processing speed. Thus, effects of visual imagery might be strong enough to influence the perception of our real-life surroundings, probably because of the involvement of visual imagery in several top-down strategies.
Subject(s)
Imagination , Visual Perception , HumansABSTRACT
Aphantasia is a neurocognitive phenomenon affecting voluntary visual imagery, such that it is either entirely absent, or markedly impaired. Using both the social and medical models of disability, this article discusses the extent to which aphantasia can be understood as a disorder or just a form of neutral neurodivergence, given that imagery plays a central role in thinking and memory for most other people. Preliminary school performance data are presented, showing that low imagery does not necessarily complicate life, especially given compensatory strategies and low societal barriers. In addition, we discuss the consequences of labelling aphantasia a disorder with regard to self- and public stigma, and we provide further data regarding a confidence gap, by which aphantasics perceive themselves as performing worse than they objectively do. We conclude that aphantasia should be understood as neutral neurodivergence and that labelling it a disorder is not only wrong, but potentially harmful.
Subject(s)
Cognition , Imagination , Humans , Preliminary Data , Imagery, Psychotherapy , MemoryABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION: Recent research shows ambivalent results regarding the relationship between mental imagery and schizophrenia. The role of voluntary visual imagery in schizophrenic hallucinations remains unclear. The aim of the study was to investigate the association between visual imagery, schizophrenia, and the occurrence of schizophrenic hallucinations using an objective visual imagery task. METHODS: The sample consisted of 16 participants with schizophrenia (59.1% female; MAge = 45.55) and 44 participants without schizophrenia (62.5% female; MAge = 43.94). Visual imagery was measured using the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) as well as the well-validated Binocular Rivalry Task (BRT). Occurrences of hallucinations were assessed using the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale. RESULTS: Participants with schizophrenia showed more hallucinatory experiences but did not score higher on either the VVIQ or the BRT than participants without schizophrenia. A correlation between the VVIQ and the BRT was found, validating the measurement of visual imagery and enabling the interpretation that visual imagery vividness is not enhanced in people with schizophrenia. CONCLUSION: The association between mental imagery vividness and schizophrenia found in previous studies may be based on other facets of mental imagery than visual imagery.
Subject(s)
Schizophrenia , Humans , Female , Middle Aged , Adult , Male , Imagination , Hallucinations , Affect , Visual PerceptionABSTRACT
Aphantasia and prosopagnosia are both rare conditions with impairments in visual cognition. While prosopagnosia refers to a face recognition deficit, aphantasics exhibit a lack of mental imagery. Current object recognition theories propose an interplay of perception and mental representations, making an association between recognition performance and visual imagery plausible. While the literature assumes a link between aphantasia and prosopagnosia, other impairments in aphantasia have been shown to be rather global. Therefore, we assumed that aphantasics do not solely exhibit impairments in face recognition but rather in general visual recognition performance, probably moderated by stimulus complexity. To test this hypothesis, 65 aphantasics were compared to 55 controls in a face recognition task, the Cambridge Face Memory Test, and a corresponding object recognition task, the Cambridge Car Memory Test. In both tasks, aphantasics performed worse than controls, indicating mild recognition deficits without face-specificity. Additional correlations between imagery vividness and performance in both tasks were found, suggesting that visual imagery influences visual recognition not only in imagery extremes. Stimulus complexity produced the expected moderation effect but only for the whole imagery-spectrum and only with face stimuli. Overall, the results imply that aphantasia is linked to a general but mild deficit in visual recognition.
Subject(s)
Prosopagnosia , Humans , Prevalence , Recognition, Psychology , Cognition , Visual Perception , Pattern Recognition, VisualABSTRACT
Imaginal exposure is a standard procedure of cognitive behavioral therapy for the treatment of anxiety and panic disorders. It is often used when in vivo exposure is not possible, too stressful for patients, or would be too expensive. Peter Lang's Bio-Informational Theory implies that imaginal exposure is effective because of the perceptual proximity of mental imagery to real events, whereas empirical findings suggest that propositional thought of fear stimuli (i.e., thinking about the stimuli without seeing them in the mind's eye) could be sufficient in therapeutical contexts. Exposure to propositional thought, instead of vivid mental imagery, would be more tolerable for patients since vivid imagery is associated with high emotional distress. To investigate whether mental imagery or propositional thought is crucial for the success of imaginal exposure, participants with the rare state of aphantasia (= absence of sensory mental imagery but with intact propositional thought) and two control groups were subjected to a fear conditioning paradigm followed by imaginal exposure and a reinstatement procedure. During imaginal exposure, control group 1 (N = 30) stared at a bright screen to disrupt visual imagery by incoming luminance (= simulated aphantasia), whereas control group 2 (N = 30) and participants with actual aphantasia (N = 30) kept their eyes closed. The results show [ ].
Subject(s)
Cognition , Imagination , Humans , Imagery, Psychotherapy , Emotions , FearABSTRACT
As awareness of the phenomenon of aphantasia (= lack of voluntary imagery) has increased in recent years, many psychotherapists ponder its clinical implications. The present study investigates whether aphantasia meets the criteria for mental disorders, i.e. statistical rarity, impairment in activities of daily living, violation of social norms and inappropriate behavior and personal distress. Prevalence of aphantasia was determined meta-analytically based on 3,543 participants. An international sample of 156 participants with aphantasia (58.3% male; Mage = 35.23) and 131 controls (65.6% male; Mage = 28.88) was assessed with the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, the Questionnaire for the Assessment of Everyday Memory Performance and the Aphantasia Distress Questionnaire, as well as measures of depression, anxiety and well-being. The prevalence of aphantasia was estimated at 3.5 to 4.8%. Participants with aphantasia scored significantly lower than controls on every day and autobiographical memory, but not on theory of mind. A subgroup of 34.7% of participants with aphantasia reported distress significantly associated with lower well-being and high levels of anxiety and depression. The level of distress increased with poorer performance in autobiographical memory and theory of mind. Although aphantasia meets the criterion of statistical rarity, the impact on activities of daily living and personal distress is too weak to justify a classification as a mental disorder. In a subgroup, however, distress can reach clinically relevant levels. In individual cases, it is therefore advisable to conduct a psychological assessment, for example by means of the Aphantasia Distress Questionnaire.
Subject(s)
Mental Disorders , Psychotic Disorders , Humans , Male , Adult , Female , Activities of Daily Living , Mental Disorders/psychology , Cognition , Anxiety/diagnosisABSTRACT
Recently, the term 'aphantasia' has become current in scientific and public discourse to denote the absence of mental imagery. However, new terms for aphantasia or its subgroups have recently been proposed, e.g., 'dysikonesia' or 'anauralia', which complicates the literature, research communication and understanding for the general public. Before further terms emerge, we advocate the consistent use of the term 'aphantasia' as it can be used flexibly and precisely, and is already widely known in the scientific community and among the general public.
Subject(s)
Imagination , Visual Perception , Humans , Imagery, PsychotherapyABSTRACT
Scene Construction Theory suggests similar neural mechanisms for visual imagery and autobiographical memory, supporting the seeming scientific consensus that a loss of visual imagery affects autobiographical memory. Based on the Dual Coding Theory and the Reverse Hierarchy Model, we also assumed influences of visual imagery on recent visual memory and even verbal memory, although little evidence has been provided so far. Thus, in a sample of 67 congenital aphantasics (= persons without mental imagery) and 32 demographically matched controls, it was investigated whether deficits in visual imagery are associated with deficits in visual as well as verbal short-term and long-term memory. The memory tasks were theoretically selected based on task difficulty, retrieval condition, and subcategories of stimuli, as previous null findings were attributed to insensitive tasks that were solvable by aphantasics by means of non-visual alternative strategies. Significant group differences were found in all memory components, with aphantasics performing worse than non-aphantasics. Therefore, evidence was obtained for the influence of visual imagery on all memory components beyond autobiographical memory.
Subject(s)
Memory, Episodic , Humans , Imagination , Memory Disorders/etiology , Mental Recall , Visual PerceptionABSTRACT
Aphantasia is the condition of reduced or absent voluntary imagery. So far, behavioural differences between aphantasics and non-aphantasics have hardly been studied as the base rate of those affected is quite low. The aim of the study was to examine if attentional guidance in aphantasics is impaired by their lack of visual imagery. In two visual search tasks, an already established one by Moriya (Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 80(5), 1127-1142, 2018) and a newly developed one, we examined whether aphantasics are primed less by their visual imagery than non-aphantasics. The sample in Study 1 consisted of 531 and the sample in Study 2 consisted of 325 age-matched pairs of aphantasics and non-aphantasics. Moriya's Task was not capable of showing the expected effect, whereas the new developed task was. These results could mainly be attributed to different task characteristics. Therefore, a lack of attentional guidance through visual imagery in aphantasics can be assumed and interpreted as new evidence in the imagery debate, showing that mental images actually influence information processing and are not merely epiphenomena of propositional processing.