A new look at physicians' responses to financial incentives: Quality of care, practice characteristics, and motivations.

There is considerable controversy about what causes (in)effectiveness of physician performance pay in improving the quality of care. Using a behavioral experiment with German primary-care physicians, we study the incentive effect of performance pay on service provision and quality of care. To explore whether variations in quality are based on the incentive scheme and the interplay with physicians' real-world profit orientation and patient-regarding motivations, we link administrative data on practice characteristics and survey data on physicians' attitudes with experimental data. We find that, under performance pay, quality increases by about 7pp compared to baseline capitation. While the effect increases with the severity of illness, the bonus level does not significantly affect the quality of care. Data linkage indicates that primary-care physicians in high-profit practices provide a lower quality of care. Physicians' other-regarding motivations and attitudes are significant drivers of high treatment quality.

The formation of physician altruism.

We study how patient-regarding altruism is formed by medical education. We elicit and structurally estimate altruistic preferences using experimental data from a large sample of medical students (N = 733) in Germany at different progress stages in their studies. The estimates reveal substantial heterogeneity in altruistic preferences of medical students. Patient-regarding altruism is highest for freshmen, significantly declines for students in the course of medical studies, and tends to increase again for last year students, who assist in clinical practice. Also, patient-regarding altruism is higher for females and positively associated to general altruism. Altruistic medical students have gained prior practical experience in healthcare, have lower income expectations, and are more likely to choose surgery and pediatrics as their preferred specialty.

Sanctions and international interaction improve cooperation to avert climate change.

Imposing sanctions on non-compliant parties to international agreements is advocated as a remedy for international cooperation failure. Nevertheless, sanctions are costly, and rational choice theory predicts their ineffectiveness in improving cooperation. We test sanctions effectiveness experimentally in international collective-risk social dilemmas simulating efforts to avoid catastrophic climate change. We involve individuals from countries where sanctions were shown to be effective (Germany) or ineffective (Russia) in increasing cooperation. Here, we show that, while this result still holds nationally, international interaction backed by sanctions is beneficial. Cooperation by low cooperator groups increases relative to national cooperation and converges to the levels of high cooperators. This result holds regardless of revealing other group members' nationality, suggesting that participants' specific attitudes or stereotypes over the other country were irrelevant. Groups interacting under sanctions contribute more to catastrophe prevention than what would maximize expected group payoffs. This behaviour signals a strong propensity for protection against collective risks.

Dishonesty in health care practice: A behavioral experiment on upcoding in neonatology.

Dishonest behavior significantly increases the cost of medical care provision. Upcoding of patients is a common form of fraud to attract higher reimbursements. Imposing audit mechanisms including fines to curtail upcoding is widely discussed among health care policy-makers. How audits and fines affect individual health care providers' behavior is empirically not well understood. To provide new evidence on fraudulent behavior in health care, we analyze the effect of a random audit including fines on individuals' honesty by means of a novel controlled behavioral experiment framed in a neonatal care context. Prevalent dishonest behavior declines significantly when audits and fines are introduced. The effect is driven by a reduction in upcoding when being detectable. Yet upcoding increases when not being detectable as fraudulent. We find evidence that individual characteristics (gender, medical background, and integrity) are related to dishonest behavior. Policy implications are discussed.

The Effects of Introducing Mixed Payment Systems for Physicians: Experimental Evidence.

Mixed payment systems have become a prominent alternative to paying physicians through fee-for-service and capitation. While theory shows mixed payment systems to be superior, causal effects on physicians' behavior when introducing mixed systems are not well understood empirically. We systematically analyze the influence of fee-for-service, capitation, and mixed payment systems on physicians' service provision. In a controlled laboratory setting, we implement an exogenous variation of the payment method. Medical and non-medical students in the role of physicians in the lab (N = 213) choose quantities of medical services affecting patients' health outside the lab. Behavioral data reveal significant overprovision of medical services under fee-for-service and significant underprovision under capitation, although less than predicted when assuming profit maximization. Introducing mixed payment systems significantly reduces deviations from patient-optimal treatment. Although medical students tend to be more patient regarding, our results hold for both medical and non-medical students. Responses to incentive systems can be explained by a behavioral model capturing individual altruism. In particular, we find support that altruism plays a role in service provision and can partially mitigate agency problems, but altruism is heterogeneous in the population. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

In Wrong Anticipation - Miscalibrated Beliefs between Germans, Israelis, and Palestinians.

The reconcilability of actions and beliefs in inter-country relationships, either in business or politics, is of vital importance as incorrect beliefs on foreigners' behavior can have serious implications. We study a typical inter-country interaction by means of a controlled laboratory investment game experiment in Germany, Israel and Palestine involving 400 student participants in total. An investor has to take a risky decision in a foreign country that involves transferring money to an investee/allocator. We found a notable constellation of calibrated and un-calibrated beliefs. Within each country, transfer standards exist, which investees correctly anticipate within their country. However, across countries these standards differ. By attributing the standard of their own environment to the other countries investees are remarkably bad in predicting foreign investors' behavior. The tendency to ignore this potential difference can be a source of misinterpreting motives in cross-country interaction. Foreigners might perceive behavior as unfavorable or favorable differentiation, even though-unknown to them-investors actually treat fellow-country people and foreigners alike.

Ethnicity- and sex-based discrimination and the maintenance of self-esteem.

The psychological underpinnings of labor market discrimination were investigated by having participants from Israel, the West Bank and Germany (N = 205) act as employers in a stylized employment task in which they ranked, set wages, and imposed a minimum effort level on applicants. State self-esteem was measured before and after the employment task, in which applicant ethnicity and sex were salient. The applicants were real people and all behavior was monetarily incentivized. Supporting the full self-esteem hypothesis of the social identity approach, low self-esteem in women was associated with assigning higher wages to women than to men, and such behavior was related to the maintenance of self-esteem. The narrower hypothesis that successful intergroup discrimination serves to protect self-esteem received broader support. Across all participants, both ethnicity- and sex-based discrimination of out-groups were associated with the maintenance of self-esteem, with the former showing a stronger association than the latter.

Other-regarding behavior and motivation in health care provision: an experiment with medical and non-medical students.

Other-regarding motivation is a fundamental determinant of public service provision. In health care, one example is physicians who act benevolently towards their patients when providing medical services. Such patient-regarding motivation seems closely associated with a personal sacrifice that health service providers are willing to make. Surprisingly, evidence on physicians' motivation is rare. This paper contributes to the literature by investigating prospective physicians', in particular, medical students', motivations and behavior. We measure the willingness to sacrifice own profit in order to increase the patients' health benefit. We conduct the same analysis for non-medical students. In a controlled incentivized laboratory experiment, participants decide, in the role of physicians, on the provision of medical services under fee-for-service or capitation schemes. Overall, 42 medical students and 44 non-medical students participated in five experimental sessions conducted between 2006 and 2008. We find substantial differences under both payment systems: compared to medical students, students of non-medical majors are less patient-regarding, less willing to sacrifice their own profit, and they state less motivation to improve patients' health. This results in significantly lower patient health benefits. Some implications for health care policies in light of physician shortage and for physician payment systems are discussed.

How payment systems affect physicians' provision behaviour--an experimental investigation.

Understanding how physicians respond to incentives from payment schemes is a central concern in health economics research. We introduce a controlled laboratory experiment to analyse the influence of incentives from fee-for-service and capitation payments on physicians' supply of medical services. In our experiment, physicians choose quantities of medical services for patients with different states of health. We find that physicians provide significantly more services under fee-for-service than under capitation. Patients are overserved under fee-for-service and underserved under capitation. However, payment incentives are not the only motivation for physicians' quantity choices, as patients' health benefits are of considerable importance as well. We find that patients in need of a high (low) level of medical services receive larger health benefits under fee-for-service (capitation).