Occupational stress and mental health of employees of a petrochemical company before and after privatization.

BACKGROUND: Many countries make many of their governmental sectors private. This transition, however, may affect their employees in numerous ways. OBJECTIVE: To determine the level of occupational stress and mental health of employees of a petrochemical company in Isfahan, Central Iran, before and 3 months after privatization. METHODS: Out of the 700 employees of the studied company, using a stratified random sampling technique, 140 persons were selected. We used Steinmetz occupational stress and GHQ-28 questionnaires to determine the level of stress and mental health status of participants. RESULTS: The reliability of the questionnaires used was acceptable (Chronbach alpha coefficients: 0.85 and 0.86, respectively). Job stress level was significantly increased 3 months after privatization; the mean±SD job stress score before and after privatization were 22.9±10.43 and 28.3±12.25, respectively (p<0.001). The mean±SD mental health score after privatization (17.57±11.63) was also significantly (p<0.001) higher than that before the privatization (13.8±6.0). There was a significant (p<0.001) positive correlation between the mental health status score and job score (r = 0.476). CONCLUSION: After privatization, the job stress of employees increased significantly. This increase was associated with a decrease in mental health. To lessen the side effects of privatization, the process should be performed cautiously.

Trailer siting issues: BP Texas City.

On 23 March, 2005, a series of explosions and fires occurred at the BP Texas City refinery during the startup of an isomerization (ISOM) process unit. Fifteen workers were killed and about 180 others were injured. All of the fatalities were contract workers; the deaths and most of the serious injuries occurred in and around temporary office trailers that had been sited near a blowdown drum and stack open to the atmosphere as part of ongoing turnaround activities in an adjacent unit. Due to problems that developed during the ISOM startup, flammable hydrocarbon liquid overfilled the blowdown drum and stack which resulted in a geyser-like release out the top into the atmosphere. The flammable hydrocarbons fell to the ground releasing vapors that were likely ignited from a nearby idling diesel pickup truck. A total of 44 trailers were damaged by the blast pressure wave that propagated through the refinery when the vapor cloud exploded. Thirteen trailers were totally destroyed and workers were injured in trailers as far as 479ft away from the release. The focus of this paper will be on trailer siting issues, including: need for work/office trailers within process units, adequacy of risk analysis methods in API RP 752, and minimum safe distance requirements

Potential use of advanced process control for safety purposes during attack of a process plant.

Many refineries and commodity chemical plants employ advanced process control (APC) systems to improve throughputs and yields. These APC systems utilize empirical process models for control purposes and enable operation closer to constraints than can be achieved with traditional PID regulatory feedback control. Substantial economic benefits are typically realized from the addition of APC systems. This paper considers leveraging the control capabilities of existing APC systems to minimize the potential impact of a terrorist attack on a process plant (e.g., petroleum refinery). Two potential uses of APC are described. The first is a conventional application of APC and involves automatically moving the process to a reduced operating rate when an attack first begins. The second is a non-conventional application and involves reconfiguring the APC system to optimize safety rather than economics. The underlying intent in both cases is to reduce the demands on the operator to allow focus on situation assessment and optimal response planning. An overview of APC is provided along with a brief description of the modifications required for the proposed new applications of the technology.

The use of generic failure frequencies in QRA: the quality and use of failure frequencies and how to bring them up-to-date.

Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is a method which is often used in the chemical industry and, in some countries, also in land-use planning. In QRA calculations the frequency of an accident scenario is most often assessed by a generic failure frequency approach. The credibility and validity of the failure frequencies used in the Netherlands for land-use planning is evaluated by means of an historical review. Furthermore, the possibility is presented how these generic data can be revised and updated.

Incidents/accidents classification and reporting in Statoil.

Based on requirements in the new petroleum regulations from Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and the realisation of a need to improve and rationalise the routines for reporting and follow up of incidents, Statoil Exploration & Production Norway (Statoil E&P Norway) has formulated a new strategy and process for handling of incidents/accidents. The following past experiences serve as basis for the changes made to incident reporting in Statoil E&P Norway; too much resources were spent on a comprehensive handling and analysis of a vast amount of incidents with less importance for the safety level, taking the focus away from the more severe and important issues at hand, the assessment of "Risk Factor", i.e. the combination of recurrence frequency and consequence, was difficult to use. The high degree of subjectivity involved in the determination of the "Risk Factor" (in particular the estimation of the recurrence frequency) resulted in poor data quality and lack of consistency in the data material. The new system for categorisation and handling of undesirable incidents was established in January 2002. The intention was to get a higher degree of focus on serious incidents (injuries, damages, loss and near misses), with a thorough handling and follow-up. This is reflected throughout the handling of the serious incidents, all the way from immediate notification of the incident, through investigation and follow-up of corrective and preventive actions. Simultaneously, it was also an objective to rationalise/simplify the handling of less serious incidents. These incidents are, however, subjected to analyses twice a year in order to utilize the learning opportunity that they also provide. A year after the introduction of this new system for categorisation and follow-up of undesirable incidents, Statoil's experiences are predominantly good; the intention to get a higher degree of focus on serious incidents (injuries, damages, loss and near misses), has been met, the data quality for the more serious incidents (5% of the total number of incidents registered) has improved, the improved handling of incidents has contributed to more reliable and accurate HSE indicators at a corporate level, more user friendly codes in place for incident registration (based on MTO methodology), the revised matrix gives distinct criteria with respect to which investigation level to be initiated for a specific incident. All activities related to handling of undesirable incidents have been summarised and illustrated on a two-sided plastic form, incorporating both the categorisation matrix and the activity flowchart (see Figs. 1 and 4).