Multicriteria Decision Framework for Cybersecurity Risk Assessment and Management.

Risk assessors and managers face many difficult challenges related to novel cyber systems. Among these challenges are the constantly changing nature of cyber systems caused by technical advances, their distribution across the physical, information, and sociocognitive domains, and the complex network structures often including thousands of nodes. Here, we review probabilistic and risk-based decision-making techniques applied to cyber systems and conclude that existing approaches typically do not address all components of the risk assessment triplet (threat, vulnerability, consequence) and lack the ability to integrate across multiple domains of cyber systems to provide guidance for enhancing cybersecurity. We present a decision-analysis-based approach that quantifies threat, vulnerability, and consequences through a set of criteria designed to assess the overall utility of cybersecurity management alternatives. The proposed framework bridges the gap between risk assessment and risk management, allowing an analyst to ensure a structured and transparent process of selecting risk management alternatives. The use of this technique is illustrated for a hypothetical, but realistic, case study exemplifying the process of evaluating and ranking five cybersecurity enhancement strategies. The approach presented does not necessarily eliminate biases and subjectivity necessary for selecting countermeasures, but provides justifiable methods for selecting risk management actions consistent with stakeholder and decisionmaker values and technical data.

Stability of a giant connected component in a complex network.

We analyze the stability of the network's giant connected component under impact of adverse events, which we model through the link percolation. Specifically, we quantify the extent to which the largest connected component of a network consists of the same nodes, regardless of the specific set of deactivated links. Our results are intuitive in the case of single-layered systems: the presence of large degree nodes in a single-layered network ensures both its robustness and stability. In contrast, we find that interdependent networks that are robust to adverse events have unstable connected components. Our results bring novel insights to the design of resilient network topologies and the reinforcement of existing networked systems.

Resilience and efficiency in transportation networks.

Urban transportation systems are vulnerable to congestion, accidents, weather, special events, and other costly delays. Whereas typical policy responses prioritize reduction of delays under normal conditions to improve the efficiency of urban road systems, analytic support for investments that improve resilience (defined as system recovery from additional disruptions) is still scarce. In this effort, we represent paved roads as a transportation network by mapping intersections to nodes and road segments between the intersections to links. We built road networks for 40 of the urban areas defined by the U.S. Census Bureau. We developed and calibrated a model to evaluate traffic delays using link loads. The loads may be regarded as traffic-based centrality measures, estimating the number of individuals using corresponding road segments. Efficiency was estimated as the average annual delay per peak-period auto commuter, and modeled results were found to be close to observed data, with the notable exception of New York City. Resilience was estimated as the change in efficiency resulting from roadway disruptions and was found to vary between cities, with increased delays due to a 5% random loss of road linkages ranging from 9.5% in Los Angeles to 56.0% in San Francisco. The results demonstrate that many urban road systems that operate inefficiently under normal conditions are nevertheless resilient to disruption, whereas some more efficient cities are more fragile. The implication is that resilience, not just efficiency, should be considered explicitly in roadway project selection and justify investment opportunities related to disaster and other disruptions.

Resilience of Cyber Systems with Over- and Underregulation.

Recent cyber attacks provide evidence of increased threats to our critical systems and infrastructure. A common reaction to a new threat is to harden the system by adding new rules and regulations. As federal and state governments request new procedures to follow, each of their organizations implements their own cyber defense strategies. This unintentionally increases time and effort that employees spend on training and policy implementation and decreases the time and latitude to perform critical job functions, thus raising overall levels of stress. People's performance under stress, coupled with an overabundance of information, results in even more vulnerabilities for adversaries to exploit. In this article, we embed a simple regulatory model that accounts for cybersecurity human factors and an organization's regulatory environment in a model of a corporate cyber network under attack. The resulting model demonstrates the effect of under- and overregulation on an organization's resilience with respect to insider threats. Currently, there is a tendency to use ad-hoc approaches to account for human factors rather than to incorporate them into cyber resilience modeling. It is clear that using a systematic approach utilizing behavioral science, which already exists in cyber resilience assessment, would provide a more holistic view for decisionmakers.

Operational resilience: concepts, design and analysis.

Building resilience into today's complex infrastructures is critical to the daily functioning of society and its ability to withstand and recover from natural disasters, epidemics, and cyber-threats. This study proposes quantitative measures that capture and implement the definition of engineering resilience advanced by the National Academy of Sciences. The approach is applicable across physical, information, and social domains. It evaluates the critical functionality, defined as a performance function of time set by the stakeholders. Critical functionality is a source of valuable information, such as the integrated system resilience over a time interval, and its robustness. The paper demonstrates the formulation on two classes of models: 1) multi-level directed acyclic graphs, and 2) interdependent coupled networks. For both models synthetic case studies are used to explore trends. For the first class, the approach is also applied to the Linux operating system. Results indicate that desired resilience and robustness levels are achievable by trading off different design parameters, such as redundancy, node recovery time, and backup supply available. The nonlinear relationship between network parameters and resilience levels confirms the utility of the proposed approach, which is of benefit to analysts and designers of complex systems and networks.