Neuroethics: a guide for the perplexed.

Like filings to a magnet, issues of all shapes, sizes, and degrees of importance are sticking to the idea of neuroethics. Martha Farah, an early thinker in this new field, proposes that, numerous as they are, the problems actually fall into just three categories. She finds that neuroethics has made a quick start sizing up many practical--and some unique--questions swirling up from brain science, but, she writes, watch for challenges that reach beyond these to the metaphysical. Neuroscience may one day explain in terms of neural tissue virtually all aspects of human cognition and emotion--realms traditionally deemed apart from physical law. Thus, we should also expect neuroethics to grapple with our fundamental distinction between persons and mere "things." If mental processes prove to result from purely physical events, this opens to question our notions of consciousness, spirituality, free will, and moral responsibility.

Visual object and face processing in mild-to-moderate Alzheimer's disease: from segmentation to imagination.

Little is known about the fate of higher level visual perception and visual mental imagery in the early stages of Alzheimer's disease (AD). In this study, we assessed these abilities in a group of mild-to-moderate AD patients using tasks selected to satisfy two main criteria. First, they have been shown to be sensitive to impairments of perception and imagery caused by other neurological conditions. Second, they test specific stages of visual perception and cognition in a reasonably selective manner. These stages were (in their normal order of occurrence during perception): the segmentation of different local points of the visual field into regions belonging to distinct objects; the representation of the shapes of these segmented regions in the image; the construction of more abstract shape representations that possess constancy over changes in size, location, orientation or illumination (assessed separately for faces and objects); the use of these perceived shape representations to access stored shape representations; and the access of lexical semantic representations from these high-level visual representations. Additional tasks tested the top-down activation of earlier visual representations from the semantic level in visual mental imagery. Our findings indicate small, but in most cases reliable, impairments in visual perception, which are independent of degree of cognitive decline. Deficits in basic shape processing influenced performance on some higher level visual tasks, but did not contribute to poor performance on face processing, or to the profound deficit on object naming. The latter of these is related to semantic-lexical impairment.