Acute drug effects differentially predict desire to take dextroamphetamine again for work and recreation.

RATIONALE: Misuse of dextroamphetamine occurs in work and recreational contexts. While acute drug effects broadly predict abuse liability, few studies have considered the relationship between acute effects and context. OBJECTIVES: This study examined how individual differences in acute effects of dextroamphetamine relate to desire to take dextroamphetamine again in different contexts. METHODS: This secondary analysis used data from healthy adults with no history of moderate-to-severe substance use disorder, who received oral doses of placebo and dextroamphetamine (10 and 20 mg) over 3 sessions under double-blind, randomized conditions. Subjects rated subjective effects and completed reward-related behavioral tasks. Subjects rated their desire to take dextroamphetamine again in hypothetical work and recreational contexts. Multilevel models examined within-subjects change scores (10 mg-placebo; 20 mg-placebo) to determine how subjective effects and behavioral outcomes predicted desire to take dextroamphetamine again for work versus recreation. RESULTS: Subjects reported more desire to take 20 mg dextroamphetamine again for work than for recreation. At 20 mg, there was an interaction between context and liking/wanting, such that liking/wanting predicted desire to use dextroamphetamine for work only. There was also an interaction at 20 mg between context and psychomotor speed, such that psychomotor speed predicted interest in using dextroamphetamine for recreation only. CONCLUSIONS: We found that positive subjective effects predicted desire to use dextroamphetamine again for work, while increased motor effects predicted desire to use dextroamphetamine recreationally. Hedonic effects may be perceived as advantageous when working, while increased physical energy may be preferred during recreation, suggesting that context of intended use is important when examining abuse liability.

Reduced adaptation of glutamatergic stress response is associated with pessimistic expectations in depression.

Stress is a significant risk factor for the development of major depressive disorder (MDD), yet the underlying mechanisms remain unclear. Preclinically, adaptive and maladaptive stress-induced changes in glutamatergic function have been observed in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Here, we examine stress-induced changes in human mPFC glutamate using magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS) in two healthy control samples and a third sample of unmedicated participants with MDD who completed the Maastricht acute stress task, and one sample of healthy control participants who completed a no-stress control manipulation. In healthy controls, we find that the magnitude of mPFC glutamate response to the acute stressor decreases as individual levels of perceived stress increase. This adaptative glutamate response is absent in individuals with MDD and is associated with pessimistic expectations during a 1-month follow-up period. Together, this work shows evidence for glutamatergic adaptation to stress that is significantly disrupted in MDD.

Dose-response effects of d-amphetamine on effort-based decision-making and reinforcement learning.

Effort-related decision-making and reward learning are both dopamine-dependent, but preclinical research suggests they depend on different dopamine signaling dynamics. Therefore, the same dose of a dopaminergic medication could have differential effects on effort for reward vs. reward learning. However, no study has tested how effort and reward learning respond to the same dopaminergic medication within subjects. The current study aimed to test the effect of therapeutic doses of d-amphetamine on effort for reward and reward learning in the same healthy volunteers. Participants (n = 30) completed the Effort Expenditure for Reward Task (EEfRT) measure of effort-related decision-making, and the Probabilistic Reward Task (PRT) measure of reward learning, under placebo and two doses of d-amphetamine (10 mg, and 20 mg). Secondarily, we examined whether the individual characteristics of baseline working memory and willingness to exert effort for reward moderated the effects of d-amphetamine. d-Amphetamine increased willingness to exert effort, particularly at low to intermediate expected values of reward. Computational modeling analyses suggested this was due to decreased effort discounting rather than probability discounting or decision consistency. Both baseline effort and working memory emerged as moderators of this effect, such that d-amphetamine increased effort more in individuals with lower working memory and lower baseline effort, also primarily at low to intermediate expected values of reward. In contrast, d-amphetamine had no significant effect on reward learning. These results have implications for treatment of neuropsychiatric disorders, which may be characterized by multiple underlying reward dysfunctions.

Distinct regions of the striatum underlying effort, movement initiation and effort discounting.

The ventral striatum is believed to encode the subjective value of cost-benefit options; however, this effect has notably been absent during choices that involve physical effort. Previous work in freely moving animals has revealed opposing striatal signals, with greater response to increasing effort demands and reduced responses to rewards requiring effort. Yet, the relationship between these conflicting signals remains unknown. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging with a naturalistic maze-navigation paradigm, we identified functionally segregated regions within the ventral striatum that separately encoded effort activation, movement initiation and effort discounting of rewards. In addition, activity in regions associated with effort activation and discounting oppositely predicted striatal encoding of effort during effort-based decision-making. Our results suggest that the dorsomedial region hitherto associated with action may instead represent the cost of effort and raise fundamental questions regarding the interpretation of striatal 'reward' signals in the context of effort demands. This has implications for uncovering the neural architecture underlying motivated behaviour.

Dissecting the impact of depression on decision-making.

BACKGROUND: Cognitive deficits in depressed adults may reflect impaired decision-making. To investigate this possibility, we analyzed data from unmedicated adults with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) and healthy controls as they performed a probabilistic reward task. The Hierarchical Drift Diffusion Model (HDDM) was used to quantify decision-making mechanisms recruited by the task, to determine if any such mechanism was disrupted by depression. METHODS: Data came from two samples (Study 1: 258 MDD, 36 controls; Study 2: 23 MDD, 25 controls). On each trial, participants indicated which of two similar stimuli was presented; correct identifications were rewarded. Quantile-probability plots and the HDDM quantified the impact of MDD on response times (RT), speed of evidence accumulation (drift rate), and the width of decision thresholds, among other parameters. RESULTS: RTs were more positively skewed in depressed v. healthy adults, and the HDDM revealed that drift rates were reduced-and decision thresholds were wider-in the MDD groups. This pattern suggests that depressed adults accumulated the evidence needed to make decisions more slowly than controls did. CONCLUSIONS: Depressed adults responded slower than controls in both studies, and poorer performance led the MDD group to receive fewer rewards than controls in Study 1. These results did not reflect a sensorimotor deficit but were instead due to sluggish evidence accumulation. Thus, slowed decision-making-not slowed perception or response execution-caused the performance deficit in MDD. If these results generalize to other tasks, they may help explain the broad cognitive deficits seen in depression.