Medical Therapy of Patients Contaminated with Radioactive Cesium or Iodine.

Follow-up studies after the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents have shown that 137Cs and 131I made up the major amount of harmful contaminants in the atmospheric dispersion and fallout. Other potential sources for such radionuclide exposure may be terrorist attacks, e.g., via contamination of drinking water reservoirs. A primary purpose of radionuclide mobilization is to minimize the radiation dose. Rapid initiation of treatment of poisoned patients is imperative after a contaminating event. Internal contamination with radioactive material can expose patients to prolonged radiation, thus leading to short- and long-term clinical consequences. After the patient's emergency conditions are addressed, the treating physicians and assisting experts should assess the amount of radioactive material that has been internalized. This evaluation should include estimation of the radiation dose that is delivered and the specific radionuclides inside the body. These complex assessments warrant the reliance on a multidisciplinary approach that incorporates regional experts in radiation medicine and emergencies. Regional hospitals should have elaborated strategies for the handling of radiation emergencies. If radioactive cesium is a significant pollutant, Prussian blue is the approved antidote for internal detoxification. Upon risks of radioiodine exposure, prophylactic or immediate treatment with potassium iodide tablets is recommended. Chelators developed from calcium salts have been studied for gastrointestinal trapping and enhanced mobilization after strontium exposure.

The role of the health physicist in nuclear security.

Health physics is a recognized safety function in the holistic context of the protection of workers, members of the public, and the environment against the hazardous effects of ionizing radiation, often generically designated as radiation protection. The role of the health physicist as protector dates back to the Manhattan Project. Nuclear security is the prevention and detection of, and response to, criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities, or associated activities. Its importance has become more visible and pronounced in the post 9/11 environment, and it has a shared purpose with health physics in the context of protection of workers, members of the public, and the environment. However, the duties and responsibilities of the health physicist in the nuclear security domain are neither clearly defined nor recognized, while a fundamental understanding of nuclear phenomena in general, nuclear or other radioactive material specifically, and the potential hazards related to them is required for threat assessment, protection, and risk management. Furthermore, given the unique skills and attributes of professional health physicists, it is argued that the role of the health physicist should encompass all aspects of nuclear security, ranging from input in the development to implementation and execution of an efficient and effective nuclear security regime. As such, health physicists should transcend their current typical role as consultants in nuclear security issues and become fully integrated and recognized experts in the nuclear security domain and decision making process. Issues regarding the security clearances of health physics personnel and the possibility of insider threats must be addressed in the same manner as for other trusted individuals; however, the net gain from recognizing and integrating health physics expertise in all levels of a nuclear security regime far outweighs any negative aspects. In fact, it can be argued that health physics is essential in achieving an integrated approach toward nuclear safety, security, and safeguards.

Assessing the dose values received by patients during conventional radiography X-ray examinations and the technical condition of the equipment used for this purpose.

BACKGROUND: X-ray examination is associated with patient exposure to ionizing radiation. Dose values depend on the type of medical procedure used, the X-ray unit technical condition and exposure conditions selected. The aim of this study was to determine the dose value received by patients during certain conventional radiography X-ray examinations and to assess the technical condition of medical equipment used for this purpose. MATERIAL AND METHODS: The study covered the total number of 118 conventional diagnostic X-ray units located in the Masovian Voivodeship. The methodology used to assess the conventional diagnostic X-ray unit technical condition and the measurement of the radiation dose rate received by patients are based on test procedures developed by the Department of Radiation Protection and Radiobiology of the National Institute of Public Health - National Institute of Hygiene (Warszawa, Poland) accredited for compliance with PN-EN 17025 standard by the Polish Centre for Accreditation. RESULTS: It was found that 84.7% of X-ray units fully meet the criteria set out in the Polish legislation regarding the safe use of ionizing radiation in medicine, while 15.3% of the units do not meet some of them. The broadest dose value range was recorded for adult patients. Particularly, during lateral (LATl) lumbar spine radiography the recorded entrance surface dose (ESD) values ranged from 283.5 to 7827 µGy (mean: 2183.3 µGy). CONCLUSIONS: It is absolutely necessary to constantly monitor the technical condition of all X-ray units, because it affects population exposure to ionizing radiation. Furthermore, it is essential to raise radiographers' awareness of the effects that ionizing radiation exposure can have on the human body.

Toward a holistic approach in the presentation of benefits and risks of medical radiation.

Frequently messages are conveyed about benefit and risk in medical imaging or in imaging-guided medical intervention that are quite different from the intended communication. This is because communication is not merely the words used to express an idea. The message involves many personal factors on the part of the communicator and on the part of the audience. The intent of this article is to disclose some of the underlying factors that disproportionately bias communication of benefit and risk. Suggestions on how to develop a holistic communication of benefits and risks are presented. It is recommended that communication about the application of radiation to patients be disassociated from standard radiation protection concepts. The medical profession should develop unique communication tools to deliver a message that focuses on benefit/risk as a holistic entity, not benefit or risk as separate entities.

Probabilistic model evaluation of continuous air monitor response for meeting radiation protection goals.

Effective continuous air monitor (CAM) programs can eliminate or significantly reduce the amount of inhaled radioactive material following an accidental release. Numerous factors impact the levels of protection CAM programs provide to the workers during these releases. These factors range from those related to the capability of the CAM instrument (e.g., CAM alarm set point and length of counting intervals) to those related to CAM placement in the room relative to dispersion rates and patterns of the released material in a room. While the impact of many of these factors on alarm sensitivity has been investigated in isolation, there are no methods for holistic evaluations of CAM programs relative to radiation protection goals (RPGs) or the contribution of the factors, either individually or combined, toward limiting worker dose. In this study, worker exposure was predicted using CAM response models developed to evaluate protection levels for continuous and acute releases. Monte Carlo simulations of 10,000 releases were performed using various combinations of model parameter values, with associated uncertainty distributions, to assess the expected ability of a CAM program to meet RPGs, and, further, to assess the relative influence of each factor toward lowering worker exposure. Results showed that improvements to CAM instrument capability combined with better ventilation and CAM placement improve worker protection nonlinearly and that these improvements are critical to meet RPGs. The sensitivity analysis showed that ventilation-driven dilution had the greatest impact on exposure reduction with the selected counting interval for alarm decisions and the alarm set point as secondarily important.

Protecting people against radiation exposure in the event of a radiological attack. A report of The International Commission on Radiological Protection.

This report responds to a widely perceived need for professional advice on radiological protection measures to be undertaken in the event of a radiological attack. The report, which is mainly concerned with possible attacks involving 'radioactive dispersion devices', re-affirms the applicability of existing ICRP recommendations to such situations, should they ever occur. Many aspects of the emergency scenarios expected to arise in the event of a radiological attack may be similar to those that experience has shown can arise from radiological accidents, but there may also be important differences. For instance, a radiological attack would probably be targeted at a public area, possibly in an urban environment, where the presence of radiation is not anticipated and the dispersion conditions commonly assumed for a nuclear or radiological emergency, such as at a nuclear installation, may not be applicable. First responders to a radiological attack and other rescuers need to be adequately trained and to have the proper equipment for identifying radiation and radioactive contamination, and specialists in radiological protection must be available to provide advice. It may be prudent to assume that radiological, chemical, and/or biological agents are involved in an attack until it is proven otherwise. This calls for an 'all-hazard' approach to the response. In the aftermath of an attack, the main aim of radiological protection must be to prevent the occurrence of acute health effects attributable to radiation exposure (termed 'deterministic' effects) and to restrict the likelihood of late health effects (termed 'stochastic' effects) such as cancers and some hereditable diseases. A supplementary aim is to minimise environmental contamination from radioactive residues and the subsequent general disruption of daily life. The report notes that action taken to avert exposures is a much more effective protective measure than protective measure the provision of medical treatment after exposure has occurred. Responders involved in recovery, remediation and eventual restoration should be subject to the usual international standards for occupational radiological protection, which are based on ICRP recommendations, including the relevant requirements for occupational dose limitation established in such standards. These restrictions may be relaxed for informed volunteers undertaking urgent rescue operations, and they are not applicable for voluntary life-saving actions. However, specific protection measures are recommended for female workers who may be pregnant or nursing an infant. The immediate countermeasures to protect the public in the rescue phase are primarily caring for people with traumatic injuries and controlling access. Subsequent actions include respiratory protection, personal decontamination, sheltering, iodine prophylaxis (if radio-iodines are involved), and temporary evacuation. In the recovery phase, the relocation and resettlement of people may be needed in extreme cases. This phase may require remedial action, including cleanup, management of the resulting radioactive waste, management of any human remains containing significant amounts of radioactive substances, and dealing with remaining radioactive residues. The guidance given in relation to public protection is based solely on radiological protection considerations and should be seen as a decision-aiding tool to prepare for the aftermath of a radiological attack. It is expected to serve as input to a final decision-making process that may include other societal concerns, consideration of lessons learned in the past (especially these involving the public perception of the risks posed by radioactive contamination) and the participation of interested parties. A radiological attack could also be the cause of radioactive contamination of water, food, and other widely consumed commodities. This possible outcome is considered unlikely to lead to significant internal contamination of a large number of people owing to the large amounts of radioactive material that would be required to cause high levels of contamination of water, food, and other commodities. Nonetheless, the report recommends radiological criteria for restricting the use of commodities under such circumstances. The report concludes by re-iterating that the response to radiological attacks should be planned beforehand following the customary processes for optimisation of radiological protection recommended by ICRP, and that optimised measures should be prepared in advance. Such plans should result in a systematic approach that can be modified if necessary to take into account the prevailing conditions and to invoke actions as warranted by the circumstances. Many potential scenarios clearly cannot induce immediate severe radiation injuries. Therefore, in order to prevent over-reaction, response measures prepared in advance should reflect the real expected gravity of the various possible scenarios.