From Mind to Body: Is Mental Practice Effective on Strength Gains? A Meta-Analysis.

Mental practice is an internal reproduction of a motor act (whose intention is to promote learning and improving motor skills). Some studies have shown that other cognitive strategies also increase the strength and muscular resistance in healthy people by the enhancement of the performance during dynamic tasks. Mental training sessions may be primordial to improving muscle strength in different subjects. The aim of this study was to systematically review and meta-analiyze studies that assessed whether mental practice is effective in improving muscular strength. We conducted an electronic-computed search in Pub-Med/Medline and ISI Web of Knowledge, Scielo and manual searchs, searching papers written in English between 1991 and 2014. There were 44 studies in Pub-Med/Medline, 631 in ISI Web of Knowledge, 11 in Scielo and 3 in manual searchs databases. After exclusion of studies for duplicate, unrelated to the topic by title and summary, different samples and methodologies, a meta-analysis of 4 studies was carried out to identify the dose-response relationship. We did not find evidence that mental practice is effective in increasing strength in healthy individuals. There is no evidence that mental practice alone can be effective to induce strength gains or to optimize the training effects.

A neurociência afetiva como modelo explicativo das emoções básicas / Affective neuroscience as an explanatory model of basic emotions

A neurociência afetiva constitui uma orientação científica que surgiu com a proposta de reconfigurar o estudo acerca do papel exercido pelas emoções básicas no comportamento humano. Nossa intenção é demonstrar que sua versão mais conhecida, a de Jaak Panksepp, pode constituir um modelo de explicação dos sistemas operativos emocionais básicos, capaz de oferecer uma contribuição original para o exame dos percursos neurais inerentes às emoções básicas, e mais particularmente ao sistema do medo. Nossa análise se apoia basicamente na obra que inaugura essa orientação, Affective Neuroscience, em associada a outros artigos de Panksepp. Pudemos concluir que esta orientação científica propicia a possibilidade de uma instigante taxonomia das emoções em seguras bases biológicas a partir da ideia de que as atividades de distintos sistemas cerebrais correspondem a comportamentos emocionais específicos, ou seja,a partir da correlação entre tipos de sistemas ou estados cerebrais e tipos de comportamentos ou ações emocionais.

Affective neuroscience is a scientific orientation that emerged with the proposal to reconfigure the study of the role of basic emotions in human behavior. Our intention is to demonstrate that its best-known version, the one of Jaak Panksepp, can be an explanatory model of the basic emotional operating systems and is able to provide an original contribution to the analysis of the neural pathways inherent to basic emotions, and more particularly to the fear system. Our analysis is bases primarily on the book that originated this orientation, Affective Neuroscience, in association with other articles of Panksepp. We concluded that this scientific orientation provides the possibility of an instigating taxonomy of emotions in safe biological bases from the idea that the activities of different brain systems correspond to specific emotional behaviors, that is, from the correlation between different types of systems or brain conditions and types of behaviors or emotional actions.

Changes in Cortical Activity During Real and Imagined Movements: an ERP Study.

This study aims to compare the topographic distribution of cortical activation between real and imagined movement through event-related potential (ERP). We are specifically interested in identifying, the topographic distribution of activated areas, the intensity of activated areas, and the temporal occurrence of these activations on preparation and motor response phases. Twelve healthy and right handed subjects were instructed to perform a task under real and imagery conditions. The task was performed simultaneously to electroencephalographic (EEG) recording. When compared the conditions, we found a statistically significant difference in favor of real condition revealed by performing an unpaired t-test with multiple corrections of Bonferroni, demonstrating negative activity on electrode C3 and positive activity on the electrode C4 only in motor response phase. These findings revealed similar functional connections established during real and imagery conditions, suggesting that there are common neural substrate and similar properties of functional integration shared by conditions.

Repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS) to Treat Social Anxiety Disorder: Case Reports and a Review of the Literature.

OBJECTIVES: Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is a common and debilitating anxiety disorders. However, few studies had been dedicated to the neurobiology underlying SAD until the last decade. Rates of non-responders to standard methods of treatment remain unsatisfactorily high of approximately 25%, including SAD. Advances in our understanding of SAD could lead to new treatment strategies. A potential non invasive therapeutic option is repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS). Thus, we reported two cases of SAD treated with rTMS Methods: The bibliographical search used Pubmed/Medline, ISI Web of Knowledge and Scielo databases. The terms chosen for the search were: anxiety disorders, neuroimaging, repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation. RESULTS: In most of the studies conducted on anxiety disorders, except SAD, the right prefrontal cortex (PFC), more specifically dorsolateral PFC was stimulated, with marked results when applying high-rTMS compared with studies stimulating the opposite side. However, according to the "valence hypothesis", anxiety disorders might be characterized by an interhemispheric imbalance associated with increased right-hemispheric activity. With regard to the two cases treated with rTMS, we found a decrease in BDI, BAI and LSAS scores from baseline to follow-up. CONCLUSION: We hypothesize that the application of low-rTMS over the right medial PFC (mPFC; the main structure involved in SAD circuitry) combined with high-rTMS over the left mPFC, for at least 4 weeks on consecutive weekdays, may induce a balance in brain activity, opening an attractive therapeutic option for the treatment of SAD.

What affective neuroscience means for science of consciousness.

The field of affective neuroscience has emerged from the efforts of Jaak Panksepp in the 1990s and reinforced by the work of, among others, Joseph LeDoux in the 2000s. It is based on the ideas that affective processes are supported by brain structures that appeared earlier in the phylogenetic scale (as the periaqueductal gray area), they run in parallel with cognitive processes, and can influence behaviour independently of cognitive judgements. This kind of approach contrasts with the hegemonic concept of conscious processing in cognitive neurosciences, which is based on the identification of brain circuits responsible for the processing of (cognitive) representations. Within cognitive neurosciences, the frontal lobes are assigned the role of coordinators in maintaining affective states and their emotional expressions under cognitive control. An intermediary view is the Damasio-Bechara Somatic Marker model, which puts cognition under partial somatic-affective control. We present here our efforts to make a synthesis of these views, by proposing the existence of two interacting brain circuits; the first one in charge of cognitive processes and the second mediating feelings about cognitive contents. The coupling of the two circuits promotes an endogenous feedback that supports conscious processes. Within this framework, we present the defence that detailed study of both affective and cognitive processes, their interactions, as well of their respective brain networks, is necessary for a science of consciousness.

Clonazepam for the treatment of panic disorder.

Clonazepam was initially licensed as an anti-epileptic agent, but its use in a wide variety of psychiatric conditions, including panic disorder (PD) has now been well established. This overview evaluates the current role of clonazepam alone or in combination with antidepressants and/or behavioral therapy in the treatment of PD. We review the data establishing the use of clonazepam in the treatment of PD as well as new information, particularly confirmation of longterm efficacy and safety. We also discuss a regimen for safely tapered withdrawal of clonazepam, the characteristics of the respiratory subtype of PD, and CO2-induced panic attacks as a diagnostic measure and predictor for therapeutic success. It has been shown that panic attacks can more readily be induced by CO2 in PD patients with the respiratory subtype than those with the non-respiratory subtype. More than 25 years after the first report of efficacy in PD in 1984, clonazepam, alone or combined with selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) and/or behavioral therapy, remains an important therapeutic modality for the management of PD.

Repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation for clinical applications in neurological and psychiatric disorders: an overview.

Neurological and psychiatric disorders are characterized by several disabling symptoms for which effective, mechanism-based treatments remain elusive. Consequently, more advanced non-invasive therapeutic methods are required. A method that may modulate brain activity and be viable for use in clinical practice is repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS). It is a non-invasive procedure whereby a pulsed magnetic field stimulates electrical activity in the brain. Here, we focus on the basic foundation of rTMS, the main stimulation parametters, the factors that influence individual responses to rTMS and the experimental advances of rTMS that may become a viable clinical application to treat neurological and psychiatric disorders. The findings showed that rTMS can improve some symptoms associated with these conditions and might be useful for promoting cortical plasticity in patients with neurological and psychiatric disorders. However, these changes are transient and it is premature to propose these applications as realistic therapeutic options, even though the rTMS technique has been evidenced as a potential modulator of sensorimotor integration and neuroplasticity. Functional imaging of the region of interest could highlight the capacity of rTMS to bring about plastic changes of the cortical circuitry and hint at future novel clinical interventions. Thus, we recommend that further studies clearly determine the role of rTMS in the treatment of these conditions. Finally, we must remember that however exciting the neurobiological mechanisms might be, the clinical usefulness of rTMS will be determined by its ability to provide patients with neurological and psychiatric disorders with safe, long-lasting and substantial improvements in quality of life.

Processos implícitos não-conscientes na tomada de decisão: a hipótese dos marcadores somáticos / Implicit non - conscious processes in decision – making: the somatic-marker hypothesis

Nesse artigo, pretendemos avaliar os fundamentos filosóficos e científicos da hipótese dos marcadores somáticos (HMS) quanto ao papel exercido por processos implícitos não-conscientes nas tomadas de decisão. Para tanto, analisaremos as relações entre nosso sistema neural reflexivo e nosso sistema neural impulsivo, destacando o papel da amígdala e do córtex pré-frontal ventromedial no desencadeamento de estados afetivos/emocionais que aumentam ou diminuem a velocidade e acurácia de processos decisórios. Essa discussão nos conduzirá à análise do modo como estados somáticos podem ser conduzidos por indutores primários e/ou secundários. Essa última análise propiciará um entendimento sobre como a emergência ou ausência da força de vontade depende da interação entre o sistema neural impulsivo, que desencadeia estados somáticos de indutores primários, e o sistema neural reflexivo, que desencadeia estados somáticos de indutores secundários. Concluímos que o conceito tradicional de autonomia precisa ser revisto, ainda que estejamos longe da possibilidade de fundamentar um novo

A alma e o cérebro: as origens do debate acerca da Psicologia científica no Brasil / The soul and the brain: the origins of the discussions on scientific Psychology in Brazil

Neste artigo, meu objetivo é o de apontar para a significação dos primeiros debates acerca da natureza da Psicologia Científica no Brasil. Para tanto, trabalharei com textos de dois autores em especial, Gonçalves de Magalhães e Tobias Barreto. Meu interesse é o de demonstrar em que sentido estes filósofos foram capazes de oferecer oposição a uma tendência positiva vigente na Psicologia e, ao mesmo tempo, superar o caráter contemplativo da consciência de si inerente à Psicologia sob a égide dos Jesuítas, e em vista da necessidade de modernização filosófica no Brasil. Ao mesmo tempo, pretendo mostrar que, a despeito da crítica de Tobias a Magalhães, ambos souberam reconhecer a significação do naturalismo em Psicologia, especialmente no que diz respeito à tarefa de inserir o pensamento brasileiro nos rumos da filosofia ocidental. (AU)

In this paper, my aim is to point to the significance of the earlier discussions about the nature of Scientific Psychology in Brazil. Therefore, I will work in particular with texts of two authors, Gonçalves de Magalhães and Tobias Barreto. My interest it to demonstrate in what sense these philosophers were able to offer opposition to a current positive trend in Psychology and the same time, overcome the contemplative character of self-consciousness inherent in Psychology under the aegis of the Jesuits, in view of need for philosophical modernization in Brazil. At the same time, I intend to show that, despite the criticism of Tobias to Magalhães, both know recognize the significance of the naturalism in Psychology, especially with regard to the task of entering the Brazilian thought in the course of Western Philosophy. (AU)

Defesa da introspecção como método filosófico de acesso à consciência de si: Farias Brito em face de Henri Bergson e Edmund Husserl / Defense of introspection as philosophical method of access to selfconsciousness: Farias Brito in the face of Henri Bergson and Edmund Husserl

Neste artigo, propomos situar a filosofia brasileira em função da consciência de si como problema essencial, assim estabelecendo uma ideia de filosofia como "ciência" do espírito. Para tanto, buscamos apontar para a introspecção como o método filosófico capaz de levar a uma consideração da alma em separado do corpo, o que une Farias Brito a seus antecessores no Brasil, dentre os quais Padre Vieira, Gonçalves de Magalhães e Tobias Barreto, bem como a Henri Bergson e Edmund Husserl no cenário europeu. Propusemo-nos também demonstrar que somente com a irrupção das ciências da natureza e da filosofia moderna que se torna possível discutir em profundidade a ideia de uma "ciência" do espírito como o problema da filosofia em sua historicidade. Por fim, e a partir da análise das especificidades da intuição e do método analítico, defendemos que o método experimental não pode considerar o psíquico em sua especificidade.(AU)

In this paper, we propose to situate Brazilian philosophy based on self-consciousness, considering it as a crucial problem, thus establishing an ideia of philosophy as "science" of the spirit. For this purpose, we seek to point out to introspection as the philosophical method that can lead to a consideration of the soul separated from the body, which unites Farias Brito to his predecessors, among them, Antonio Vieira, Gonçalves de Magalhães and Tobias Barreto, as well as Henri Bergson and Edmund Husserl in the European scenery. We have also proposed to show that only with the emergence of the natural sciences and modern philosophy that it became possible to discuss the idea of a "science" of the spirit as the problem of philosophy on its historicity. Finally, and from the analysis of the specificities of the intuition and the analytical method, we argue that the experimental method cannot consider the psychic in its specificity.(AU)