Ensuring vaccine safety in immunization programmes--a WHO perspective.

Ever since vaccines were firstly used against smallpox, adverse events following immunization have been reported. As immunization programmes expand to reach even the most remote communities in the poorest countries, it is likely that many more events will be temporally linked with vaccine administration. Furthermore, the profound shift in the general public and media interest in adverse events may lead to undue concerns and allegations which may ultimately jeopardize immunization programmes world-wide. While the health professional has understood this issue for some time, the public and the media have now also become all too aware of the significance of vaccine-related adverse events. The familiar vaccines, well-tested over decades, have not changed--but the perception regarding their safety has shifted. Claims outrageous or reasonable are being made against both the old and the newly-introduced vaccines. At the same time, the immunological and genetic revolution of the last decade may well bring to our notice some hypothetical risks that need to be addressed at pre-clinical level. WHO has been at the leading edge to guarantee vaccine safety for the last 30 years and will continue to do so. The Organization's plans for the next decade and beyond include the Safe Injection Global Network (SIGN), the development and introduction of safer technologies, and the prevention, early detection and management of AEFIs. The new technologies include needle-containing injection devices such as the autodisable syringe, as well as mucosal and transcutaneous immunization. Training will continue to be at the centre of WHO's efforts, limiting human error to a minimum. Mechanisms have been set in place to detect and respond to new and unforeseen events occurring. Above all, there is a willingness to respond to new climates and new technologies so that the Organization is in the best position to ensure safe immunization for all the world's children.

Manufacturing processes at two French rapeseed oil companies: possible relationships to toxic oil syndrome in Spain.

The toxic oil syndrome (TOS) epidemic that occurred in Spain in spring 1981 has been associated with the consumption of rapeseed oil that was denatured with aniline for industrial use but diverted for human consumption. The precise aetiologic agent in the oil responsible for the outbreak has not been identified. To learn more about possible contaminants and how the contamination might have occurred, we visited two French companies that process rapeseed oil and that were identified in Spanish administrative and judicial records as the ones exporting aniline-denatured rapeseed oil to Spain in 1981. With the apparently full and voluntary co-operation of personnel at both companies, we reviewed the processes involved in manufacturing, treating and transporting rapeseed oil, and we have summarized the information provided to us. Of particular importance is the finding that oil exported to Spain was taken from stock, the rest of which was sold for human consumption in the French domestic market, apparently without any adverse health effects. The differences between the oil exported to Spain and the oil sold as food in France were that aniline equivalent to 2% of the weight of the oil was added to most of the Spanish oil but not to that sold in France, and that contamination of the Spanish oil may have occurred in the tank trucks used for transportation to Spain, which had previously carried industrial chemicals. There is no assurance that the trucks were cleaned appropriately for transporting a food product before the oil was loaded for the journey to Spain. Since the clinical manifestations of TOS are not those of aniline toxicity, we conclude that the aetiological agent of TOS is likely to be one of the following: (1) a contaminant in the aniline, (2) a contaminant introduced during transportation, (3) a reaction product of normal oil components or materials used in refining with either aniline or the potential contaminants mentioned under (1) or (2) above.