Too perfect to be good? An investigation of magicians' Too Perfect Theory.

The "Too Perfect Theory" states that if a trick is too perfect, it might paradoxically become less impressive, or give away its secret method. This theory suggests that an increased impossibility results in a less magical effect. The Too Perfect Theory is often applied to magic effects, but it conflicts with recent scientific investigations showing that participants' level of enjoyment of a magic performance is positively related to their perceived impossibility of the trick. The current article investigated whether an imperfect magic performance is more impressive than a perfect one. Across two experiments, we studied whether participants enjoy a performance more if the effect is not perfect. We also examined the different types of explanations people give to these two types of performances. The results showed that participants enjoyed a perfect performance more than an imperfect one. However, consistently with the Too Perfect Theory, participants watching the perfect performance also discovered the correct method behind the magic trick more frequently and believed the performance was staged more often. Moreover, participants' method explanation significantly impacted their reports about the performance.

Mind Control Tricks: Magicians' Forcing and Free Will.

A new research program has recently emerged that investigates magicians' mind control tricks, also called forces. This research highlights the psychological processes that underpin decision-making, illustrates the ease by which our decisions can be covertly influenced, and helps answer questions about our sense of free will and agency over choices.

Subtly encouraging more deliberate decisions: using a forcing technique and population stereotype to investigate free will.

Magicians' forcing techniques allow them to covertly influence spectators' choices. We used a type of force (Position Force) to investigate whether explicitly informing people that they are making a decision results in more deliberate decisions. The magician placed four face-down cards on the table in a horizontal row, after which the spectator was asked to select a card by pushing it forward. According to magicians and position effects literature, people should be more likely to choose a card in the third position from their left, because it can be easily reached. We manipulated whether participants were reminded that they were making a decision (explicit choice) or not (implicit choice) when asked to select one of the cards. Two experiments confirmed the efficiency of the Position Force-52% of participants chose the target card. Explicitly informing participants of the decision impairs the success of the force, leading to a more deliberate choice. A range of awareness measures illustrates that participants were unaware of their stereotypical behaviours. Participants who chose the target card significantly underestimated the number of people who would have chosen the same card, and felt as free as the participants who chose another card. Finally, we tested an embodied-cognition idea, but our data suggest that different ways of holding an object do not affect the level of self-control they have over their actions. Results are discussed in terms of theoretical implications regarding free will, Wegner's apparent mental causation, choice blindness and reachability effects.

The apparent action causation: Using a magician forcing technique to investigate our illusory sense of agency over the outcome of our choices.

We often fall victim of an illusory sense of control and agency over our thoughts and actions. Magicians are masters at exploiting these illusions, and forcing techniques provide a powerful way to study apparent action causation-the illusion that our action caused the outcome we get. In this article, we used the Criss-Cross force to study whether people can tell the difference between an action which had an impact on the outcome they get and one which has no impact. In the Criss-Cross force, participants are asked to cut to a card, and while they are genuinely free to cut the cards at any position, the cut does not affect the card they are given (i.e., they always get the top card). We investigate the psychological processes that underpin the success of this force. Experiment 1 (N = 60) showed that participants cannot tell the difference between a forced and a controlled outcome. Experiment 2 (N = 90) showed that contrary to common magicians' knowledge, misdirection does not play a role in the success of the force. Finally, Experiment 3 (N = 60) suggests that rather than misdirection, an attribute substitution error explains why people fail to understand that their action does not have an impact on the outcome they get. Debriefing also shows the importance of participants' expectations in the perception of the trick, as well as the role of prediction of the outcome in participants' sense of agency over the events.

Magical Potential: Why Magic Performances Should be Used to Explore the Psychological Factors Contributing to Human Belief Formation.

Beliefs in supernatural entities are integral parts of both our culturally embedded religions and more individualized magical belief systems (e.g., paranormal beliefs, spirituality). Scholars regularly link the occurrence of beliefs to individuals' cognitive and affective ways of information processing. For magical beliefs in particular, we expect children to endorse them. When reaching adulthood, however, individuals should have abandoned magical beliefs, and become pragmatic, sceptical, critical and rational thinkers. The reality is, a large proportion of the adult population can be described as magical thinkers, or report having had magical experiences, even in the recent past. Moreover, psychological research in adults shows a large range of magical beliefs, which correlate with particular psychological processing biases (e.g., repetition avoidance, seeing signal in noise). Unfortunately, these correlational studies do not tell us whether such psychological processing biases precede magical beliefs or whether they result from these magical beliefs. Knowing the direction of such relationships is key to understand which psychological biases might contribute to adult belief formation (or the persistence of beliefs from childhood). To test such causal relationships, we started to systematically apply an experimental approach in which people are exposed to anomalous events. Such a central event allows before-after comparisons of psychological biases. First empirical results confirmed that the use of magic performances, particularly when of paranormal nature, results in an important amount of paranormal explanations. Pre-existing beliefs enhanced this explanation bias. These results show how easily naïve observers can be "tricked" into unsubstantiated beliefs.

Why are you looking at me? It's because I'm talking, but mostly because I'm staring or not doing much.

Our attention is particularly driven toward faces, especially the eyes, and there is much debate over the factors that modulate this social attentional orienting. Most of the previous research has presented faces in isolation, and we tried to address this shortcoming by measuring people's eye movements whilst they observe more naturalistic and varied social interactions. Participants' eye movements were monitored whilst they watched three different types of social interactions (monologue, manual activity, active attentional misdirection), which were either accompanied by the corresponding audio as speech or by silence. Our results showed that (1) participants spent more time looking at the face when the person was giving a monologue, than when he/she was carrying out manual activities, and in the latter case they spent more time fixating on the person's hands. (2) Hearing speech significantly increases the amount of time participants spent looking at the face (this effect was relatively small), although this was not accounted for by any increase in mouth-oriented gaze. (3) Participants spent significantly more time fixating on the face when direct eye contact was established, and this drive to establish eye contact was significantly stronger in the manual activities than during the monologue. These results highlight people's strategic top-down control over when they attend to faces and the eyes, and support the view that we use our eyes to signal non-verbal information.

Fake science: The impact of pseudo-psychological demonstrations on people's beliefs in psychological principles.

Magicians use deception to create effects that allow us to experience the impossible. More recently, magicians have started to contextualize these tricks in psychological demonstrations. We investigated whether witnessing a magic demonstration alters people's beliefs in these pseudo-psychological principles. In the classroom, a magician claimed to use psychological skills to read a volunteer's thoughts. After this demonstration, participants reported higher beliefs that an individual can 1) read a person's mind by evaluating micro expressions, psychological profiles and muscle activities, and 2) effectively prime a person's behaviour through subtle suggestions. Whether he was presented as a magician or psychologist did not influence people's beliefs about how the demonstration was achieved, nor did it influence their beliefs in pseudo-psychological principles. Our results demonstrate that pseudo-psychological demonstrations can have a significant impact on perpetuating false beliefs in scientific principles and raise important questions about the wider impact of scientific misinformation.

The Flushtration Count Illusion: Attribute substitution tricks our interpretation of a simple visual event sequence.

When faced with a difficult question, people sometimes work out an answer to a related, easier question without realizing that a substitution has taken place (e.g., Kahneman, 2011, Thinking, fast and slow. New York, Farrar, Strauss, Giroux). In two experiments, we investigated whether this attribute substitution effect can also affect the interpretation of a simple visual event sequence. We used a magic trick called the 'Flushtration Count Illusion', which involves a technique used by magicians to give the illusion of having seen multiple cards with identical backs, when in fact only the back of one card (the bottom card) is repeatedly shown. In Experiment 1, we demonstrated that most participants are susceptible to the illusion, even if they have the visual and analytical reasoning capacity to correctly process the sequence. In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that participants construct a biased and simplified representation of the Flushtration Count by substituting some attributes of the event sequence. We discussed of the psychological processes underlying this attribute substitution effect.

Don't be fooled! Attentional responses to social cues in a face-to-face and video magic trick reveals greater top-down control for overt than covert attention.

People's attention is oriented towards faces, but the extent to which these social attention effects are under top down control is more ambiguous. Our first aim was to measure and compare, in real life and in the lab, people's top-down control over overt and covert shifts in reflexive social attention to the face of another. We employed a magic trick in which the magician used social cues (i.e. asking a question whilst establishing eye contact) to misdirect attention towards his face, and thus preventing participants from noticing a visible colour change to a playing card. Our results show that overall people spend more time looking at the magician's face when he is seen on video than in reality. Additionally, although most participants looked at the magician's face when misdirected, this tendency to look at the face was modulated by instruction (i.e., "keep your attention on the cards"), and therefore, by top down control. Moreover, while the card's colour change was fully visible, the majority of participants failed to notice the change, and critically, change detection (our measure of covert attention) was not affected by where people looked (overt attention). We conclude that there is a tendency to shift overt and covert attention reflexively to faces, but that people exert more top down control over this overt shift in attention. These finding are discussed within a new framework that focuses on the role of eye movements as an attentional process as well as a form of non-verbal communication.

The magic grasp: motor expertise in deception.

BACKGROUND: Most of us are poor at faking actions. Kinematic studies have shown that when pretending to pick up imagined objects (pantomimed actions), we move and shape our hands quite differently from when grasping real ones. These differences between real and pantomimed actions have been linked to separate brain pathways specialized for different kinds of visuomotor guidance. Yet professional magicians regularly use pantomimed actions to deceive audiences. METHODOLOGY AND PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: In this study, we tested whether, despite their skill, magicians might still show kinematic differences between grasping actions made toward real versus imagined objects. We found that their pantomimed actions in fact closely resembled real grasps when the object was visible (but displaced) (Experiment 1), but failed to do so when the object was absent (Experiment 2). CONCLUSIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE: We suggest that although the occipito-parietal visuomotor system in the dorsal stream is designed to guide goal-directed actions, prolonged practice may enable it to calibrate actions based on visual inputs displaced from the action.

Misdirected by the gap: the relationship between inattentional blindness and attentional misdirection.

In several of our articles we have drawn analogies between inattentional blindness paradigms and misdirection. Memmert (2010) however, has criticized this analogy and urged for caution in assuming too much of a close relationship between these two phenomena. Here we consider the points raised by Memmert and highlight some misunderstandings and omissions in his interpretation of our work, which substantially undermine his argument. Debating the similarities and differences between aspects of misdirection and inattentional blindness is valuable and has the potential to highlight the utility of these two phenomena. However, it is important not to be misdirected by subtle differences between particular instances of each phenomenon, at the expense of failing to detect the opportunities that these phenomena present for extending our understanding of attention and awareness.

How magic changes our expectations about autism.

In the vanishing-ball illusion, the magician's social cues misdirect the audience's expectations and attention so that the audience "sees" a ball vanish in the air. Because individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are less sensitive to social cues and have superior perception for nonsocial details compared with typically developing individuals, we predicted that they would be less susceptible to the illusion. Surprisingly, the opposite result was found, as individuals with ASD were more susceptible to the illusion than a comparison group. Eye-tracking data indicated that subtle temporal delays in allocating attention might explain their heightened susceptibility. Additionally, although individuals with ASD showed typical patterns of looking to the magician's face and eyes, they were slower to launch their first saccade to the face and had difficulty in fixating the fast-moving observable ball. Considered together, the results indicate that individuals with ASD have difficulties in rapidly allocating attention toward both people and moving objects.

Imaging the impossible: an fMRI study of impossible causal relationships in magic tricks.

Understanding causal relationships and violations of those relationships is fundamental to learning about the world around us. Over time some of these relationships become so firmly established that they form part of an implicit belief system about what is possible and impossible in the world. Previous studies investigating the neural correlates of violations of learned relationships have focused on relationships that were task-specific and probabilistic. In contrast, the present study uses magic-trick perception as a means of investigating violations of relationships that are long-established, deterministic, and that form part of the aforementioned belief system. Compared to situations in which expected causal relationships are observed, magic trick perception recruited dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), brain regions associated with the detection of conflict and the implementation of cognitive control. These activations were greater in the left hemisphere, supporting a role for this hemisphere in the interpretation of complex events. DLPFC is more greatly activated by magic tricks than by surprising events, but not more greatly activated by surprising than non surprising events, suggesting that this region plays a special role in causality processing. The results suggest a role for cognitive control regions in the left hemisphere in a neurobiology of disbelief.

Towards a science of magic.

It is argued here that cognitive science currently neglects an important source of insight into the human mind: the effects created by magicians. Over the centuries, magicians have learned how to perform acts that are perceived as defying the laws of nature, and that induce a strong sense of wonder. This article argues that the time has come to examine the scientific bases behind such phenomena, and to create a science of magic linked to relevant areas of cognitive science. Concrete examples are taken from three areas of magic: the ability to control attention, to distort perception, and to influence choice. It is shown how such knowledge can help develop new tools and indicate new avenues of research into human perception and cognition.