Multiple Levels of Heuristic Reasoning Processes in Scientific Model Construction.

Science historians have recognized the importance of heuristic reasoning strategies for constructing theories, but their extent and degree of organization are still poorly understood. This paper first consolidates a set of important heuristic strategies for constructing scientific models from three books, including studies in the history of genetics and electromagnetism, and an expert think-aloud study in the field of mechanics. The books focus on qualitative reasoning strategies (processes) involved in creative model construction, scientific breakthroughs, and conceptual change. Twenty four processes are examined, most of which are field-general, but all are heuristic in not being guaranteed to work. An organizing framework is then proposed as a four-level hierarchy of nested reasoning processes and subprocesses at different size and time scales, including: Level (L4) Several longer-time-scale Major Modeling Modes, such as Model Evolution and Model Competition; the former mode utilizes: (L3) Modeling Cycle Phases of Model Generation, Evaluation, and Modification under Constraints; which can utilize: (L2) Thirteen Tactical Heuristic Processes, e.g., Analogy, Infer new model feature (e.g., by running the model), etc.; many of which selectively utilize: (L1) Grounded Imagistic Processes, namely Mental Simulations and Structural Transformations. Incomplete serial ordering in the framework gives it an intermediate degree of organization that is neither anarchistic nor fully algorithmic. Its organizational structure is hypothesized to promote a difficult balance between divergent and convergent processes as it alternates between them in modeling cycles with increasingly constrained modifications. Videotaped think-aloud protocols that include depictive gestures and other imagery indicators indicate that the processes in L1 above can be imagistic. From neurological evidence that imagery uses many of the same brain regions as actual perception and action, it is argued that these expert reasoning processes are grounded in the sense of utilizing the perceptual and motor systems, and interconnections to and possible benefits for reasoning processes at higher levels are examined. The discussion examines whether this grounding and the various forms of organization in the framework may begin to explain how processes that are only sometimes useful and not guaranteed to work can combine successfully to achieve innovative scientific model construction.

How do insects choose flowers? A review of multi-attribute flower choice and decoy effects in flower-visiting insects.

Understanding why animals (including humans) choose one thing over another is one of the key questions underlying the fields of behavioural ecology, behavioural economics and psychology. Most traditional studies of food choice in animals focus on simple, single-attribute decision tasks. However, animals in the wild are often faced with multi-attribute choice tasks where options in the choice set vary across multiple dimensions. Multi-attribute decision-making is particularly relevant for flower-visiting insects faced with deciding between flowers that may differ in reward attributes such as sugar concentration, nectar volume and pollen composition as well as non-rewarding attributes such as colour, symmetry and odour. How do flower-visiting insects deal with complex multi-attribute decision tasks? Here we review and synthesise research on the decision strategies used by flower-visiting insects when making multi-attribute decisions. In particular, we review how different types of foraging frameworks (classic optimal foraging theory, nutritional ecology, heuristics) conceptualise multi-attribute choice and we discuss how phenomena such as innate preferences, flower constancy and context dependence influence our understanding of flower choice. We find that multi-attribute decision-making is a complex process that can be influenced by innate preferences, flower constancy, the composition of the choice set and economic reward value. We argue that to understand and predict flower choice in flower-visiting insects, we need to move beyond simplified choice sets towards a view of multi-attribute choice which integrates the role of non-rewarding attributes and which includes flower constancy, innate preferences and context dependence. We further caution that behavioural experiments need to consider the possibility of context dependence in the design and interpretation of preference experiments. We conclude with a discussion of outstanding questions for future research. We also present a conceptual framework that incorporates the multiple dimensions of choice behaviour.

Role of norms in variation in cancer centers' end-of-life quality: qualitative case study protocol.

BACKGROUND: A critical barrier to improving the quality of end-of-life (EOL) cancer care is our lack of understanding of the mechanisms underlying variation in EOL treatment intensity. This study aims to fill this gap by identifying 1) organizational and provider practice norms at major US cancer centers, and 2) how these norms influence provider decision making heuristics and patient expectations for EOL care, particularly for minority patients with advanced cancer. METHODS: This is a multi-center, qualitative case study at six National Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN) and National Cancer Institute (NCI) Comprehensive Cancer Centers. We will theoretically sample centers based upon National Quality Forum (NQF) endorsed EOL quality metrics and demographics to ensure heterogeneity in EOL intensity and region. A multidisciplinary team of clinician and non-clinician researchers will conduct direct observations, semi-structured interviews, and artifact collection. Participants will include: 1) cancer center and clinical service line administrators; 2) providers from medical, surgical, and radiation oncology; palliative or supportive care; intensive care; hospital medicine; and emergency medicine who see patients with cancer and have high clinical practice volume or high local influence (provider interviews and observations); and 3) adult patients with metastatic solid tumors and whom the provider would not be surprised if they died in the next 12 months and their caregivers (patient and caregiver interviews). Leadership interviews will probe about EOL institutional norms and organization. We will observe inpatient and outpatient care for two weeks. Provider interviews will use vignettes to probe explicit and implicit motivations for treatment choices. Semi-structured interviews with patients near EOL, or their family members and caregivers will explore past, current, and future decisions related to their cancer care. We will import transcribed field notes and interviews into Dedoose software for qualitative data management and analysis, and we will develop and apply a deductive and inductive codebook to the data. DISCUSSION: This study aims to improve our understanding of organizational and provider practice norms pertinent to EOL care in U.S. cancer centers. This research will ultimately be used to inform a provider-oriented intervention to improve EOL care for racial and ethnic minority patients with advanced cancer. TRIAL REGISTRATION: Clinicaltrials.gov ; NCT03780816 ; December 19, 2018.

Folk-economic beliefs: An evolutionary cognitive model.

The domain of "folk-economics" consists in explicit beliefs about the economy held by laypeople, untrained in economics, about such topics as, for example, the causes of the wealth of nations, the benefits or drawbacks of markets and international trade, the effects of regulation, the origins of inequality, the connection between work and wages, the economic consequences of immigration, or the possible causes of unemployment. These beliefs are crucial in forming people's political beliefs and in shaping their reception of different policies. Yet, they often conflict with elementary principles of economic theory and are often described as the consequences of ignorance, irrationality, or specific biases. As we will argue, these past perspectives fail to predict the particular contents of popular folk-economic beliefs and, as a result, there is no systematic study of the cognitive factors involved in their emergence and cultural success. Here we propose that the cultural success of particular beliefs about the economy is predictable if we consider the influence of specialized, largely automatic inference systems that evolved as adaptations to ancestral human small-scale sociality. These systems, for which there is independent evidence, include free-rider detection, fairness-based partner choice, ownership intuitions, coalitional psychology, and more. Information about modern mass-market conditions activates these specific inference systems, resulting in particular intuitions, for example, that impersonal transactions are dangerous or that international trade is a zero-sum game. These intuitions in turn make specific policy proposals more likely than others to become intuitively compelling, and, as a consequence, exert a crucial influence on political choices.

Cognitive framing in action.

Cognitive framing effects have been widely reported in higher-level decision-making and have been ascribed to rules of thumb for quick thinking. No such demonstrations have been reported for physical action, as far as we know, but they would be expected if cognition for physical action is fundamentally similar to cognition for higher-level decision-making. To test for such effects, we asked participants to reach for a horizontally-oriented pipe to move it from one height to another while turning the pipe 180° to bring one end (the "business end") to a target on the left or right. From a physical perspective, participants could have always rotated the pipe in the same angular direction no matter which end was the business end; a given participant could have always turned the pipe clockwise or counter-clockwise. Instead, our participants turned the business end counter-clockwise for left targets and clockwise for right targets. Thus, the way the identical physical task was framed altered the way it was performed. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that cognition for physical action is fundamentally similar to cognition for higher-level decision-making. A tantalizing possibility is that higher-level decision heuristics have roots in the control of physical action, a hypothesis that accords with embodied views of cognition.