Hypnosis and suggestion as interventions for functional neurological disorder: A systematic review.

OBJECTIVE: Functional neurological disorder (FND) involves the presence of neurological symptoms that cannot be explained by neurological disease. FND has long been linked to hypnosis and suggestion, both of which have been used as treatments. Given ongoing interest, this review examined evidence for the efficacy of hypnosis and suggestion as treatment interventions for FND. METHOD: A systematic search of bibliographic databases was conducted to identify group studies published over the last hundred years. No restrictions were placed on study design, language, or clinical setting. Two reviewers independently assessed papers for inclusion, extracted data, and rated study quality. RESULTS: The search identified 35 studies, including 5 randomised controlled trials, 2 non-randomised trials, and 28 pre-post studies. Of 1584 patients receiving either intervention, 1379 (87%) showed significant improvements, including many who demonstrated resolution of their symptoms in the short-term. Given the heterogeneity of interventions and limitations in study quality overall, more formal quantitative synthesis was not possible. CONCLUSIONS: The findings highlight longstanding and ongoing interest in using hypnosis and suggestion as interventions for FND. While the findings appear promising, limitations in the evidence base, reflecting limitations in FND research more broadly, prevent definitive recommendations. Further research seems warranted given these supportive findings.

Giving Up on Consciousness as the Ghost in the Machine.

Consciousness as used here, refers to the private, subjective experience of being aware of our perceptions, thoughts, feelings, actions, memories (psychological contents) including the intimate experience of a unified self with the capacity to generate and control actions and psychological contents. This compelling, intuitive consciousness-centric account has, and continues to shape folk and scientific accounts of psychology and human behavior. Over the last 30 years, research from the cognitive neurosciences has challenged this intuitive social construct account when providing a neurocognitive architecture for a human psychology. Growing evidence suggests that the executive functions typically attributed to the experience of consciousness are carried out competently, backstage and outside subjective awareness by a myriad of fast, efficient non-conscious brain systems. While it remains unclear how and where the experience of consciousness is generated in the brain, we suggested that the traditional intuitive explanation that consciousness is causally efficacious is wrong-headed when providing a cognitive neuroscientific account of human psychology. Notwithstanding the compelling 1st-person experience (inside view) that convinces us that subjective awareness is the mental curator of our actions and thoughts, we argue that the best framework for building a scientific account is to be consistent with the biophysical causal dependency of prior neural processes. From a 3rd person perspective, (outside view), we propose that subjective awareness lacking causal influence, is (no more) than our experience of being aware, our awareness of our psychological content, knowing that we are aware, and the belief that that such experiences are evidence of an agentive capacity shared by others. While the human mind can be described as comprising both conscious and nonconscious aspects, both ultimately depend on neural process in the brain. In arguing for the counter-intuitive epiphenomenal perspective, we suggest that a scientific approach considers all mental aspects of mind including consciousness in terms of their underlying, preceding (causal) biological changes, in the realization that most brain processes are not accompanied by any discernible change in subjective awareness.

Direct verbal suggestibility: Measurement and significance.

Hypnotic suggestibility is part of the wider psychological trait of direct verbal suggestibility (DVS). Historically, DVS in hypnosis has informed theories of consciousness and of conversion disorder. More recently it has served as a research tool in cognitive science and in cognitive neuroscience in particular. Here we consider DVS as a general trait, its relation to other psychological characteristics and abilities, and to the origin and treatment of clinical conditions. We then outline the distribution of DVS in the population, its measurement, relationship to other forms of suggestibility, placebo responsiveness, personal characteristics, gender, neurological processes and other factors, such as expectancy. There is currently no scale specifically designed to measure DVS outside a hypnotic context. The most commonly used and well-researched of the hypnosis-based scales, the Harvard Group Scale, is described and identified as a basis for a more broadly based measure of DVS for use in psychological research.

UNITED KINGDOM NORMS FOR THE HARVARD GROUP SCALE OF HYPNOTIC SUSCEPTIBILITY, FORM A.

The Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A (HGSHS:A), is widely used as a measure of suggestibility to screen participants for research purposes. To date, there have been a number of normative studies of the HGSHS:A, the majority of which originate from Western countries. The outcomes of these Western studies are summarized, and variations in methodologies are described and discussed. Also reported are the psychometric properties of the HGSHS:A in a large contemporary United Kingdom (UK) sample. Overall, these UK results are consistent with the earlier Western norms studies in terms of response distribution and item difficulty, with only minor differences. The continued use of HGSHS:A as a screening procedure is supported, particularly if corrected for response subjectivity/involuntariness and with revised amnesia scoring. The HGSHS:A is also important as a potential measure of the broader trait of direct verbal suggestibility.

The biopsychosocial model of illness: a model whose time has come.

The biopsychosocial model outlined in Engel's classic Science paper four decades ago emerged from dissatisfaction with the biomedical model of illness, which remains the dominant healthcare model. Engel's call to arms for a biopsychosocial model has been taken up in several healthcare fields, but it has not been accepted in the more economically dominant and politically powerful acute medical and surgical domains. It is widely used in research into complex healthcare interventions, it is the basis of the World Health Organisation's International Classification of Functioning (WHO ICF), it is used clinically, and it is used to structure clinical guidelines. Critically, it is now generally accepted that illness and health are the result of an interaction between biological, psychological, and social factors. Despite the evidence supporting its validity and utility, the biopsychosocial model has had little influence on the larger scale organization and funding of healthcare provision. With chronic diseases now accounting for most morbidity and many deaths in Western countries, healthcare systems designed around acute biomedical care models are struggling to improve patient-reported outcomes and reduce healthcare costs. Consequently, there is now a greater need to apply the biopsychological model to healthcare management. The increasing proportion of healthcare resource devoted to chronic disorders and the accompanying need to improve patient outcomes requires action; better understanding and employment of the biopsychosocial model by those charged with healthcare funding could help improve healthcare outcome while also controlling costs.

Brain mechanisms for loss of awareness of thought and movement.

Loss or reduction of awareness is common in neuropsychiatric disorders and culturally influenced dissociative phenomena but the underlying brain mechanisms are poorly understood. fMRI was combined with suggestions for automatic writing in 18 healthy highly hypnotically suggestible individuals in a within-subjects design to determine whether clinical alterations in awareness of thought and movement can be experimentally modelled and studied independently of illness. Subjective ratings of control, ownership, and awareness of thought and movement, and fMRI data were collected following suggestions for thought insertion and alien control of writing movement, with and without loss of awareness. Subjective ratings confirmed that suggestions were effective. At the neural level, our main findings indicated that loss of awareness for both thought and movement during automatic writing was associated with reduced activation in a predominantly left-sided posterior cortical network including BA 7 (superior parietal lobule and precuneus), and posterior cingulate cortex, involved in self-related processing and awareness of the body in space. Reduced activity in posterior parietal cortices may underlie specific clinical and cultural alterations in awareness of thought and movement. Clinically, these findings may assist development of imaging assessments for loss of awareness of psychological origin, and interventions such as neurofeedback.

The functional anatomy and connectivity of thought insertion and alien control of movement.

Alien control phenomena are symptoms reported by patients with schizophrenia whereby feelings of control and ownership of thoughts and movements are lost. Comparable alien control experiences occur in culturally influenced dissociative states. We used fMRI and suggestions for automatic writing in highly hypnotically suggestible individuals to investigate the neural underpinnings of alien control. Targeted suggestions selectively reduced subjective ratings of control and ownership for both thought and movement. Thought insertion (TI) was associated with reduced activation of networks supporting language, movement, and self-related processing. In contrast, alien control of writing movement was associated with increased activity of a left-lateralised cerebellar-parietal network and decreased activity in brain regions involved in voluntary movement, including sensory-motor hand areas and the thalamus. Both experiences involved a reduction in activity of left supplementary motor area (SMA) and were associated with altered functional connectivity (FC) between SMA and brain regions involved in language processing and movement implementation. Collectively these results indicate the SMA plays a central role in alien control phenomena as a high level executive system involved in the sense that we control and own our thoughts and movements.

Using hypnosis to disrupt face processing: mirrored-self misidentification delusion and different visual media.

Mirrored-self misidentification delusion is the belief that one's reflection in the mirror is not oneself. This experiment used hypnotic suggestion to impair normal face processing in healthy participants and recreate key aspects of the delusion in the laboratory. From a pool of 439 participants, 22 high hypnotisable participants ("highs") and 20 low hypnotisable participants were selected on the basis of their extreme scores on two separately administered measures of hypnotisability. These participants received a hypnotic induction and a suggestion for either impaired (i) self-face recognition or (ii) impaired recognition of all faces. Participants were tested on their ability to recognize themselves in a mirror and other visual media - including a photograph, live video, and handheld mirror - and their ability to recognize other people, including the experimenter and famous faces. Both suggestions produced impaired self-face recognition and recreated key aspects of the delusion in highs. However, only the suggestion for impaired other-face recognition disrupted recognition of other faces, albeit in a minority of highs. The findings confirm that hypnotic suggestion can disrupt face processing and recreate features of mirrored-self misidentification. The variability seen in participants' responses also corresponds to the heterogeneity seen in clinical patients. An important direction for future research will be to examine sources of this variability within both clinical patients and the hypnotic model.

Modelling psychiatric and cultural possession phenomena with suggestion and fMRI.

Involuntary movements occur in a variety of neuropsychiatric disorders and culturally influenced dissociative states (e.g., delusions of alien control and attributions of spirit possession). However, the underlying brain processes are poorly understood. We combined suggestion and fMRI in 15 highly hypnotically susceptible volunteers to investigate changes in brain activity accompanying different experiences of loss of self-control of movement. Suggestions of external personal control and internal personal control over involuntary movements modelled delusions of control and spirit possession respectively. A suggestion of impersonal control by a malfunctioning machine modelled technical delusions of control, where involuntary movements are attributed to the influence of machines. We found that (i) brain activity and/or connectivity significantly varied with different experiences and attributions of loss of agency; (ii) compared to the impersonal control condition, both external and internal personal alien control were associated with increased connectivity between primary motor cortex (M1) and brain regions involved in attribution of mental states and representing the self in relation to others; (iii) compared to both personal alien control conditions, impersonal control of movement was associated with increased activity in brain regions involved in error detection and object imagery; (iv) there were no significant differences in brain activity, and minor differences in M1 connectivity, between the external and internal personal alien control conditions. Brain networks supporting error detection and object imagery, together with representation of self and others, are differentially recruited to support experiences of impersonal and personal control of involuntary movements. However, similar brain systems underpin attributions and experiences of external and internal alien control of movement. Loss of self-agency for movement can therefore accompany different kinds of experience of alien control supported by distinct brain mechanisms. These findings caution against generalization about single cognitive processes or brain systems underpinning different experiences of loss of self-control of movement.

Using hypnotic suggestion to model loss of control and awareness of movements: an exploratory FMRI study.

The feeling of voluntary control and awareness of movement is fundamental to our notions of selfhood and responsibility for actions, yet can be lost in neuropsychiatric syndromes (e.g. delusions of control, non-epileptic seizures) and culturally influenced dissociative states (e.g. attributions of spirit possession). The brain processes involved remain poorly understood. We used suggestion and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate loss of control and awareness of right hand movements in 15 highly hypnotically suggestible subjects. Loss of perceived control of movements was associated with reduced connectivity between supplementary motor area (SMA) and motor regions. Reduced awareness of involuntary movements was associated with less activation in parietal cortices (BA 7, BA 40) and insula. Collectively these results suggest that the sense of voluntary control of movement may critically depend on the functional coupling of SMA with motor systems, and provide a potential neural basis for the narrowing of awareness reported in pathological and culturally influenced dissociative phenomena.

Hypnotic suggestion: opportunities for cognitive neuroscience.

Hypnosis uses the powerful effects of attention and suggestion to produce, modify and enhance a broad range of subjectively compelling experiences and behaviours. For more than a century, hypnotic suggestion has been used successfully as an adjunctive procedure to treat a wide range of clinical conditions. More recently, hypnosis has attracted a growing interest from a cognitive neuroscience perspective. Recent studies using hypnotic suggestion show how manipulating subjective awareness in the laboratory can provide insights into brain mechanisms involved in attention, motor control, pain perception, beliefs and volition. Moreover, they indicate that hypnotic suggestion can create informative analogues of clinical conditions that may be useful for understanding these conditions and their treatments.

The functional anatomy of suggested limb paralysis.

Suggestions of limb paralysis in highly hypnotically suggestible subjects have been employed to successfully model conversion disorders, revealing similar patterns of brain activation associated with attempted movement of the affected limb. However, previous studies differ with regard to the executive regions involved during involuntary inhibition of the affected limb. This difference may have arisen as previous studies did not control for differences in hypnosis depth between conditions and/or include subjective measures to explore the experience of suggested paralysis. In the current study we employed functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the functional anatomy of left and right upper limb movements in eight healthy subjects selected for high hypnotic suggestibility during (i) hypnosis (NORMAL) and (ii) attempted movement following additional left upper limb paralysis suggestions (PARALYSIS). Contrast of left upper limb motor function during NORMAL relative to PARALYSIS conditions revealed greater activation of contralateral M1/S1 and ipsilateral cerebellum, consistent with the engagement of these regions in the completion of movements. By contrast, two significant observations were noted in PARALYSIS relative to NORMAL conditions. In conjunction with reports of attempts to move the paralysed limb, greater supplementary motor area (SMA) activation was observed, a finding consistent with the role of SMA in motor intention and planning. The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, BA 24) was also significantly more active in PARALYSIS relative to NORMAL conditions - suggesting that ACC (BA 24) may be implicated in involuntary, as well as voluntary inhibition of prepotent motor responses.

Modulating the default mode network using hypnosis.

Debate regarding the neural basis of the hypnotic state continues, but a recent hypothesis suggests that it may produce alterations in the default mode network (DMN). DMN describes a network of brain regions more active during low-demand compared to high-demand task conditions and has been linked to processes such as task-independent thinking, episodic memory, semantic processing, and self-awareness. However, the experiential and cognitive correlates of DMN remain difficult to investigate directly. Using hypnosis as a means of altering the resting ("default") state in conjunction with subjective measures and brain imaging, the authors found that the state of attentional absorption following a hypnotic induction was associated with reduced activity in DMN and increased activity in prefrontal attentional systems, under invariant conditions of passive visual stimulation. The findings that hypnosis and spontaneous conceptual thought at rest were subjectively and neurally distinctive are also relevant to understanding hypnosis itself.

Dissociation in hysteria and hypnosis: evidence from cognitive neuroscience.

Jean-Martin Charcot proposed the radical hypothesis that similar brain processes were responsible for the unexplained neurological symptoms of 'hysteria', now typically diagnosed as 'conversion disorder' or 'dissociative (conversion) disorder', and the temporary effects of hypnosis. While this idea has been largely ignored, recent cognitive neuroscience studies indicate that (i) hypnotisability traits are associated with a tendency to develop dissociative symptoms in the sensorimotor domain; (ii) dissociative symptoms can be modelled with suggestions in highly hypnotisable subjects; and (iii) hypnotic phenomena engage brain processes similar to those seen in patients with symptoms of hysteria. One clear theme to emerge from the findings is that 'symptom' presentation, whether clinically diagnosed or simulated using hypnosis, is associated with increases in prefrontal cortex activity suggesting that intervention by the executive system in both automatic and voluntary cognitive processing is common to both hysteria and hypnosis. Nevertheless, while the recent literature provides some compelling leads into the understanding of these phenomena, the field still lacks well controlled systematically designed studies to give a clear insight into the neurocognitive processes underlying dissociation in both hysteria and hypnosis. The aim of this review is to provide an agenda for future research.

Using hypnosis to gain insights into healthy and pathological cognitive functioning.

The demonstration that hypnotic suggestion can inhibit word/colour Stroop highlights one of the benefits of using hypnosis to explore cognitive psychology and in particular attentional processes. The compelling results using a rigorous design have particular relevance for the presumed automaticity of some forms of information processing. Moreover the results support the potential that hypnotic suggestion offers for creating clinically informed analogues of relevant psychological and neuropsychological conditions. As with all novel research, the results of Raz and Campbell raise further operational and theoretical questions, relating in this case to the use of hypnotic, post-hypnotic and non-hypnotic suggestion and the utility of existing measures of hypnotizability.

Contralateral stimulation, using TENS, of phantom limb pain: two confirmatory cases.

OBJECTIVES: This study aims to evaluate the effectiveness of trans-electric nerve stimulation (TENS) for phantom limb pain applied to contralateral limb (nonamputated limb). DESIGN: Two detailed single case studies using TENS on the contralateral limb are reported in a longitudinal study with one-year follow-up. Five variables were measured across this period. The study comprised of five sequential stages (Pre-assessment, Preliminary baseline, Start of intervention, Extended assessment, One-year follow-up). SETTING AND PATIENTS: Patients were identified at the Rookwood Hospital in Cardiff. They subsequently received regular home visits. The first patient was a 24-year-old male who had suffered a left below-elbow amputation following a car crash. The second patient was a 38-year-old male who had a transfemoral right amputation further to a viral infection. MEASURES: The following semistructured interview and questionnaires were used: McGill Comprehensive pain questionnaire part A and B; The Cambridge Phantom Limb Profile; The Groningen Questionnaire: Problems after Arm Amputation; and 13 Visual Analog Scales. CONCLUSIONS: Both patients showed a significant improvement in their perception of phantom limb pain and sensations that was maintained at one-year follow-up. A randomized blinded controlled trial to confirm these positive outcomes is required.

Hypnotic suggestion and cognitive neuroscience.

The growing acceptance of consciousness as a legitimate field of enquiry and the availability of functional imaging has rekindled research interest in the use of hypnosis and suggestion to manipulate subjective experience and to gain insights into healthy and pathological cognitive functioning. Current research forms two strands. The first comprises studies exploring the cognitive and neural nature of hypnosis itself. The second employs hypnosis to explore known psychological processes using specifically targeted suggestions. An extension of this second approach involves using hypnotic suggestion to create clinically informed analogues of established structural and functional neuropsychological disorders. With functional imaging, this type of experimental neuropsychopathology offers a productive means of investigating brain activity involved in many symptom-based disorders and their related phenomenology.

Hereditary prosopagnosia: the first case series.

Prosopagnosia is defined as a specific type of visual agnosia characterised by a discernible impairment in the capacity to recognise familiar people by their faces. We present seven family pedigrees with 38 cases in two to four generations of suspected hereditary prosopagnosia, detected using a screening questionnaire. Men and women are impaired and the anomaly is regularly transmitted from generation to generation in all pedigrees studied. Segregation is best explained by a simple autosomal dominant mode of inheritance, suggesting that loss of human face recognition can occur by the mutation of a single gene. Eight of the 38 affected persons were tested on the Warrington Recognition Memory Test for Faces (RMF; Warrington, 1984), famous and family faces tests, learning tests for internal and external facial features and a measure of mental imagery for face and non-face images. As a group, the eight participants scored significantly below an age- and education-matched comparison group on the most relevant test of face recognition; and all were impaired on at least one of the tests. The results provide compelling evidence for significant genetic contribution to face recognition skills and contribute to the promise offered by the emerging field of cognitive neurogenetics.