RESUMO
The National Ignition Facility (NIF) has been designed to accommodate some challenging radiological conditions. The high prompt neutron source (up to 1.6 × 10(19) neutrons per shot) results in the need for significant fixed shielding. Concrete shielding approximately 2 m thick is used for the primary (target bay) shield. Penetrations in this shield, including those required for 192 laser beams, utilities, diagnostics, and 19 shielded personnel access doors, make the design challenging. An additional 28 shield doors are part of the secondary shield. In addition, the prompt neutron pulse results in activated air within the target bay, requiring special ventilation considerations. Finally, targets can use a number of hazardous and radioactive materials including tritium, beryllium, and depleted uranium (the latter of which results in the generation of small quantities of fission products). Frequent access is required to the associated potentially contaminated volumes for experimental setup, facilitating the need for local exhaust ventilation to manage these hazards. This paper reviews some of these challenges, design considerations, and the engineering solutions to these design requirements.
Assuntos
Arquitetura de Instituições de Saúde , Fusão Nuclear , Proteção Radiológica/métodos , Berílio/efeitos adversos , California , Materiais de Construção , Lasers/efeitos adversos , Nêutrons , Monitoramento de Radiação/métodos , Trítio/efeitos adversos , Urânio/efeitos adversos , Ventilação/métodosRESUMO
The National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is the world's largest and most energetic laser system for inertial confinement fusion and experiments studying high energy density science. Many experiments performed at the National Ignition Facility involve radioactive materials; these may take the form of tritium and small quantities of depleted uranium used in targets, activation products created by neutron-producing fusion experiments, and fission products produced by the fast fissioning of the depleted uranium. While planning for the introduction of radioactive material, it was recognized that some of the standard institutional processes would need to be customized to accommodate aspects of NIF operations, such as surface contamination limits, radiological postings, airborne tritium monitoring protocols, and personnel protective equipment. These customizations were overlaid onto existing work practices to accommodate the new hazard of radioactive materials. This paper will discuss preparations that were made prior to the introduction of radioactive material, the types of radiological work activities performed, and the hazards and controls encountered. Updates to processes based on actual monitoring results are also discussed.
Assuntos
Fusão Nuclear , Proteção Radiológica/métodos , California , Arquitetura de Instituições de Saúde , Humanos , Monitoramento de Radiação/métodos , Gestão da Segurança/métodos , Trítio/efeitos adversos , Urânio/efeitos adversosRESUMO
Synchronized suspension cultures of Chinese hamster ovary cells (CHO) were labeled with various doses of 3H-thymidine or 125I-iododeoxyuridine to evaluate the cytocidal effects of intranuclear radionuclide decay. Damage produced by radionuclide decay outside the cell nucleus was studied on cells exposed to 125I labeled, monovalent concanavalin A. After labeling, the cells were resynchronized in G1-phase and incubated for 36 h at 4 degrees C to permit dose accumulation. Cell lethality was evaluated by the standard colony assay. Based on radionuclide incorporation data, cellular dimensions, and subcellular radionuclide distributions, the cumulative dose to whole cells, cell nuclei, and cellular cytoplasm was calculated from the known decay properties of 3H and 125I. As expected, DNA associated 125I (LD50: 60 decays/cell; 45 rad) was much more toxic to CHO cells than 3H (LD50: 1350 decays/cell; 380 rad) 380 rad) or external X-irradiation (LD50: 330 rad). In contrast, membrane associated 125I was surprisingly non-toxic (LD50: 19 600 decays/cell). At 19 600 decays/cell the dose to the cell membrane was approximately 52 krad and the overlap dose into the cytoplasm was about 2470 rad. Even at these high dose levels, membrane damage or cytoplasmic damage apparently did not contribute significantly to radiation induced cell death. With 19 600 decays on the plasma membrane the CHO nuclei received an overlap dose of about 410 rad. As can be seen from the LD50 data for 3H and X-rays, a nuclear dose of 410 rad should be sufficient to account for 50% cell death. These findings indicate that, although intranuclear decay by electron capture is extremely destructive, identical decay events in the plasma membrane cause only minimal cell damage. This parallels our earlier studies on 67Ga labeled leukemia cells which showed that electron capture decay in the cytoplasm is also highly ineffective in killing mammalian cells. It therefore appears that radiation-induced cell lethality in dividing mammalian cells results primarily from nuclear damage. Cytoplasmic or membrane contributions to radiation-induced cell death, if any, must be minimal. By implication, these findings refute the enzyme release hypothesis and similar theories designed to explain mitotic death in terms of cytoplasmic or membrane damage rather than nuclear damage.