That means something to me: How linguistic and emotional experience affect the acquisition, representation, and processing of novel abstract concepts.

We used a novel linguistic training paradigm to investigate the experience-dependent acquisition, representation, and processing of novel emotional and neutral abstract concepts. Participants engaged in mental imagery (n = 32) or lexico-semantic rephrasing (n = 34) of linguistic material during five training sessions and successfully learned the novel abstract concepts. Feature production after training showed that specifically emotion features enriched the emotional concepts' representations. Unexpectedly, for participants engaging in vivid mental imagery during training a higher semantic richness of the acquired emotional concepts slowed down lexical decisions. Rephrasing, in turn, promoted a better learning and processing performance than imagery, probably due to stronger established lexical associations. Our results confirm the importance of emotional and linguistic experience and additional deep lexico-semantic processing for the acquisition, representation, and processing of abstract concepts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Auditory N1 and P2 attenuation in action observation: An event-related potential study considering effects of temporal predictability and individualism.

Tones that are generated by self-performed actions elicit attenuated N1 and P2 amplitudes, as measured by electroencephalography (EEG), compared to identical external tones, which is referred to as neurophysiological sensory attenuation (SA). At the same time, self-generated tones are perceived as less loud compared to external tones (perceptual SA). Action observation led in part to a similar neurophysiological and perceptual SA. The perceptual SA in observers was found in comparison to tones that were temporally predictable, and one study suggested that perceptual SA in observers might depend on the cultural dimension of individualism. In this study, we examined neurophysiological SA for tones elicited by self-performed and observed actions during simultaneous EEG acquisitions in two participants, extending the paradigm with a visual cue condition controlling for effects of temporal predictability. Moreover, we investigated the effect of individualism on neurophysiological SA in action observation. Relative to un-cued external tones, the N1 was only descriptively reduced for tones that were elicited by self-performed or observed actions and significantly attenuated for cued external tones. A P2 attenuation effect relative to un-cued external tones was found in all three conditions, with stronger effects for self- and other-generated tones than for cued external tones. We found no evidence for an effect of individualism. These findings add to previous evidence for neurophysiological SA in action performance and observation with a paradigm well-controlled for the effect of predictability and individualism, showing differential effects of the former on the N1 and P2 components, and no effect of the latter.

My view on your actions: Dynamic changes in viewpoint-dependent auditory ERP attenuation during action observation.

It has been suggested that during action observation, a sensory representation of the observed action is mapped onto one's own motor system. However, it is largely unexplored what this may imply for the early processing of the action's sensory consequences, whether the observational viewpoint exerts influence on this and how such a modulatory effect might change over time. We tested whether the event-related potential of auditory effects of actions observed from a first- versus third-person perspective show amplitude reductions compared with externally generated sounds, as revealed for self-generated sounds. Multilevel modeling on trial-level data showed distinct dynamic patterns for the two viewpoints on reductions of the N1, P2, and N2 components. For both viewpoints, an N1 reduction for sounds generated by observed actions versus externally generated sounds was observed. However, only during first-person observation, we found a temporal dynamic within experimental runs (i.e., the N1 reduction only emerged with increasing trial number), indicating time-variant, viewpoint-dependent processes involved in sensorimotor prediction during action observation. For the P2, only a viewpoint-independent reduction was found for sounds elicited by observed actions, which disappeared in the second half of the experiment. The opposite pattern was found in an exploratory analysis concerning the N2, revealing a reduction that increased in the second half of the experiment, and, moreover, a temporal dynamic within experimental runs for the first-person perspective, possibly reflecting an agency-related process. Overall, these results suggested that the processing of auditory outcomes of observed actions is dynamically modulated by the viewpoint over time.

Illusion of control affects ERP amplitude reductions for auditory outcomes of self-generated actions.

The reduction of neural responses to self-generated stimuli compared to external stimuli is thought to result from the matching of motor-based sensory predictions and sensory reafferences and to serve the identification of changes in the environment as caused by oneself. The amplitude of the auditory event-related potential (ERP) component N1 seems to closely reflect this matching process, while the later positive component (P2/ P3a) has been associated with judgments of agency, which are also sensitive to contextual top-down information. In this study, we examined the effect of perceived control over sound production on the processing of self-generated and external stimuli, as reflected in these components. We used a new version of a classic two-button choice task to induce different degrees of the illusion of control (IoC) and recorded ERPs for the processing of self-generated and external sounds in a subsequent task. N1 amplitudes were reduced for self-generated compared to external sounds, but not significantly affected by IoC. P2/3a amplitudes were affected by IoC: We found reduced P2/3a amplitudes after a high compared to a low IoC induction training, but only for self-generated, not for external sounds. These findings suggest that prior contextual belief information induced by an IoC affects later processing as reflected in the P2/P3a, possibly for the formation of agency judgments, while early processing reflecting motor-based predictions is not affected.

Similarities and Differences between Performers and Observers in Processing Auditory Action Consequences: Evidence from Simultaneous EEG Acquisition.

In our social environment, we easily distinguish stimuli caused by our own actions (e.g., water splashing when I fill my glass) from stimuli that have an external source (e.g., water splashing in a fountain). Accumulating evidence suggests that processing the auditory consequences of self-performed actions elicits N1 and P2 ERPs of reduced amplitude compared to physically identical but externally generated sounds, with such reductions being ascribed to neural predictive mechanisms. It is unexplored, however, whether the sensory processing of action outcomes is similarly modulated by action observation (e.g., water splashing when I observe you filling my glass). We tested 40 healthy participants by applying a methodological approach for the simultaneous EEG recording of two persons: An observer observed button presses executed by a performer in real time. For the performers, we replicated previous findings of a reduced N1 amplitude for self- versus externally generated sounds. This pattern differed significantly from the one in observers, whose N1 for sounds generated by observed button presses was not attenuated. In turn, the P2 amplitude was reduced for processing action- versus externally generated sounds for both performers and observers. These findings show that both action performance and observation affect the processing of action-generated sounds. There are, however, important differences between the two in the timing of the effects, probably related to differences in the predictability of the actions and thus also the associated stimuli. We discuss how these differences might contribute to recognizing the stimulus as caused by self versus others.

Separate and overlapping functional roles for efference copies in the human thalamus.

How the perception of space is generated from the multiple maps in the brain is still an unsolved mystery in neuroscience. A neural pathway ascending from the superior colliculus through the medio-dorsal (MD) nucleus of thalamus to the frontal eye field has been identified in monkeys that conveys efference copy information about the metrics of upcoming eye movements. Information sent through this pathway stabilizes vision across saccades. We investigated whether this motor plan information might also shape spatial perception even when no saccades are performed. We studied patients with medial or lateral thalamic lesions (likely involving either the MD or the ventrolateral (VL) nuclei). Patients performed a double-step task testing motor updating, a trans-saccadic localization task testing visual updating, and a localization task during fixation testing a general role of motor signals for visual space in the absence of eye movements. Single patients with medial or lateral thalamic lesions showed deficits in the double-step task, reflecting insufficient transfer of efference copy. However, only a patient with a medial lesion showed impaired performance in the trans-saccadic localization task, suggesting that different types of efference copies contribute to motor and visual updating. During fixation, the MD patient localized stationary stimuli more accurately than healthy controls, suggesting that patients compensate the deficit in visual prediction of saccades - induced by the thalamic lesion - by relying on stationary visual references. We conclude that partially separable efference copy signals contribute to motor and visual stability in company of purely visual signals that are equally effective in supporting trans-saccadic perception.

Cognitive training with action-related verbs induces neural plasticity in the action representation system as assessed by gray matter brain morphometry.

Embodied cognition theories of semantic memory still face the need for multiple sources of converging evidence in support of the involvement of sensory-motor systems in action-related knowledge. Previous studies showed that training manual actions improves semantic processing of verbs referring to the trained actions. The present work aimed to provide complementary evidence by measuring the brain plasticity effects of a cognitive training requiring sustained lexical-semantic processing of action-related verbs. We included two groups of participants, namely the Proximal Group (PG) and the Distal Group (DG), which underwent a 3-week training with verbs referring to actions involving the proximal and the distal upper limb musculature, respectively. Before and after training, we measured gray matter voxel brain morphometry based on T1 structural magnetic resonance imaging. By means of this 2 (Group: PG, DG) × 2 (Time: pre-, post-training) factorial design, we tested whether sustained cognitive experience with specific action-related verbs induces congruent brain plasticity modifications in target regions of interest pertaining to the action representation system. We found significant post- versus pre-training gray matter volume increases, specifically for PG in the left dorsal precentral gyrus, and for DG in the right cerebellar lobule VIIa. These preliminary results suggest that a cognitive training can induce structural plasticity modifications in brain regions specifically coding for the distal and proximal motor actions the trained verbs refer to.

Fine-grained semantic categorization across the abstract and concrete domains.

A consolidated approach to the study of the mental representation of word meanings has consisted in contrasting different domains of knowledge, broadly reflecting the abstract-concrete dichotomy. More fine-grained semantic distinctions have emerged in neuropsychological and cognitive neuroscience work, reflecting semantic category specificity, but almost exclusively within the concrete domain. Theoretical advances, particularly within the area of embodied cognition, have more recently put forward the idea that distributed neural representations tied to the kinds of experience maintained with the concepts' referents might distinguish conceptual meanings with a high degree of specificity, including those within the abstract domain. Here we report the results of two psycholinguistic rating studies incorporating such theoretical advances with two main objectives: first, to provide empirical evidence of fine-grained distinctions within both the abstract and the concrete semantic domains with respect to relevant psycholinguistic dimensions; second, to develop a carefully controlled linguistic stimulus set that may be used for auditory as well as visual neuroimaging studies focusing on the parametrization of the semantic space beyond the abstract-concrete dichotomy. Ninety-six participants rated a set of 210 sentences across pre-selected concrete (mouth, hand, or leg action-related) and abstract (mental state-, emotion-, mathematics-related) categories, with respect either to different semantic domain-related scales (rating study 1), or to concreteness, familiarity, and context availability (rating study 2). Inferential statistics and correspondence analyses highlighted distinguishing semantic and psycholinguistic traits for each of the pre-selected categories, indicating that a simple abstract-concrete dichotomy is not sufficient to account for the entire semantic variability within either domains.