The Power of Suggestion: Posthypnotically Induced Changes in the Temporal Binding of Intentional Action Outcomes.

The sense of agency is the experience of initiating and controlling one's voluntary actions and their outcomes. Intentional binding (i.e., when voluntary actions and their outcomes are perceived to occur closer together in time than involuntary actions and their outcomes) is increased in intentional action but requires no explicit reflection on agency. The reported experience of involuntariness is central to hypnotic responding, during which strategic action is experienced as involuntary. We report reduced intentional binding in a hypnotically induced experience of involuntariness, providing an objective correlate of reports of involuntariness. We argue that this reduced binding results from the diminished influence of motor intentions in the generation of the sense of agency when beliefs about whether an action is intended are altered. Thus, intentional binding depends on awareness of intentions. This finding shows that changes in metacognition of intentions affect perception.

Pain relief by touch: a quantitative approach.

Pain relief by touch has been studied for decades in pain neuroscience. Human perceptual studies revealed analgesic effects of segmental tactile stimulation, as compared to extrasegmental touch. However, the spatial organisation of touch-pain interactions within a single human dermatome has not been investigated yet. In 2 experiments we tested whether, how, and where within a dermatome touch modulates the perception of laser-evoked pain. We measured pain perception using intensity ratings, qualitative descriptors, and signal detection measures of sensitivity and response bias. Touch concurrent with laser pulses produced a significant analgesia, and reduced the sensitivity in detecting the energy of laser stimulation, implying a functional loss of information within the ascending Aδ pathway. Touch also produced a bias to judge laser stimuli as less painful. This bias decreased linearly when the distance between the laser and tactile stimuli increased. Thus, our study provides evidence for a spatial organisation of intrasegmental touch-pain interactions.

How voluntary actions modulate time perception.

Distortions of time perception are generally explained either by variations in the rate of pacing signals of an "internal clock", or by lag-adaptation mechanisms that recalibrate the perceived time of one event relative to another. This study compares these accounts directly for one temporal illusion: the subjective compression of the interval between voluntary actions and their effects, known as 'intentional binding'. Participants discriminated whether two cutaneous stimuli presented after voluntary or passive movements were simultaneous or successive. In other trials, they judged the temporal interval between their movement and an ensuing tone. Temporal discrimination was impaired following voluntary movements compared to passive movements early in the action-tone interval. In a control experiment, active movements without subsequent tones produced no impairment in temporal discrimination. These results suggest that voluntary actions transiently slow down an internal clock during the action-effect interval. This in turn leads to intentional binding, and links the effects of voluntary actions to the self.

The effects of acoustic startle on sensorimotor attenuation prior to movement.

A startling auditory stimulus delivered unexpectedly can activate subcortical structures triggering a prepared movement involuntarily and shortening reaction times. We investigated the effects of the startle acceleration of response on sensory suppression, a phenomenon linked to the voluntary motor command whereby a tactile stimulus is less likely to be perceived on a moving body-part prior to voluntary movement than at rest. Subjects had to detect weak shocks which were delivered to the index finger after a Go signal on some trials. We found that detection rates on movement trials were lower than on non-movement trials, consistent with sensory suppression. In addition, a loud acoustic stimulus was presented at the same time as the Go signal on some trials (startle trials). Reaction times were significantly shorter on startle trials than on other trials, replicating previous startle acceleration of reaction time effects attributed to the operation of subcortical pathways. However, we found no overall difference in premovement sensory suppression effects between baseline and startle movement trials. Rather, startle acceleration of voluntary reactions produced a corresponding acceleration of sensory suppression. Our results provide evidence for a subcortical contribution to sensory suppression and suggest that sensory suppression is a highly general form of motor and sensory interaction.

The cutaneous rabbit revisited.

In the cutaneous rabbit effect (CRE), a tactile event (so-called attractee tap) is mislocalized toward an adjacent attractor tap. The effect depends on the time interval between the taps. The authors delivered sequences of taps to the forearm and asked participants to report the location of one of the taps. The authors replicated the original CRE findings and observed a smaller but significant mislocalization when the attractor tap preceded the attractee tap. These results are consistent with the CRE arising from spatiotemporal interactions between the sensory codes for each individual tap. In subsequent experiments, the authors showed that the CRE was not affected by either gaze direction or concurrent auditory temporal information. The authors propose a model that explains the CRE by the spatiotemporal dynamics of an early, unimodal, sensory map.

The timing of brain events: authors' response to Libet's 'reply'.

A commentary in response to B. Libet: 'The timing of brain events: Reply to the "Special Section" in this journal of September 2004, edited by Susan Pockett' ().

Anomalous control: when 'free-will' is not conscious.

The conscious feeling of exercising 'free-will' is fundamental to our sense of self. However, in some psychopathological conditions actions may be experienced as involuntary or unwilled. We have used suggestion in hypnosis to create the experience of involuntariness (anomalous control) in normal participants. We compared a voluntary finger movement, a passive movement and a voluntary movement suggested by hypnosis to be 'involuntary.' Hypnosis itself had no effect on the subjective experience of voluntariness associated with willed movements and passive movements or on time estimations of their occurrence. However, subjective time estimates of a hypnotically-suggested, 'involuntary' finger movement were more similar to those for passive movements than for voluntary movements. The experience of anomalous control is qualitatively and quantitatively different from the normal conscious experience of a similar act produced intentionally. The experience of anomalous control may be produced either by pathology, or, in our case, by suggestion.