Caring by lying.

Caring for loved ones with dementia can sometimes necessitate a loose relationship with the truth. Some might view such deception as categorically immoral, and a violation of our general truth-telling obligations. I argue that this view is mistaken. This is because truth-telling obligations may be limited by the particular relationships in which they feature. Specifically, within caregiving relationships, we are often permitted (and sometimes obligated) to deceive the people with whom we share them. Our standing to deceive follows from certain features of caregiving relationships. Specifically, they are relationships that involve obligations to promote a person's interests and values (and not simply their autonomy), that often permit us to assume the hypothetical consent of the person with whom we share them, and in which we are often entitled to act out of self-interest. Once we appreciate these features, we will be able to recognize that the truth-telling norms governing our relationships with loved ones with dementia do not represent a radical departure from our general truth-telling obligations, but are instead consistent with truth-telling norms that feature in other caregiving relationships. In addition, we will be able to understand why we may feel conflicted about lying to loved ones with dementia, even when lying is permissible.

An improved in vitro model for studying the structural and functional properties of the endothelial glycocalyx in arteries, capillaries and veins.

The endothelial glycocalyx is a dynamic structure integral to blood vessel hemodynamics and capable of tightly regulating a range of biological processes (ie, innate immunity, inflammation, and coagulation) through dynamic changes in its composition of the brush structure. Evaluating the specific roles of the endothelial glycocalyx under a range of pathophysiologic conditions has been a challenge in vitro as it is difficult to generate functional glycocalyces using commonly employed 2D cell culture models. We present a new multi-height microfluidic platform that promotes the growth of functional glycocalyces by eliciting unique shear stress forces over a continuous human umbilical vein endothelial cell monolayer at magnitudes that recapitulate the physical environment in arterial, capillary and venous regions of the vasculature. Following 72 hours of shear stress, unique glycocalyx structures formed within each region that were distinct from that observed in short (3 days) and long-term (21 days) static cell culture. The model demonstrated glycocalyx-specific properties that match the characteristics of the endothelium in arteries, capillaries and veins, with respect to surface protein expression, platelet adhesion, lymphocyte binding and nanoparticle uptake. With artery-to-capillary-to-vein transition on a continuous endothelial monolayer, this in vitro platform is an improved system over static cell culture for more effectively studying the role of the glycocalyx in endothelial biology and disease.

Does pediatric hand transplantation undermine a child's right to an open future?

To date, pediatric hand transplantations have only been performed twice. The ethical issue most often discussed in the literature on this surgery concerns the risks of immunosuppression. While these risks are significant, they can be at least partially mitigated by selecting for patients who are already immunocompromised. Nevertheless, as we will argue, pediatric hand transplantation raises ethical issues that go beyond the risks of immunosuppression. In this paper, we focus on three additional ethical issues: the fact that pediatric hand transplantation aims to improve, rather than save life; the fact that it is an experimental surgery; and the fact that it will be performed on non-autonomous patients whose 'right to an open future' may potentially be undermined by the surgery. Taken together, we think that these considerations suggest that transplantation should be postponed until a child is mature enough to make their own decision about it.

Genetic Information, the Principle of Rescue, and Special Obligations.

In "Genetic Privacy, Disease Prevention, and the Principle of Rescue," Madison Kilbride argues that patients have a duty to warn biological family members about clinically actionable adverse genetic findings. The duty does not stem from the special obligations that we may have to family members, she argues, but rather follows from the principle of rescue, which she understands as the idea that one ought to prevent, reduce, or mitigate the risk of harm to another person when the expected harm is serious and the cost or risk to oneself is sufficiently moderate. We doubt, however, whether the principle of rescue can ground a duty to warn in the cases Kilbride envisages, and we suggest that Kilbride may have underappreciated the role that special obligations could play in generating a duty to warn family members.