Do diagnosis-related group-based payments incentivise hospitals to adjust output mix?

This study investigates whether the diagnosis-related group (DRG)-based payment method motivates hospitals to adjust output mix in order to maximise profits. The hypothesis is that when there is an increase in profitability of a DRG, hospitals will increase the proportion of that DRG (own-price effects) and decrease those of other DRGs (cross-price effects), except in cases where there are scope economies in producing two different DRGs. This conjecture is tested in the context of the case payment scheme (CPS) under Taiwan's National Health Insurance programme over the period of July 1999 to December 2004. To tackle endogeneity of DRG profitability and treatment policy, a fixed-effects three-stage least squares method is applied. The results support the hypothesised own-price and cross-price effects, showing that DRGs which share similar resources appear to be complements rather substitutes. For-profit hospitals do not appear to be more responsive to DRG profitability, possibly because of their institutional characteristics and bonds with local communities. The key conclusion is that DRG-based payments will encourage a type of 'product-range' specialisation, which may improve hospital efficiency in the long run. However, further research is needed on how changes in output mix impact patient access and pay-outs of health insurance.

Hospital ownership and performance: evidence from stroke and cardiac treatment in Taiwan.

This paper compares program expenditure and treatment quality of stroke and cardiac patients between 1997 and 2000 across hospitals of various ownership types in Taiwan. Because Taiwan implemented national health insurance in 1995, the analysis is immune from problems arising from the complex setting of the U.S. health care market, such as segmentation of insurance status or multiple payers. Because patients may select admitted hospitals based on their observed and unobserved characteristics, we employ instrument variable (IV) estimation to account for the endogeneity of ownership status. Results of IV estimation find that patients admitted to non-profit hospitals receive better quality care, either measured by 1- or 12-month mortality rates. In terms of treatment expenditure, our results indicate no difference between non-profits and for-profits index admission expenditures, and at most 10% higher long-term expenditure for patients admitted to non-profits than to for-profits.

Association of hospital ownership with patient transfers to outpatient care under a prospective payment system in Taiwan.

Case payment, a prospective payment system akin to diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) has in-built incentives for hospitals to transfer inpatients to their own ambulatory care units following early discharge. This study used nation-wide inpatient claims data on a total of 100,730 patients treated in 2000 in (Taiwan): cesarean section (59,364 cases), femoral/inguinal hernia operation (18,675 cases), and hemorrhoidectomy (22,691 cases), all reimbursed by case payment, to explore the relationship between hospital ownership and patient transfers to outpatient treatment. For all three diagnoses, for-profit (FP) hospitals not only had lower lengths of stay (LOS) compared to public hospitals, but also showed very high odds of patient transfer to their own outpatient units, after controlling for institutional variables, (hospital level, teaching status, and geographic location), hospital competitive environment (the Herfindal-Hirschman index), and patient variables (gender, age, length of stay, and number of secondary diagnoses, a proxy for severity of illness). Similar, though slightly lower odds were observed with not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals relative to public hospitals. The findings support the property rights theory, suggesting that in Taiwan, institutional profit maximization motives may be driving patient transfers under the case payment diagnoses, rather than medical care needs. In NFP hospitals, their physician compensation mechanism, driven largely by care volumes provided by each physician, appears to be driving the disproportionately greater likelihood of patient transfer to outpatient care.

The funding of private hospitals in Australia.

Private hospitals are an essential component of Australia's complex mix of public and private health funding and provision. Private hospitals account for 34.3 per cent of all hospital separations, and over half (56.2%) of all same-day separations. The revenue (funding) of the sector approached $4 billion by 1998/99, and as a result of its recent rapid growth capital expenditure in the sector was nearly $550 million in the same year. Private casemix of private hospitals is distinctive, and characterised by a high proportion of surgical procedures in general (48.1 per cent), and more than a majority of all services in such areas as rehabilitation, orthopaedics (shoulder, knee, spinal fusion, and hand surgery), alcohol disorders, same day colonoscopy and sleep disorders. This chapter synthesizes data from a multitude of sources to produce a comprehensive picture of Australia's private hospital sector and its funding. It examines the funding (revenue) sources of private hospitals, and considers how and why private hospitals approach the issue of funding from a different perspective than their public sector colleagues. To illustrate how Australian private hospitals approach revenue (funding) strategically, a series of indicative types of hospitals is explored.

Organizational economics and health care markets.

As health policy emphasizes the use of private sector mechanisms to pursue public sector goals, health services research needs to develop stronger conceptual frameworks for the interpretation of empirical studies of health care markets and organizations. Organizational relationships should not be interpreted exclusively in terms of competition among providers of similar services but also in terms of relationships among providers of substitute and complementary services and in terms of upstream suppliers and downstream distributors. This article illustrates the potential applicability of transactions cost economics, agency theory, and organizational economics more broadly to horizontal and vertical markets in health care. Examples are derived from organizational integration between physicians and hospitals and organizational conversions from nonprofit to for-profit ownership.

Cash management in health care systems.

Cash is one of the most precious assets held by health systems. This article presents results of discussions on cash management and investment policies at a dozen major not-for-profit health systems. Health system data indicate that cash holdings have increased dramatically since 1993, mostly due to investment earnings. Discussions with chief financial officers of these health systems reveal that cash holdings are significant, that decisions about cash balances are strategic, and that most systems aim to increase cash balances to levels that permit access to capital markets on more favorable terms.

IDS conversions to for-profit status: structuring the deal.

Not-for-profit integrated delivery systems (IDSs) may convert assets to for-profit status in a variety of ways, but typically choose from three basic conversion structures: sale of assets, joint ventures, and lease or management agreements. To select the optimal conversion structure, not-for-profit IDS executives should understand the forces driving their organization's desire or need to effect such a conversion and examine the legal, business, and political implications of each option in light of the organization's particular circumstances.

Steps for winning state approval of integration transactions.

The powers attorneys general have to regulate integration transactions between for-profit and not-for-profit organizations may differ from state to state, but regardless of location, health-care executives planning integration transactions should take steps to help ensure that such transactions receive state approval. Executives should familiarize themselves with the attorney general's approval process in their state, be prepared to defend the valuation of any not-for-profit assets to be transferred as part of an integration transaction, review articles of incorporation and state statutes to make certain that the proposed transfer of assets is permissible, and ensure that the process for securing board approval to proceed with the integration is free from conflicts of interest.

Vertical integration strategies: revenue effects in hospital and Medicare markets.

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the revenue effects of seven vertically integrated strategies on California hospitals. The strategies investigated were managed care contracts, physician affiliations, ambulatory care, ambulatory surgery, home health services, inpatient rehabilitation, and skilled nursing care. The study population included 242 not-for-profit hospitals in continuous operation from 1983 to 1990. Many hospitals developed vertically integrated programs in the 1980s as inpatient utilization fell in response to the Medicare Prospective Payment program. Net revenue rose on average by $2,080 from 1983 to 1990, but fell by $2,421 from the Medicare program. On the whole, the more physicians affiliated with a hospital, the higher the net revenue. However, in the Medicare population, the number of managed care contracts was significant. The pre-hospital strategies generated significant revenue, while the post-hospital strategies did not. In the Medicare program, inpatient rehabilitation significantly reduced revenue.

Accessing capital for integrated delivery systems.

As healthcare organizations integrate to better coordinate services and control costs, they often must turn to capital markets for financing. To successfully access capital for system development, however, healthcare executives first must understand how capital markets view the various entities of a healthcare system and must structure financing proposals in keeping with market expectations. Some relatively new financing strategies, such as taxable debt and equity financing, can help healthcare executives acquire the necessary capital for systems development.

Federal tax concerns in structuring integrated delivery systems. Part II: Systems with taxable and tax-exempt participants.

The concluding segment of this two-part article covers the tax rules for integrated delivery systems that incorporate both taxable and tax-exempt participants. The author also analyzes the different organizational forms such ventures may take.