Spillover effects of mandatory hip and knee replacement surgery bundles in medicare.

BACKGROUND: Medicare used the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) Model to mandate that hospitals in certain health care markets accept bundled payments for lower extremity joint replacement surgery. CJR has reduced spending with stable quality as intended among Medicare fee-for-service patients, but benefits could "spill over" to individuals insured through private health plans. Definitive evidence of spillovers remains lacking. OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the association between CJR participation and changes in outcomes among privately insured individuals. DESIGN, SETTING, PARTICIPANTS: We used 2013-2017 Health Care Cost Institute claims for 418,016 privately insured individuals undergoing joint replacement in 75 CJR and 121 Non-CJR markets. Multivariable generalized linear models with hospital and market random effects and time fixed effects were used to analyze the association between CJR participation and changes in outcomes. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES: Total episode spending, discharge to institutional post-acute care, and quality (e.g., surgical complications, readmissions). RESULTS: Patients in CJR and Non-CJR markets did not differ in total episode spending (difference of -$157, 95% CI -$1043 to $728, p = 0.73) or discharge to institutional post-acute care (difference of -1.1%, 95% CI -3.2%-1.0%, p = 0.31). Similarly, patients in the two groups did not differ in quality or other utilization outcomes. Findings were generally similar in stratified and sensitivity analyses. CONCLUSIONS: There was a lack of evidence of cost or utilization spillovers from CJR to privately insured individuals. There may be limits in the ability of certain value-based payment reforms to drive broad changes in care delivery and patient outcomes.

Effect of Financial Bonus Size, Loss Aversion, and Increased Social Pressure on Physician Pay-for-Performance: A Randomized Clinical Trial and Cohort Study.

Importance: Despite limited effectiveness of pay-for-performance (P4P), payers continue to expand P4P nationally. Objective: To test whether increasing bonus size or adding the behavioral economic principles of increased social pressure (ISP) or loss aversion (LA) improves the effectiveness of P4P. Design, Setting, and Participants: Parallel studies conducted from January 1 to December 31, 2016, consisted of a randomized clinical trial with patients cluster-randomized by practice site to an active control group (larger bonus size [LBS] only) or to groups with 1 of 2 behavioral economic interventions added and a cohort study comparing changes in outcomes among patients of physicians receiving an LBS with outcomes in propensity-matched physicians not receiving an LBS. A total of 8118 patients attributed to 66 physicians with 1 of 5 chronic conditions were treated at Advocate HealthCare, an integrated health system in Illinois. Data were analyzed using intention to treat and multiple imputation from February 1, 2017, through May 31, 2018. Interventions: Physician participants received an LBS increased by a mean of $3355 per physician (LBS-only group); prefunded incentives to elicit LA and an LBS; or increasing proportion of a P4P bonus determined by group performance from 30% to 50% (ISP) and an LBS. Main Outcomes and Measures: The proportion of 20 evidence-based quality measures achieved at the patient level. Results: A total of 86 physicians were eligible for the randomized trial. Of these, 32 were excluded because they did not have unique attributed patients. Fifty-four physicians were randomly assigned to 1 of 3 groups, and 33 physicians (54.5% male; mean [SD] age, 57 [10] years) and 3747 patients (63.6% female; mean [SD] age, 64 [18] years) were included in the final analysis. Nine physicians and 864 patients were randomized to the LBS-only group, 13 physicians and 1496 patients to the LBS plus ISP group, and 11 physicians and 1387 patients to the LBS plus LA group. Physician characteristics did not differ significantly by arm, such as mean (SD) physician age ranging from 56 (9) to 59 (9) years, and sex (6 [46.2%] to 6 [66.7%] male). No differences were found between the LBS-only and the intervention groups (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] for LBS plus LA vs LBS-only, 0.86 [95% CI, 0.65-1.15; P = .31]; aOR for LBS plus ISP vs LBS-only, 0.95 [95% CI, 0.64-1.42; P = .81]; and aOR for LBS plus ISP vs LBS plus LA, 1.10 [95% CI, 0.75-1.61; P = .62]). Increased bonus size was associated with a greater increase in evidence-based care relative to the comparison group (risk-standardized absolute difference-in-differences, 3.2 percentage points; 95% CI, 1.9-4.5 percentage points; P < .001). Conclusions and Relevance: Increased bonus size was associated with significantly improved quality of care relative to a comparison group. Adding ISP and opportunities for LA did not improve quality. Trial Registration: ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT02634879.

National Representativeness Of Hospitals And Markets In Medicare's Mandatory Bundled Payment Program.

In 2016 Medicare implemented its first mandatory alternative payment model, the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) program, in which the agency pays clinicians and hospitals a fixed amount for services provided in hip and knee replacement surgery episodes. Medicare made CJR mandatory, rather than voluntary, to produce generalizable evidence on what results Medicare might expect if it scaled bundled payment up nationally. However, it is unknown how markets and hospitals in CJR compare to others nationwide, particularly with respect to baseline quality and spending performance and the structural hospital characteristics associated with early savings in CJR. Using data from Medicare, the American Hospital Association, and the Health Resources and Services Administration, we found differences in structural market and hospital characteristics but largely similar baseline hospital episode quality and spending. Our findings suggest that despite heterogeneity in hospital characteristics associated with early savings in CJR, Medicare might nonetheless reasonably expect similar results by scaling CJR up to additional urban markets and increasing total program coverage to areas in which 71 percent of its beneficiaries reside. In contrast, different policy designs may be needed to extend market-level programs to other regions or enable different hospital types to achieve savings from bundled payment reimbursement.