Does pay-for-performance design matter? Evidence from Brazil.

Pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes have been shown to have mixed effects on health care outcomes. A challenge in interpreting this evidence is that P4P is often considered a homogenous intervention, when in practice schemes vary widely in their design. Our study contributes to this literature by providing a detailed depiction of incentive design across municipalities within a national P4P scheme in Brazil [Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ)] and exploring the association of alternative design typologies with the performance of primary health care providers. We carried out a nation-wide survey of municipal health managers to characterize the scheme design, based on the size of the bonus, the providers incentivized and the frequency of payment. Using OLS regressions and controlling for municipality characteristics, we examined whether each design feature was associated with better family health team (FHT) performance. To capture potential interactions between design features, we used cluster analysis to group municipalities into five design typologies and then examined associations with quality of care. A majority of the municipalities included in our study used some of the PMAQ funds to provide bonuses to FHT workers, while the remaining municipalities spent the funds in the traditional way using input-based budgets. Frequent bonus payments (monthly) and higher size bonus allocations (share of 20-80%) were strongly associated with better team performance, while who within a team was eligible to receive bonuses did not in isolation appear to influence performance. The cluster analysis showed what combinations of design features were associated with better performance. The PMAQ score in the 'large bonus/many workers/high-frequency' cluster was 8.44 points higher than the 'no bonus' cluster, equivalent to a difference of 21.7% in the mean PMAQ score. Evidence from our study shows how design features can potentially influence health provider performance, informing the design of more effective P4P schemes.

Pay-for-performance for primary health care in Brazil: A comparison with England's Quality Outcomes Framework and lessons for the future.

Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been widely applied in OECD countries to improve the quality of both primary and secondary care, and is increasingly being implemented in low- and middle-income countries. In 2011, Brazil introduced one of the largest P4P schemes in the world, the National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ). We critically assess the design of PMAQ, drawing on a comparison with England's quality and outcome framework which, like PMAQ, was implemented at scale relatively rapidly within a nationalised health system. A key feature of PMAQ was that payment was based on the performance of primary care teams but rewards were given to municipalities, who had autonomy in how the funds could be used. This meant the incentives felt by family health teams were contingent on municipality decisions on whether to pass the funds on as bonuses and the basis upon which they allocated the funds between and within teams. Compared with England's P4P scheme, performance measurement under PMAQ focused more on structural rather than process quality of care, relied on many more indicators, and was less regular. While PMAQ represented an important new funding stream for primary health care, our review suggests that theoretical incentives generated were unclear and could have been better structured to direct health providers towards improvements in quality of care.

Performance bonuses and the quality of primary health care delivered by family health teams in Brazil: A difference-in-differences analysis.

BACKGROUND: Pay-for-performance (P4P) programmes to incentivise health providers to improve quality of care have been widely implemented globally. Despite intuitive appeal, evidence on the effectiveness of P4P is mixed, potentially due to differences in how schemes are designed. We exploited municipality variation in the design features of Brazil's National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ) to examine whether performance bonuses given to family health team workers were associated with changes in the quality of care and whether the size of bonus mattered. METHODS AND FINDINGS: For this quasi-experimental study, we used a difference-in-differences approach combined with matching. We compared changes over time in the quality of care delivered by family health teams between (bonus) municipalities that chose to use some or all of the PMAQ money to provide performance-related bonuses to team workers with (nonbonus) municipalities that invested the funds using traditional input-based budgets. The primary outcome was the PMAQ score, a quality of care index on a scale of 0 to 100, based on several hundred indicators (ranging from 598 to 660) of health care delivery. We did one-to-one matching of bonus municipalities to nonbonus municipalities based on baseline demographic and economic characteristics. On the matched sample, we used ordinary least squares regression to estimate the association of any bonus and size of bonus with the prepost change over time (between November 2011 and October 2015) in the PMAQ score. We performed subgroup analyses with respect to the local area income of the family health team. The matched analytical sample comprised 2,346 municipalities (1,173 nonbonus municipalities; 1,173 bonus municipalities), containing 10,275 family health teams that participated in PMAQ from the outset. Bonus municipalities were associated with a 4.6 (95% CI: 2.7 to 6.4; p < 0.001) percentage point increase in the PMAQ score compared with nonbonus municipalities. The association with quality of care increased with the size of bonus: the largest bonus group saw an improvement of 8.2 percentage points (95% CI: 6.2 to 10.2; p < 0.001) compared with the control. The subgroup analysis showed that the observed improvement in performance was most pronounced in the poorest two-fifths of localities. The limitations of the study include the potential for bias from unmeasured time-varying confounding and the fact that the PMAQ score has not been validated as a measure of quality of care. CONCLUSIONS: Performance bonuses to family health team workers compared with traditional input-based budgets were associated with an improvement in the quality of care.

Does high workload reduce the quality of healthcare? Evidence from rural Senegal.

There is a widely held perception that staff shortages in low and middle-income countries (LMICs) lead to excessive workloads, which in turn worsen the quality of healthcare. Yet there is little evidence supporting these claims. We use data from standardised patient visits in Senegal and determine the effect of workload on the quality of primary care by exploiting quasi-random variation in workload. We find that despite a lack of staff, average levels of workload are low. Even at times when workload is high, there is no evidence that provider effort or quality of care are significantly reduced. Our data indicate that providers operate below their production possibility frontier and have sufficient capacity to attend more patients without compromising quality. This contradicts the prevailing discourse that staff shortages are a key reason for poor quality primary care in LMICs and suggests that the origins likely lie elsewhere.

Can patients improve the quality of care they receive? Experimental evidence from Senegal.

Providers in many low and middle-income countries (LMICs) often fail to correctly diagnose and treat their patients, even though they have the clinical knowledge to do so. Against the backdrop of many failed attempts to increase provider effort, this study examines whether quality of care can be improved by encouraging patients to be more active during consultations. We design a simple experiment with undercover standardised patients who randomly vary how much information they disclose about their symptoms. We find that providers are 27% more likely to correctly manage a patient who volunteers several key symptoms of their condition at the start of the consultation, compared to a typical patient who shares less information. Lower performance in the control group is not due to providers' lack of knowledge, an incapacity to ask the right questions, or a response to time or resource constraints. Instead, providers' low motivation seems to limit their ability to adapt their effort to patients' inputs in the consultation. Our findings provide proof-of-concept evidence that interventions making patients more active in their consultations could significantly improve the quality of care in LMICs.

Who is paid in pay-for-performance? Inequalities in the distribution of financial bonuses amongst health centres in Zimbabwe.

Although pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes have been implemented across low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), little is known about their distributional consequences. A key concern is that financial bonuses are primarily captured by providers who are already better able to perform (for example, those in wealthier areas), P4P could exacerbate existing inequalities within the health system. We examine inequalities in the distribution of pay-outs in Zimbabwe's national P4P scheme (2014-2016) using quantitative data on bonus payments and facility characteristics and findings from a thematic policy review and 28 semi-structured interviews with stakeholders at all system levels. We found that in Zimbabwe, facilities with better baseline access to guidelines, more staff, higher consultation volumes and wealthier and less remote target populations earned significantly higher P4P bonuses throughout the programme. For instance, facilities that were 1 SD above the mean in terms of access to guidelines, earned 90 USD more per quarter than those that were 1 SD below the mean. Differences in bonus pay-outs for facilities that were 1 SD above and below the mean in terms of the number of staff and consultation volumes are even more pronounced at 348 USD and 445 USD per quarter. Similarly, facilities with villages in the poorest wealth quintile in their vicinity earned less than all others-and 752 USD less per quarter than those serving villages in the richest quintile. Qualitative data confirm these findings. Respondents identified facility baseline structural quality, leadership, catchment population size and remoteness as affecting performance in the scheme. Unequal distribution of P4P pay-outs was identified as having negative consequences on staff retention, absenteeism and motivation. Based on our findings and previous work, we provide some guidance to policymakers on how to design more equitable P4P schemes.

Pay for performance in primary care: the contribution of the Programme for Improving Access and Quality of Primary Care (PMAQ) on avoidable hospitalisations in Brazil, 2009-2018.

BACKGROUND: Evidence on the effect of pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes on provider performance is mixed in low-income and middle-income countries. Brazil introduced its first national-level P4P scheme in 2011 (PMAQ-Brazilian National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality). PMAQ is likely one of the largest P4P schemes in the world. We estimate the association between PMAQ and hospitalisations for ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSCs) based on a panel of 5564 municipalities. METHODS: We conducted a fixed effect panel data analysis over the period of 2009-2018, controlling for coverage of primary healthcare, hospital beds per 10 000 population, education, real gross domestic product per capita and population density. The outcome is the hospitalisation rate for ACSCs among people aged 64 years and under per 10 000 population. Our exposure variable is defined as the percentage of family health teams participating in PMAQ, which captures the roll-out of PMAQ over time. We also provided several sensitivity analyses, by using alternative measures of the exposure and outcome variables, and a placebo test using transport accident hospitalisations instead of ACSCs. RESULTS: The results show a negative and statistically significant association between the rollout of PMAQ and ACSC rates for all age groups. An increase in PMAQ participating of one percentage point decreased the hospitalisation rate for ACSC by 0.0356 (SE 0.0123, p=0.004) per 10 000 population (aged 0-64 years). This corresponds to a reduction of approximately 60 829 hospitalisations in 2018. The impact is stronger for children under 5 years (-0.0940, SE 0.0375, p=0.012), representing a reduction of around 11 936 hospitalisations. Our placebo test shows that the association of PMAQ on the hospitalisation rate for transport accidents is not statistically significant, as expected. CONCLUSION: We find that PMAQ was associated with a modest reduction in hospitalisation for ACSCs.

Can Results-Based Financing improve health outcomes in resource poor settings? Evidence from Zimbabwe.

Result Based Financing (RBF) has been implemented in health systems across low and middle-income countries (LMICs), with the objective of improving population health. Most evaluations of RBF schemes have focused on average programme effects for incentivised services. There is limited evidence on the potential effect of RBF on health outcomes, as well as on the heterogeneous effects across socio-economic groups and time periods. This study analyses the effect of Zimbabwe's national RBF scheme on neonatal, infant and under five mortality, using Demographic and Health Survey data from 2005, 2010 and 2015. We use a difference in differences design, which exploits the staggered roll-out of the scheme across 60 districts. We examine average programme effects and perform sub-group analyses to assess differences between socio-economic groups. We find that RBF reduced under-five mortality by two percentage points overall, but that this decrease was only significant for children of mothers with above median wealth (2.7 percentage points) and education (2.1 percentage points). RBF increased institutional delivery by seven percentage points - with a statistically significant effect for poorer socio-economic groups and least educated. We also find that RBF reduced c-section rates by three percentage points. We find no detectable effect of RBF on other incentivised services. When considering programme effects over time, we find that effects were only observed during the second phase of the programme (March 2012) with the exception of c-sections, which only reduced in the longer term. Further research is needed to examine whether these findings can be generalised to other settings.

Socioeconomic inequalities in the quality of primary care under Brazil's national pay-for-performance programme: a longitudinal study of family health teams.

BACKGROUND: Many governments have introduced pay-for-performance programmes to incentivise health providers to improve quality of care. Evidence on whether these programmes reduce or exacerbate disparities in health care is scarce. In this study, we aimed to assess socioeconomic inequalities in the performance of family health teams under Brazil's National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ). METHODS: For this longitudinal study, we analysed data on the quality of care delivered by family health teams participating in PMAQ over three rounds of implementation: round 1 (November, 2011, to March, 2013), round 2 (April, 2013, to September, 2015), and round 3 (October, 2015, to December, 2019). The primary outcome was the percentage of the maximum performance score obtainable by family health teams (the PMAQ score), based on several hundred (ranging from 598 to 914) indicators of health-care delivery. Using census data on household income of local areas, we examined the PMAQ score by income ventile. We used ordinary least squares regressions to examine the association between PMAQ scores and the income of each local area across implementation rounds, and we did an analysis of variance to assess geographical variation in PMAQ score. FINDINGS: Of the 40 361 family health teams that were registered as ever participating in PMAQ, we included 13 934 teams that participated in the three rounds of PMAQ in our analysis. These teams were located in 11 472 census areas and served approximately 48 million people. The mean PMAQ score was 61·0% (median 61·8, IQR 55·3-67·9) in round 1, 55·3% (median 56·0, IQR 47·6-63·4) in round 2, and 61·6% (median 62·7, IQR 54·4-69·9) in round 3. In round 1, we observed a positive socioeconomic gradient, with the mean PMAQ score ranging from 56·6% in the poorest group to 64·1% in the richest group. Between rounds 1 and 3, mean PMAQ performance increased by 7·1 percentage points for the poorest group and decreased by 0·8 percentage points for the richest group (p<0·0001), with the gap between richest and poorest narrowing from 7·5 percentage points (95% CI 6·5 to 8·5) to -0·4 percentage points over the same period (-1·6 to 0·8). INTERPRETATION: Existing income inequalities in the delivery of primary health care were eliminated during the three rounds of PMAQ, plausibly due to a design feature of PMAQ that adjusted financial payments for socioeconomic inequalities. However, there remains an important policy agenda in Brazil to address the large inequities in health. FUNDING: UK Medical Research Council, Newton Fund, and CONFAP (Conselho Nacional das Fundações Estaduais de Amparo à Pesquisa).

A realist review to assess for whom, under what conditions and how pay for performance programmes work in low- and middle-income countries.

Pay for performance (P4P) programmes are popular health system-focused interventions aiming to improve health outcomes in low-and middle-income countries (LMICs). This realist review aims to understand how, why and under what circumstance P4P works in LMICs.We systematically searched peer-reviewed and grey literature databases, and examined the mechanisms underpinning P4P effects on: utilisation of services, patient satisfaction, provider productivity and broader health system, and contextual factors moderating these. This evidence was then used to construct a causal loop diagram.We included 112 records (19 grey literature; 93 peer-reviewed articles) assessing P4P schemes in 36 countries. Although we found mixed evidence of P4P's effects on identified outcomes, common pathways to improved outcomes include: community outreach; adherence to clinical guidelines, patient-provider interactions, patient trust, facility improvements, access to drugs and equipment, facility autonomy, and lower user fees. Contextual factors shaping the system response to P4P include: degree of facility autonomy, efficiency of banking, role of user charges in financing public services; staffing levels; staff training and motivation, quality of facility infrastructure and community social norms. Programme design features supporting or impeding health system effects of P4P included: scope of incentivised indicators, fairness and reach of incentives, timely payments and a supportive, robust verification system that does not overburden staff. Facility bonuses are a key element of P4P, but rely on provider autonomy for maximum effect. If health system inputs are vastly underperforming pre-P4P, they are unlikely to improve only due to P4P. This is the first realist review describing how and why P4P initiatives work (or fail) in different LMIC contexts by exploring the underlying mechanisms and contextual and programme design moderators. Future studies should systematically examine health system pathways to outcomes for P4P and other health system strengthening initiatives, and offer more understanding of how programme design shapes mechanisms and effects.

Pay for Performance: A Reflection on How a Global Perspective Could Enhance Policy and Research.

Pay-for-performance (P4P) is the provision of financial incentives to healthcare providers based on pre-specified performance targets. P4P has been used as a policy tool to improve healthcare provision globally. However, researchers tend to cluster into those working on high or low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), with still limited knowledge exchange, potentially constraining opportunities for learning from across income settings. We reflect here on some commonalities and differences in the design of P4P schemes, research questions, methods and data across income settings. We highlight how a global perspective on knowledge synthesis could lead to innovations and further knowledge advancement.

How are pay-for-performance schemes in healthcare designed in low- and middle-income countries? Typology and systematic literature review.

BACKGROUND: Pay for performance (P4P) schemes provide financial incentives to health workers or facilities based on the achievement of pre-specified performance targets and have been widely implemented in health systems across low and middle-income countries (LMICs). The growing evidence base on P4P highlights that (i) there is substantial variation in the effect of P4P schemes on outcomes and (ii) there appears to be heterogeneity in incentive design. Even though scheme design is likely a key determinant of scheme effectiveness, we currently lack systematic evidence on how P4P schemes are designed in LMICs. METHODS: We develop a typology to classify the design of P4P schemes in LMICs, which highlights different design features that are a priori likely to affect the behaviour of incentivised actors. We then use results from a systematic literature review to classify and describe the design of P4P schemes that have been evaluated in LMICs. To capture academic publications, Medline, Embase, and EconLit databases were searched. To include relevant grey literature, Google Scholar, Emerald Insight, and websites of the World Bank, WHO, Cordaid, Norad, DfID, USAID and PEPFAR were searched. RESULTS: We identify 41 different P4P schemes implemented in 29 LMICs. We find that there is substantial heterogeneity in the design of P4P schemes in LMICs and pinpoint precisely how scheme design varies across settings. Our results also highlight that incentive design is not adequately being reported on in the literature - with many studies failing to report key design features. CONCLUSIONS: We encourage authors to make a greater effort to report information on P4P scheme design in the future and suggest using the typology laid out in this paper as a starting point.

Measuring patient trust: Comparing measures from a survey and an economic experiment.

Despite its importance in health care, empirical evidence on patient trust is limited. This is likely because, as with many complex concepts, trust is difficult to measure. This study measured patient trust in health care providers in a sample of 667 patients in Senegal. Two instruments were used to measure patient trust in providers: a survey questionnaire and an incentivised behavioural economic experiment-a "trust game." The results show that the two measures are significantly, but weakly, associated. Using information from patients and providers, we find that continuity of care, provider communication ability, and clinical competence were positively associated with patient trust. Based on the results obtained from both methods, the trust game seems to have higher construct validity than the survey instrument in this context. This paper contributes to the methodological literature on patient trust and the evidence on the determinants of patient trust. It suggests that researchers interested in studying patient trust in providers should rely more on economic experiments and explore their validity in different contexts.

The macro-level drivers of intimate partner violence: New evidence from a multilevel dataset.

This study uses multi-level regression analysis to determine the impact of macro-level drivers on intimate partner violence (IPV). It argues that we need to look beyond the usual, individual-level risk factors in order to understand why women experience abuse at the hands of their intimate partners. Using Demographic and Health Survey data from 40 developing countries, this paper demonstrates that socio-economic development, beliefs and laws play an important role in explaining IPV.

Targeting LOXL2 for cardiac interstitial fibrosis and heart failure treatment.

Interstitial fibrosis plays a key role in the development and progression of heart failure. Here, we show that an enzyme that crosslinks collagen-Lysyl oxidase-like 2 (Loxl2)-is essential for interstitial fibrosis and mechanical dysfunction of pathologically stressed hearts. In mice, cardiac stress activates fibroblasts to express and secrete Loxl2 into the interstitium, triggering fibrosis, systolic and diastolic dysfunction of stressed hearts. Antibody-mediated inhibition or genetic disruption of Loxl2 greatly reduces stress-induced cardiac fibrosis and chamber dilatation, improving systolic and diastolic functions. Loxl2 stimulates cardiac fibroblasts through PI3K/AKT to produce TGF-ß2, promoting fibroblast-to-myofibroblast transformation; Loxl2 also acts downstream of TGF-ß2 to stimulate myofibroblast migration. In diseased human hearts, LOXL2 is upregulated in cardiac interstitium; its levels correlate with collagen crosslinking and cardiac dysfunction. LOXL2 is also elevated in the serum of heart failure (HF) patients, correlating with other HF biomarkers, suggesting a conserved LOXL2-mediated mechanism of human HF.

Evaluation of the anti-ischemic effects of D-ribose during dobutamine stress echocardiography: a pilot study.

D-Ribose, a pentose sugar, has shown to improve myocardial high-energy phosphate stores depleted by ischemia. This study investigated the ability of D-Ribose with low dose dobutamine to improve the contractile response of viable myocardium to dobutamine and to assess the efficacy of D-ribose in reducing stress-induced ischemia. Twenty-six patients with ischemic cardiomyopathy completed a two-day, randomized, double blind crossover trial comparing the effects of D-Ribose and placebo on regional wall motion. On the first study day, either D-Ribose or placebo was infused for 4.5 hours. Low (5 and 10 micro/kg/min) and subsequently, high (up to 50 micro/kg/min) dose dobutamine echocardiography was then performed. On the second study day, patients crossed over to the alternative article for a similar 4.5 hours infusion time period and underwent a similar evaluation. The wall motion response during low dose dobutamine was the same with D-Ribose and placebo in 77% of segments (203/263, Kappa = 0.37). In segments with discordant responses, more segments improved with D-Ribose than with placebo (41 vs. 19 segments, p = 0.006). With high dose dobutamine infusion, the wall motion response (ischemia vs. no ischemia) was the same with D-Ribose and placebo in 83% of interpretable segments (301/363, kappa = 0.244). In segments with discordant responses, there were more ischemic segments with placebo compared to D-Ribose (36 vs. 26, p = 0.253). Nineteen patients developed ischemia during the dobutamine and placebo infusion and 13 patients had ischemia during dobutamine and D-ribose infusion (p = 0.109). D-Ribose improved contractile responses to dobutamine in viable myocardium with resting dysfunction but had no significant effect in reducing the frequency of stress-induced wall motion abnormalities.