The price of cost-effectiveness thresholds under therapeutic competition in pharmaceutical markets.

Health systems around world are increasingly adopting cost-effectiveness (CE) analysis to inform decisions about access and reimbursement. We study how CE thresholds imposed by a health plan for granting reimbursement affect drug producers' pricing incentives and patients' access to new drugs. Analysing a sequential pricing game between an incumbent drug producer and a potential entrant with a new drug, we show that CE thresholds may have adverse effects for payers and patients. A stricter CE threshold may induce the incumbent to switch pricing strategy from entry accommodation to entry deterrence, limiting patients' access to the new drug. Otherwise, irrespective of whether entry is deterred or accommodated, a stricter CE threshold is never pro-competitive and may in fact facilitate a collusive outcome with higher prices of both drugs. Compared to a laissez-faire policy, the use of CE thresholds when an incumbent monopolist is challenged by therapeutic substitutes can only increase the surplus of a health plan if it leads to entry deterrence. In this case the price reduction by the incumbent necessary to deter entry outweighs the health loss to patients who do not get access to the new drug.

Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffs.

Two-part pricing (the Netflix model) has recently been proposed instead of uniform pricing for pharmaceuticals. Under two-part pricing the health plan pays a fixed fee for access to a drug at unit prices equal to marginal costs. Despite two-part pricing being socially efficient, we show that the health plan is worse off when the drug producer is a monopolist, as all surplus is extracted. This result is reversed with competition, as two-part pricing yields higher patient utility and lower drug costs for the health plan. However, if we allow for exclusive contracts, uniform pricing is preferred by the health plan. The choice of payment scheme is also shown to influence on the incentives to spend resources on drastic innovations relative to incremental, me-too innovations.

Diffusion of pharmaceuticals: cross-country evidence of anti-TNF drugs.

This article studies the diffusion of biopharmaceuticals across European countries, focusing on anti-TNF drugs, which are used to treat autoimmune diseases (e.g., rheumatism, psoriasis). We use detailed sales information on the three brands Remicade, Enbrel and Humira for nine European countries covering the period from the first launch in 2000 until becoming blockbusters in 2009. Descriptive statistics reveal large variations across countries in per-capita consumption and price levels both overall and at the brand level. We explore potential sources for the cross-country consumption differences by estimating several multivariate regression models. Our results show that large parts of the cross-country variation are explained by time-invariant country-specific factors (e.g., disease prevalence, demographics, health care system). We also find that differences in income [gross domestic product (GDP) per capita] and health spending (share of GDP) explain the cross-country variation in consumption, while relative price differences seem to have limited impact.

Generic substitution: micro evidence from register data in Norway.

The importance of prices, doctor and patient characteristics, and market institutions for the likelihood of choosing generic drugs instead of the more expensive original brand-name version are examined. Using an extensive dataset extracted from The Norwegian Prescription Database containing all prescriptions dispensed to individuals in February 2004 and 2006 on 23 different drugs (chemical substances) in Norway, we find strong evidence for the importance of both doctor and patient characteristics for the choice probabilities. The price difference between brand and generic versions and insurance coverage both affect generic substitution. Moreover, controlling for the retail chain affiliation of the dispensing pharmacy, we find that pharmacies play an important role in promoting generic substitution. In markets with more recent entry of generic drugs, brand-name loyalty proves to be much stronger, giving less explanatory power to our demand model.

Price regulation and generic competition in the pharmaceutical market.

In March 2003 the Norwegian government implemented yardstick-based price regulation schemes on a selection of drugs subjected to generic competition. The retail price cap, termed the "index price," on a drug (chemical substance) was set equal to the average of the three lowest producer prices on that drug, plus a fixed wholesale and retail margin. This is supposed to lower barriers of entry for generic drugs and to trigger price competition. Using monthly data over the period 1998-2004 for the six drugs (chemical entities) included in the index price system, we estimate a structural model enabling us to examine the impact of the reform on both demand and market power. Our results suggest that the index price helped to increase the market shares of generic drugs and succeeded in triggering price competition.