Hypothalamic function in patients diagnosed as brain dead and its practical consequences.

Some patients who have been diagnosed as "dead by neurologic criteria" continue to exhibit certain brain functions, most commonly, neuroendocrine functions. In this chapter, we review the pathophysiology of brain death that can lead either to neuroendocrine failure or to preserved neuroendocrine functioning. We review the evidence on continued hypothalamic functioning in patients who have been declared "brain dead," examine potential mechanisms that would explain these findings, and discuss how these findings create additional confounds for brain death testing. We conclude by reviewing the evidence for the management of hypothalamic-pituitary failure in the setting of brain death and organ transplantation.

Jahi McMath: Lessons Learned.

Jahi McMath's story has been an important reference in medicine and ethics as the landscape of the understanding of death by neurologic criteria is shifting, with families actively questioning the once-firm criterion. Palliative care providers have a role in seeking understanding and collaborating with families and clinical teams to navigate the many challenges that arise when a medical team has determined that a child has died, and their parents disagree. In this case-based narrative discussion we consider the complexity of the family experience of brain death.

Laser interstitial thermal therapy for in-field recurrence of brain metastasis after stereotactic radiosurgery: does treatment with LITT prevent a neurologic death?

Brain metastasis (BM) affects up to one-third of adults with cancer and carries a historically bleak prognosis. Despite advances in stereotactic radiosurgery (SRS), rates of in-field recurrence (IFR) after SRS range from 10 to 25%. High rates of neurologic death have been reported after SRS failure, particularly for recurrences deep in the brain and surgically inaccessible. Laser interstitial thermal therapy (LITT) is an emerging option in this setting, but its ability to prevent a neurologic death is unknown. In this study, we investigate the causes of death among patients with BM who undergo LITT for IFR after SRS. We conducted a single institution retrospective case series of patients with BM who underwent LITT for IFR after SRS. Clinical and demographic data were collected via chart review. The primary endpoint was cause of death. Between 2010 and 2018, 70 patients with BM underwent LITT for IFR after SRS. Median follow-up after LITT was 12.0 months. At analysis, 49 patients died; a cause was determined in 44. Death was neurologic in 20 patients and non-neurologic in 24. The 24-month cumulative incidence of neurologic and non-neurologic death was 35.1% and 38.6%, respectively. Etiologies of neurologic death included local recurrence (n = 7), recovery failure (n = 7), distant progression (n = 5), and other (n = 1). Among our patient population, LITT provided the ability to stabilize neurologic disease in up to 2/3 of patients. For IFR after SRS, LITT may represent a reasonable treatment strategy for select patients. Additional work is necessary to determine the extent to which LITT can prevent neurologic death after recurrence of BM.

Towards a holistic definition of death: the biological, philosophical and social deficiencies of brain stem death criteria.

With no statutory definition of death, the accepted medical definition relies on brain stem death criteria as a definitive measure of diagnosing death. However, the use of brain stem death criteria in this way is precarious and causes widespread confusion amongst both medical and lay communities. Through critical analysis, this paper considers the insufficiencies of brain stem death. It concludes that brain stem death cannot be successfully equated with either biological death or the loss of integrated bodily function. The overemphasis of the brain-stem and its consequences leaves  the criteria open to significant philosophical critique. Further, in some circumstances, the use of brain stem death criteria causes substantial emotional conflict for families and relatives. Accordingly, a more holistic and comprehensive definition of death is required.

Rethinking Brain Death as a Legal Fiction: Is the Terminology the Problem?

Brain death, or the determination of death by neurological criteria, has been described as a legal fiction. Legal fictions are devices by which the law treats two analogous things (in this case, biological death and brain death) in the same way so that the law developed for one can also cover the other. Some scholars argue that brain death should be understood as a fiction for two reasons: the way brain death is determined does not actually satisfy legal criteria requiring the permanent cessation of all brain function, and brain death is not consistent with the biological conception of death as involving the irreversible cessation of the functioning of an organism as a whole. Critics counter that the idea that brain death is a legal fiction is deceptive and undemocratic. I will argue that diagnosing brain death as a hidden legal fiction is a helpful way to understand its historical development and current status. For the legal-fictions approach to be ethically justifiable, however, the fact that brain death is a legal fiction not aligned with the standard biological conception of death must be acknowledged and made transparent.

[Subarachnoid Hemorrhage and Isolated Brainstem Death]. / Aneurysmatische Subarachnoidalblutung und Entwicklung eines "isolierten Hirnstammtods".

BACKGROUND: Worldwide there are differences in the procedure of determining brain death. An irreversible loss of all brain functions, including cerebrum, cerebellum and brainstem is mandatory for the diagnosis of brain death in Germany. On the basis of a case report some important aspects of the new recommendations of the German guidelines are discussed. CASE REPORT: We present the case of a 41-year old patient who was admitted to our clinic due to acute subarachnoid hemorrhage (SAH). Angiography revealed an aneurysm of the posterior inferior cerebellar artery. The patient was comatose without any brainstem reflexes and showed apnoea. However, on day 3, EEG showed alpha activity as a sign of residual cortical function. We diagnosed an isolated brainstem death. The next day EEG was isoelectric and brain death was confirmed. DISCUSSION: The diagnosis of isolated brainstem death does not allow a confirmation of death in Germany. Our case presents a primary infratentorial brain damage mandating additional confirmatory tests.

Morte encefálica: diagnóstico possível sem utilização de exames complementares / Brain death: possible diagnosis without complementary exams

Objetivo: A necessidade da utilização de testes confirmatórios para o diagnóstico de morte encefálica vem sendo questionada nos últimos tempos. Acredita-se que o exame clínico completo, realizado de acordo com o protocolo do Conselho Federal de Medicina, seja suficiente para constatar a ausência irreversível de função no tronco encefálico. Assim, este estudo teve como objetivo averiguar a real necessidade da utilização de exames complementares no diagnóstico de morte encefálica. Método: Foi realizado estudo prospectivo analisando os prontuários de pacientes que receberam diagnóstico de morte encefálica desde a abertura do protocolo até a realização dos exames clínicos completos e exame complementar (Doppler transcraniano). Resultados: Não foi registrado nenhum caso de recuperação da função cortical e/ou do tronco cerebral após o diagnóstico de morte encefálica utilizando os critérios clínicos. A dificuldade para a realização do Doppler transcraniano e as falhas inerentes ao exame contribuíram para tornar mais lento o diagnóstico. Conclusão: É possível diagnosticar morte encefálica apenas utilizando exame clínico completo, sem a necessidade de exames complementares.

Objective: The need to use confirmatory tests for brain death diagnosis has been questioned lately. It is believed that a full clinical examination, performed according to the protocol of brain death diagnosis of the Brazilian National Council of Medicine, is sufficient to certify the irreversible loss of brain-stem function. Therefore, this study aimed to verify the real need to use complementary exams for brain death diagnosis. Method: We carried out a prospective study analyzing the files of patients with brain death diagnoses since the beginning of the protocol and that underwent a full clinical examination and transcranial Doppler as a complementary exam. Results: No cases of cortical and/or brain-stem function recovery after brain death diagnosis using clinical criteria were registered. Difficulty to perform transcranial Doppler and failures inherent to the exam contributed to late diagnosis. Conclusion: It is possible to diagnose brain death only using a full clinical examination, with no need to perform complementary exams.

Bench-to-bedside review: when is dead really dead--on the legitimacy of using neurologic criteria to determine death.

This review explores the legitimacy of the whole brain death (WBD) criterion. I argue that it does not fulfill the traditional biologic definition of death and is, therefore, an unsound clinical and philosophical criterion for death. I dispute whether the clinical tests used to diagnose WBD are sufficient to prove all critical brain functions have ceased, as well as examine the sets of brain functions that persist in many WBD patients. I conclude that the definition of death must be modified from a biologic to an ontologic model if we intend to maintain the WBD criterion.

Reposición del sodio en el coma hiponatrémico por intoxicación hídrica / Sodium replacement in hyponatremic coma caused by water intoxication

No disponible

Controversia en el diagnóstico de la muerte encefálica y la donación de órganos: aspectos éticos, legales y culturales / Controversy in the diagnosis of brain death and organ donation: legal, ethical and cultural issues

No disponible

Estado vegetativo persistente postanoxia en la Unidad de Cuidados Intensivos. Criterios neuropatológicos / Persistent vegetative state secondary to anoxia in the intensive care unit. Neuropathological criteria

El estado vegetativo persistente (EVP) se define como una ausencia de la conciencia y de las funciones cognitivas y emociones con conservación de las funciones vegetativas. El sustrato anatómico es una desconexión (aislamiento) de la corteza cerebral y del tálamo de las aferencias del tronco del encéfalo. Las causas son variadas, pero las más frecuentes son los traumatismos cerebrales y la isquemia global transitoria secundaria a paro cardíaco, incluido el accidente anestésico. El EVP debe distinguirse de la muerte cerebral secundaria a isquemia global persistente, en ocasiones asociada al llamado cerebro de respirador. En este caso, las estructuras vitales del tronco del encéfalo están dañadas y el cuadro es de coma irreversible (AU)

A critique on the concept of "brain death".

Since the concept of "brain death" was introduced in medical terminology, enough evidence has come to light to show that the concept is based on an unclear and incoherent theory. The "brain death" concept suffers by internal inconsistencies in both the tests-criterion and the criterion-definition relationships. It is also evident that there are residual vegetative functions in "brain dead" patients. Since the content of consciousness is inaccessible in these patients who are in a profound coma, the diagnosis of "brain death" is based on an unproved hypothesis. A critical evaluation of the role and the limitations of the confirmatory tests in the diagnosis of "brain death" is attempted. Finally it is pointed out that a holistic approach to the problem of "brain death" in humans should necessarily include the inspection of the content of consciousness.

Role of short latency evoked potentials in the diagnosis of brain death.

OBJECTIVE: The aim of this study is to confirm the effectiveness of auditory brain-stem responses (ABRs) and somatosensory evoked potentials (SEPs) in the diagnosis of brain death (BD). METHODS: ABRs and SEPs were recorded at the same session in 130 BD patients (age range 8-77 years, 81 male and 49 female). Twenty-four cases were submitted to serial recordings from preterminal conditions through BD. RESULTS: ABRs were absent in 92 cases (70.8%), only waves I or I-II were present in 32 cases (24.6%), while in the remaining 6 patients (4.6%) waves V and/or III were still present, excluding the death of the brain-stem. In 4 cases (3.1%) SEPs showed the absence of all components following the cervical N9, preventing the diagnosis of BD. Among 126 cases (96.9%) with preserved cervical N9-N13 SEPs confirmed the absence of brain-stem activity in 122 cases (93.7%), in whom no waves following P11 or P13 were recordable. SEPs excluded the diagnosis of BD in the remaining 4 cases (3.2%) showing preserved P14 and/or N18. In all pre terminal patients the far-field P14-N18 were present, and their disappearance was closely related to the onset of BD. CONCLUSIONS: The combined us of ABRs and SEPs was able to confirm BD in almost all patients, providing an objective confirmation of the diagnosis, and to exclude it in 7 cases, thus improving the reliability of diagnosis.

Aportaciones de la SjO2 en la detección precoz de la muerte encefálica / SjO2 contribution in early detection of brain death

El estudio de la sangre venosa obtenido del bulbo de la yugular interna se utiliza como un parámetro más, de la monitorización rutinaria del enfermo neurocrítico. De ello, se infieren parámetros metabólicos cerebrales, por esto, se ha considerado que podría también ser de utilidad para la detección precoz de la situación de muerte encefálica. Se ha realizado una revisión de la literatura, que específicamente abordaba este tema, clasificando sus resultados según el nivel de evidencia con que eran aportados sus datos (AU)

Defining death for persons and human organisms.

This paper discusses how alternative concepts of personhood affect the definition of death. I argue that parties in the debate over the definition of death have employed different concepts of personhood, and thus have been talking past each other by proposing definitions of death for different kinds of things. In particular, I show how critics of the consciousness-related, neurological formation of death have relied on concepts of personhood that would be rejected by proponents of that formulation. These critics rest on treating persons as qualitative specifications of human organisms (Bernat, Culver, and Gert) or as identical to human organisms (Capron, Seifert, and Shewmon). Since advocates of the consciousness-related, neurological formulation of death are not committed to either of these views of personhood, these critics commit the fallacy of attacking a straw man. I then clarify the "substantive" concept of personhood (Boethius, Strawson, and Wiggins) that may be invoked in the consciousness-related, neurological formulation of death, and argue that, on this view and contra Bernat, Culver, and Gert, persons have always been the kind of thing that can literally die. I conclude by suggesting that the discussion of defining death needs to focus on which approach to personhood makes the most sense metaphysically and morally.

Diagnóstico Clínico de Muerte Encefálica / Clinical Diagnosis in Brain Death

La Muerte Encefálica (ME), es una condición anatomoclínica cuya aparición en Medicina ocurrió en la segunda mitad del siglo XX, como resultado de la introducción de las nuevas técnicas de ranimación cardio-respiratoria. La base anatómica de esta condición es la necrosis masiva de todas las estructuras que integran el encéfalo: hemisferios cerebrales, tallo cerebral y cerebelo. En este artículo se describen detalladamente el conjunto de datos clínicos cuyo reconocimiento permite establecer el diagnóstico clínico de ME. Dichos datos se dividen en dos grupos: a) los que indican el cese total de las funciones encefálicas; b) los que indican la irrevesribilidad del cese. Las alteraciones clínicas demostrativas de la abolición total de las funciones encefálicas corresponden a tres órdenes de hechos: 1) coma con ausencia de respuestas cerebrales; 2) apnea que persiste en condiciones de hipercapnia inducida; 3) ausencia de todos los reflejos del tallo cerebral. La irreversibilidad del cesa de las funciones encefálicas se establece cuando se comprueban otras tres categorías de hechos: 1) presencia de una lesión encefálica orgánica; 2) ausencia de ciertas causas que por mecanismos metabólicos pueden abolir las funciones encefálicas en forma potencialmente reversible; 3) persistencia de esta abolición por un mínimo de 12 horas. Para afirmar el diagnóstico clínico de ME, resulta obligatorio el reconocimiento de estas 6 categorías de datos. La presencia e respuestas motoras o viscerales de origen espinal, no invalida el diagnóstico.