Impact of financial agreements in European chronic care on health care expenditure growth.

Various types of financial agreements have been implemented in Europe to reduce health care expenditure by stimulating integrated chronic care. This study used difference-in-differences (DID) models to estimate differences in health care expenditure trends before and after the introduction of a financial agreement between 9 intervention countries and 16 control countries. Intervention countries included countries with pay-for-coordination (PFC), pay-for-performance (PFP), and/or all inclusive agreements (bundled and global payment) for integrated chronic care. OECD and WHO data from 1996 to 2013 was used. The results from the main DID models showed that the annual growth of outpatient expenditure was decreased in countries with PFC (by 21.28 US$ per capita) and in countries with all-inclusive agreements (by 216.60 US$ per capita). The growth of hospital and administrative expenditure was decreased in countries with PFP by 64.50 US$ per capita and 5.74 US$ per capita, respectively. When modelling impact as a non-linear function of time during the total 4-year period after implementation, PFP decreased the growth of hospital and administrative expenditure and all-inclusive agreements reduced the growth of outpatient expenditure. Financial agreements are potentially powerful tools to stimulate integrated care and influence health care expenditure growth. A blended payment scheme that combines elements of PFC, PFP, and all-inclusive payments is likely to provide the strongest financial incentives to control health care expenditure growth.

Exploring payment schemes used to promote integrated chronic care in Europe.

The rising burden of chronic conditions has led several European countries to reform healthcare payment schemes. This paper aimed to explore the adoption and success of payment schemes that promote integration of chronic care in European countries. A literature review was used to identify European countries that employed pay-for-coordination (PFC), pay-for-performance (PFP), and bundled payment schemes. Existing evidence from the literature was supplemented with fifteen interviews with chronic care experts in these countries to obtain detailed information regarding the payment schemes, facilitators and barriers to their implementation, and their perceived success. Austria, France, England, the Netherlands, and Germany have implemented payment schemes that were specifically designed to promote the integration of chronic care. Prominent factors facilitating implementation included stakeholder cooperation, adequate financial incentives for stakeholders, and flexible task allocation among different care provider disciplines. Common barriers to implementation included misaligned incentives across stakeholders and gaming. The implemented payment schemes targeted different stakeholders (e.g. individual caregivers, multidisciplinary organizations of caregivers, regions, insurers) in different countries depending on the structure and financing of each health care system. All payment reforms appeared to have changed the structure of chronic care delivery. PFC, as it was implemented in Austria, France and Germany, was perceived to be the most successful in increasing collaboration within and across healthcare sectors, whereas PFP, as it was implemented in England and France, was perceived most successful in improving other indicators of the quality of the care process. Interviewees stated that the impact of the payment reforms on healthcare expenditures remained questionable. The success of a payment scheme depends on the details of the specific implementation in a particular country, but a combination of the schemes may overcome the barriers of each individual scheme.