A Methodology for Calculating Inhalation Dose to Public Health Personnel Exposed to Material Resuspended from Evacuees Following the Detonation of a Fission Device.

ABSTRACT: Following a nuclear fission event, there likely would be a large number of contaminated persons who would seek assistance at community reception centers to be established outside the affected area. This paper provides a methodology for calculating inhalation doses to public health and other response personnel at such facilities who would be receiving and assisting potentially contaminated persons from whom particles can be resuspended. Three hypothetical facilities were considered: the Base Case is a rather small room with no forced air ventilation. The Preferred Case, which is more realistic, is a mid-sized room with an operating HVAC system with air being recirculated through a filter. The Gymnasium Case has only fresh air intake. Initial bounding calculations for the Base Case indicated the need for pre-screening of arrivals to avoid unacceptable doses to staff. The screening criterion selected was 1.67 × 10 6 Bq m -2 . Calculations are presented for radionuclide concentrations in air, dose to staff from inhalation, and how exposures and the resulting doses can be altered by air-turnover rates and the use of filters with varying efficiency. Doses are presented for various arrival times and for both plutonium- and uranium-fueled detonations. The highest calculated dose via inhalation with no respiratory protection was 0.23 mSv for the Base Case. The more important radionuclides contributing to dose with exposure starting at day D + 1 were 239 Np and 133 I. At day D + 30, 131 I and 140 Ba were the more important dosimetrically. The variable creating the highest uncertainty was the slough-off factor for resuspension of contamination from people arriving at the reception center.

Measurable radiation levels around individuals externally contaminated by nuclear fallout‡.

During the early response to large-scale radioactive contamination events, people who are potentially affected need to be screened for radioactive contamination and public health staff need to triage individuals who may need immediate decontamination. This is typically done by screening individuals for external contamination using ionising radiation detection equipment. In this study, spatially and temporally dependent isotopic compositions from a simulated nuclear detonation and Monte Carlo methods were used to relate contamination activity levels to the measurable radiation levels at select distances away from an individual with whole-body contamination. Radionuclide-specific air kerma rate coefficients and Geiger-Mueller instrument response coefficients at five select distances from contaminated individuals are presented for 662 radionuclides. Temporally and spatially dependent incident-specific coefficients are presented for a hypothetical surface detonation of a 235U-fueled device.

Use of epidemiological data and direct bioassay for prioritization of affected populations in a large-scale radiation emergency.

Following a radiation emergency, evacuated, sheltered or other members of the public would require monitoring for external and/or internal contamination and, if indicated, decontamination. In addition, the potentially-impacted population would be identified for biodosimetry/bioassay or needed medical treatment (chelation therapy, cytokine treatment, etc.) and prioritized for follow-up. Expeditious implementation of these activities presents many challenges, especially when a large population is affected. Furthermore, experience from previous radiation incidents has demonstrated that the number of people seeking monitoring for radioactive contamination (both external and internal) could be much higher than the actual number of contaminated individuals. In the United States, the Department of Health and Human Services is the lead agency to coordinate federal support for population monitoring activities. Population monitoring includes (1) monitoring people for external contamination; (2) monitoring people for internal contamination; (3) population decontamination; (4) collecting epidemiologic data regarding potentially exposed and/or contaminated individuals to prioritize the affected population for limited medical resources; (5) administering available pharmaceuticals for internal decontamination as deemed necessary by appropriate health officials; (6) performing dose reconstruction; and (7) establishing a registry to conduct long-term monitoring of this population for potential long-term health effects. This paper will focus on screening for internal contamination and will describe the use of early epidemiologic data as well as direct bioassay techniques to rapidly identify and prioritize the affected population for further analysis and medical attention.