Comparing Simultaneous Liver-Kidney Transplant Strategies: A Modified Cost-Effectiveness Analysis.

BACKGROUND: The proportion of patients with kidney failure at time of liver transplantation is at a historic high in the United States. The optimal timing of kidney transplantation with respect to the liver transplant is unknown. METHODS: We used a modified cost-effectiveness analysis to compare 4 strategies: the old system ("pre-OPTN"), the new Organ Procurement Transplant Network (OPTN) system since August 10, 2017 ("OPTN"), and 2 strategies which restrict simultaneous liver-kidney transplants ("safety net" and "stringent"). We measured "cost" by deployment of deceased donor kidneys (DDKs) to liver transplant recipients and effectiveness by life years (LYs) and quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) in liver transplant recipients. We validated our model against Scientific Registry for Transplant Recipients data. RESULTS: The OPTN, safety net and stringent strategies were on the efficiency frontier. By rank order, OPTN > safety net > stringent strategy in terms of LY, QALY, and DDK deployment. The pre-OPTN system was dominated, or outperformed, by all alternative strategies. The incremental LY per DDK between the strategies ranged from 1.30 to 1.85. The incremental QALY per DDK ranged from 1.11 to 2.03. CONCLUSIONS: These estimates quantify the "organ"-effectiveness of various kidney allocation strategies for liver transplant candidates. The OPTN system will likely deliver better liver transplant outcomes at the expense of more frequent deployment of DDKs to liver transplant recipients.

[Analysis of contractual incentives for kidney transplants in Brazil using the principal-agent model]. / Análise dos incentivos contratuais de transplantes de rins no Brasil pelo modelo agente-principal.

The aim of this article was to analyze contractual incentives for kidney transplants in Brazil based on the principal-agent model. The approach assumes that the Brazilian Ministry of Health is the principal and the public hospitals accredited by the National Transplant System are the agent. The Ministry of Health's welfare depends on measures taken by hospitals in kidney uptake. Hospitals allocate administrative, financial, and management efforts to conduct measures in kidney donation, removal, uptake, and transplantation. Hospitals may choose the levels of effort that are consistent with the payments and incentives received in relation to transplantation costs. The solution to this type of problem lies in structuring an optimal incentives contract, which requires aligning the interests of both parties involved in the transplantation system.

Análise dos incentivos contratuais de transplantes de rins no Brasil pelo modelo agente-principal / Analysis of contractual incentives for kidney transplants in Brazil using the principal-agent model / Análisis de los incentivos contractuales de trasplantes de riñón en Brasil mediante el modelo agente-principal

Resumo: O objetivo do artigo foi analisar os incentivos contratuais de transplantes renais no Brasil com base no modelo agente-principal. A abordagem assume que o Ministério da Saúde seja o principal e os hospitais públicos credenciados pelo Sistema Nacional de Transplantes sejam o agente. O bem- estar do Ministério da Saúde depende das ações tomadas pelos hospitais captadores desse órgão. Os hospitais alocam esforços administrativos, financeiros e gerenciais para realizar as ações de doação, remoção, captação e transplante de rim. Os hospitais podem escolher os níveis de esforços que são compatíveis com os pagamentos e incentivos recebidos referentes ao custeio de transplantes. A solução para esse tipo de problema está na estruturação de um contrato ótimo de incentivos, no qual se requer um alinhamento de interesses de ambas as partes envolvidas nesse sistema de transplantes.

Abstract: The aim of this article was to analyze contractual incentives for kidney transplants in Brazil based on the principal-agent model. The approach assumes that the Brazilian Ministry of Health is the principal and the public hospitals accredited by the National Transplant System are the agent. The Ministry of Health's welfare depends on measures taken by hospitals in kidney uptake. Hospitals allocate administrative, financial, and management efforts to conduct measures in kidney donation, removal, uptake, and transplantation. Hospitals may choose the levels of effort that are consistent with the payments and incentives received in relation to transplantation costs. The solution to this type of problem lies in structuring an optimal incentives contract, which requires aligning the interests of both parties involved in the transplantation system.

Resumen: El objetivo del artículo fue analizar los incentivos contractuales de trasplantes renales en Brasil, a partir del modelo agente-principal. Este enfoque asume que el Ministerio de Salud sea el principal y los hospitales públicos, autorizados por el Sistema Nacional de Trasplantes, sean los agentes. El bienestar del Ministerio de Salud depende de las acciones tomadas por los hospitales receptores de este órgano. Los hospitales proporcionan los esfuerzos administrativos, financieros y de gestión para realizar las acciones de donación, extirpación, recepción y trasplante de riñón. Los hospitales pueden escoger los niveles de esfuerzos que son compatibles con los pagos e incentivos recibidos, referentes al costeo de trasplantes. La solución para este tipo de problema está en la estructuración de un contrato óptimo de incentivos, en el que se requiera un alineamiento de intereses de ambas partes involucradas en este sistema de trasplantes.

More than 1,000 kidney transplants in a single year by the "Hospital do Rim" Group in Sao Paulo - Brazil.

We describe the organization of a high-volume Brazilian kidney transplant program that performed 7,833 transplants in 12 years fulfilling government expectations without compromising the care of the patients. The annual number of kidney transplants increased from 428 in 1999 to 1,048 in 2010. In our Organ Procurement Organization (6.1 million inhabitants) brain death notifications increased from 196 to 468 in 2010 and 35% became actual donors. There are 5,011 patients on the waiting list and recipient selection is based on HLA matching. A significant proportion of the recipients is of black ethnicity and had been for long time on dialysis. Over 700 first appointments for living donation are done every year. After the transplant, the majority of patients are followed locally (200-250 appointments per day). The transplant outcome among living-donor recipients is comparable to large registries but inferior outcome have been observed among recipients of deceased donor organs, though consistent improvement has been seen in more recent years. We also discuss issues related to local regulations and solutions to improve efficiency and outcomes.

National Kidney Registry: 213 transplants in three years.

Since its establishment in 2008, the National Kidney Registry has facilitated 213 kidney transplants between unrelated living donors and recipients at 28 transplant centers. Rapid innovations in matching strategies, advanced computer technologies, good communication and an evolving understanding of the processes at participating transplant centers and histocompatibility laboratories are among the factors driving the success of the NKR. Virtual cross match accuracy has improved from 43% to 91% as a result of changes to the HLA typing requirements for potential donors and improved mechanisms to list unacceptable HLA antigens for sensitized patients. A uniform financial agreement among participating centers eliminated a major roadblock to facilitate unbalanced donor kidney exchanges among centers. The NKR transplanted 64% of the patients registered since 2008 and the average waiting time for those transplanted in 2010 was 11 months.

Chronic kidney disease, transplantation practices and transplantation law in Pakistan: opportunity for a global meditation.

The majority of countries have enacted edicts to regulate organ transplantation due to mounting recognition of its intricacies and increasing level of global disquiet. Frail national economy and status of health care infrastructure restricts access of the local population to both dialysis and transplantation in Pakistan. There is a surge in kidney transplantation activities, however. I have reported the enormity of organ crime in Pakistan. The number of commercial renal transplants range from 3000 to 4500. Foreign nationals share the marketplace. There are current attempts from the government to stop organ trade by strictly enforcing a recently sanctioned law on organ transplantation. Scarcity of comprehensive reliable data has hampered plausible assessments and indispensable modifications to facilitate designs for the future health care. Alternatives to organ transplantation will augment the choice of treatment modalities for a proliferating end-stage renal disease (ESRD) population. The whole array of existing therapeutic modalities for ESRD has to be utilized. Promoting a fresh culture of organ donation by strengthening of the family institution may be another objective.

Costs and financing. A cost calculation of an up-to-date eye bank in Germany.

PURPOSE: To estimate the averaged cost of processing a corneal graft for keratoplasty. METHODS: We estimated the total running costs of a German corneal bank for one year. All procurement-related expenses were calculated on the basis of 300 donors per year and a disavowal percentage of 50%. RESULTS: The running costs comprise of personnel (2 physicians, 2 technicians), amortization of equipment, laboratory costs, laboratory consumables, occupancy costs and quality management. Annual expenses total 584000 EUR. This aggregation divided by 300 corneal grafts released for transplantation results in a nominal charge of 1950 EUR per corneal graft. DISCUSSION: The DRG system in Germany (in-patients at a base rate of 1.0) refunds only 850 EUR, leaving a financial gap of 1100 EUR per keratoplasty. This financial burden is currently left over to the eye bank and/or the surgeon.

The new German allocation system for donated thoracic organs causes longer ischemia and increased costs.

OBJECTIVE: Allocation criteria changed in 2000 as a result of Germany's new transplantation law. Before, thoracic organs were primarily allocated electively within the donor region (according to urgency and waiting time). Afterwards, all patients in Germany eligible for heart transplants were registered in a national waiting list. With the exception of high-urgency patients that are approved by an audit committee, waiting time has become the major criteria for allocation. In this study, we investigated the impact of the new allocation system on economic aspects as on clinical results. METHODS: One year in the new allocation system (NA) was compared to the previous year in the old allocation system (OA) regarding explantation/transportation distance, costs, ischemia time and clinical outcome. All explantations performed by our institution within Germany were evaluated. RESULTS: The number of transplantations and the spectrum was similar between the two time periods (NA vs. OA: 61 vs. 57 overall). Eighty-two percent of these explanted organs were transplanted within the donor region in the OA time period, but only 37 % in the NA period. This resulted in higher transportation distances (NA: 441 +/- 177 km vs. OA: 179 +/- 118 km), higher transportation cost (NA: EUR 4,472 +/- 2,858 per explantation vs. OA: EUR 1,858 +/- 2,293 explantation, p = 0.001), and therefore longer ischemia times in the NA period (NA: 264 +/- 56 min: OA: 208 + 61 min, p = 0.001). Perioperative results and survival after a mean clinical follow-up of 21 +/- 8 (OA) and 11 +/- 5 (NA) months were comparable (86 % vs. 87 % (p = 0.93). CONCLUSION: Transportation distance, costs for explantation and ischemia time increased significantly with the NA period. While the clinical short-term outcome proved to be comparable, we cannot yet judge the long-term impact of the prolonged ischemia time on the development of chronic rejection.

Bodily integrity and the sale of human organs.

Existing arguments against paid organ donation are examined and found to be unconvincing. It is argued that the real reason why organ sale is generally thought to be wrong is that (a) bodily integrity is highly valued and (b) the removal of healthy organs constitutes a violation of this integrity. Both sale and (free) donation involve a violation of bodily integrity. In the case of the latter, though, the disvalue of the violation is typically outweighed by the presence of other goods: chiefly, the extreme altruism involved in the giving. There is usually no such outweighing feature in the case of the former. Given this, the idea that we value bodily integrity can help to account for the perceived moral difference between sale and free donation.

Clinical toxicity and laboratory effects of granulocyte-colony-stimulating factor (filgrastim) mobilization and blood stem cell apheresis from normal donors, and analysis of charges for the procedures.

BACKGROUND: Apheresis of granulocyte-colony-stimulating factor (filgrastim)-mobilized blood stem cells from normal donors is now being used in place of a marrow harvest in transplantation. How the adverse effects of and charges for this procedure compare with those of the standard marrow harvest is not known. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS: Forty consecutive normal subjects who received filgrastim 96 micrograms/kg) subcutaneously twice daily for 4 to 6 days in preparation for apheresis were monitored prospectively by clinical and laboratory evaluation. RESULTS: Sixty-two percent of the subjects required oral analgesics. None discontinued filgrastim prematurely. Bone pain (82%), headache (70%), fatigue (20%), and nausea (10%) were reported. Filgrastim caused a mean eightfold increase in neutrophil counts, a mean twofold increase in lymphocyte counts, a mean twofold rise in alkaline phosphatase and lactate dehydrogenase levels, and minor changes in serum potassium, magnesium, and uric acid. Adverse events and laboratory effects resolved within 7 days after apheresis. No apheresis stem cell donor required transfusion or hospitalization, and only one required an additional clinic visit after completion of apheresis. By comparison, a retrospective analysis of 33 normal marrow donors demonstrated that all received transfusion(s), 3 were hospitalized, 3 required additional clinic visits after the marrow harvest. The median total charges related to the two procedures were comparable (p = 0.43), although the charges were significantly lower for donors requiring only one apheresis procedure (p = 0.002). CONCLUSION: Filgrastim mobilization and apheresis of blood stem cells constitute a safe, well-tolerated, and comparable or less expensive alternative to the traditional marrow harvest.

Costs of bone marrow transplants using unrelated donors.

Bone marrow transplantation is an expensive treatment, rationed primarily by the availability of donors. Recruiting potential unrelated bone marrow donors to a register would add not only to the cost, but also to the volume, of transplantation. Proposals to establish such registries have thus been subject to rigorous financial scrutiny. In Australia, 3 alternative estimates suggest that approximately 200 patients, otherwise suitable for bone marrow transplantation, do not receive transplants because they have no suitable related donor. The population of Australia is approximately 16 million. The alternatives for these patients are thus chemotherapy or unrelated bone marrow transplantation. The costs of chemotherapy and transplantation have been directly compared in 1 trial of treatment for acute nonlymphoblastic leukaemia. The cost per year of life saved was approximately the same for the 2 treatments, with better patient survival from transplantation. The estimated cost difference in both the United States and Australia, between the policy extremes of no patients transplanted, and all transplanted, was between 1.3-2.4% of the total costs of managing these patients. The cost of searching existing registers for unrelated donors for Australian patients, averages A$24,000-28,000 to the point of a successful donor procedure. The cost of establishing and maintaining an Australian Register of a size predicted to find donors for half of the potential recipients, has been estimated at A$ 10,000 per donor procedure. The decision to proceed with unrelated bone marrow transplantation commits resources that are currently used by the alternative therapies. It is thus important to monitor both the costs and effects of the new approach.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)