Information avoidance: Self-image concerns, inattention, and ideology.

We report the results of an experiment on willful information avoidance regarding measures to address Covid-19. In the experiment, participants choose between two options, each associated with a contribution to the Corona Fund of the Red Cross USA and a payment to the participant. Depending on the treatment, either the participants' payoff, the donation, both or none of these pieces of information were hidden, but revealable. With this design, we can separate motivated reasons for ignorance from non-motivated reasons, both of which are present in our data. Furthermore, we find evidence of both self-serving and pro-social information avoidance. These behavioral patterns correlate with the subjects' political attitudes: while voters of the Democratic Party are prone to exhibit pro-social information avoidance, Republican voters rather engage in self-serving information avoidance.

Expressive voting versus information avoidance: experimental evidence in the context of climate change mitigation.

We theoretically and experimentally investigate the effect of self-serving information avoidance on moral bias in democratic and individual decisions in the context of climate change mitigation. Subjects choose between two allocations that differ in payoffs and contributions to climate change mitigation. We vary the observability of the environmental contribution, as well as the decision context associated with different levels of pivotality. If the contribution is directly observable, we find evidence for lower pivotality leading to higher levels of "green" decisions, as predicted by the low-cost theory of voting. This effect disappears if subjects can avoid information on the contribution. Instead, we find evidence for the exploitation of moral wiggle room via information avoidance in larger democracies as well as in the consumption context. Our results indicate that information avoidance substitutes expressive voting as an instrument to manage cognitive dissonance on the part of the voter. Hence, moral biases in elections might be less likely than previously thought. Supplementary information: The online version of this article (10.1007/s11127-022-01016-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.