Exploring the nexus between childhood adversities, trauma-related fantasy and memory in maladaptive daydreaming.

We conducted a qualitative study investigating traumatic daydreaming themes among individuals with maladaptive daydreaming (MD). Forty-one participants were interviewed regarding connections between their traumatic daydreams and real-life adversity. Specifically, we asked participants about 1) childhood trauma experiences, 2) trauma-related daydreaming, 3) perceived relationships between such daydreams and authentic experiences, and 4) difficulty distinguishing traumatic memories originating from daydreams versus actual events. Many participants reported past trauma and frequent traumatic daydream themes. However, participants also noted their daydreams often depicted corrected, more positive versions of experienced events. Finally, most participants stated they did not confuse daydreaming with actual experiences. This study provides new data on the complex interplay between trauma, memory, and daydreaming in MD.

Time and memory distrust shape the dynamics of recollection and belief-in-occurrence.

The current study examined how people's metamemory judgments of recollection and belief-in-occurrence change over time. Furthermore, we examined to what extent these judgments are affected by memory distrust - the subjective appraisal of one's memory functioning - as measured by the Memory Distrust Scale (MDS) and the Squire Subjective Memory Scale (SSMQ). Participants (N = 234) studied pictorial stimuli and were tested on some of these stimuli later in the same session, but were tested on other stimuli 1, 2, 4, 8, and 17 days later. Recollection and belief ratings were correlated highly and followed similar declining patterns over time. However, belief decreased relatively more slowly than recollection, such that the discrepancy between recollection and belief increased over time. Memory distrust moderated the association between recollection and belief, with this association being weaker among people who reported greater (versus lower) memory distrust. Memory distrust also interacted with retention period to predict memory judgments. Two measures of memory distrust diverged in their predictive power. In particular, only the MDS predicted the spontaneous reporting of nonbelieved memories. Our results provide support to the theoretical perspective that belief-in-occurrence is a summative judgment informed not only by recollective phenomenology but also by metamemorial beliefs.

The effect of mood on shaping belief and recollection following false feedback.

The current study examined how mood affects the impact of false feedback on belief and recollection. In a three-session experiment, participants first watched 40 neutral mini videos, which were accompanied by music to induce either a positive or negative mood, or no music. Following a recognition test, they received false feedback to reduce belief in the occurrence of the events displayed in some of the videos (Session 2). This was followed by an immediate memory test and a delayed memory assessment one week later (Session 3). The results revealed that participants in negative mood reported higher belief scores compared to those in positive moods, despite an overall decline in belief scores for all groups following the false feedback. Notably, individuals in negative moods exhibited less reduction in their belief scores after encountering challenges, thereby maintaining a higher accuracy in their testimonies. Over time, a reduction in the clarity of participants' memory recall was observed, which correspondingly reduced their testimony accuracy. This study thus indicates that mood states play a role in shaping belief and memory recall under the influence of false feedback.

On the Edge of Psychopathology: Strong Relations Between Reversed Self-compassion and Symptoms of Anxiety and Depression in Young People.

Self-compassion is assumed to have a protective role in the etiology of emotional problems in adolescents. This assumption is primarily based on correlational data revealing negative correlations between the total score on the Self-Compassion Scale (SCS) and symptom measures of anxiety and depression. Recently, however, the SCS has been criticized because this scale not only consists of items measuring compassionate self-responding (i.e., self-kindness, common humanity, and mindfulness), but also includes 'reversed' items measuring uncompassionate self-responding (i.e., self-criticism, isolation, and overidentification), which would undermine the validity of the scale as an index of a protective construct. The present article used two methods to demonstrate that compassionate (positive) and uncompassionate (negative) self-responding have differential effects on emotional problems in youths. In the first part, a meta-analysis based on 16 relevant studies demonstrated a modest protective effect of positive self-compassion on anxiety/depression and a large (and significantly stronger) vulnerability effect of negative self-compassion on such emotional symptoms. In the second part, network analyses were conducted on three previously collected data sets and these analyses again showed that negative self-compassion is more closely connected to young people's symptoms of anxiety and depression than positive self-compassion. It is argued that the observed differential effects should not be discarded as a subversive fallacy, but rather offer an opportunity for studying the role of self-compassion in adolescents' emotional psychopathology in a more sophisticated way, taking into account both protection and vulnerability.

Retracted memories in the general population: are there differences between eastern and western countries?

The main purpose of the current studies was to examine retracted experiences in the general population from various cultural backgrounds. More specifically, in two studies, we examined the details of memory retraction experiences, the reasons for retraction, and the outcomes of retraction in participants from China and other countries, mainly the United States of America. It was found that memory retraction experiences appeared to be quite common. In the sample of Chinese participants (Study 1: N = 1380), 50.58% reported at least one such an experience, whereas in respondents from other countries (Study 2; N = 425), a significantly lower but still substantial prevalence rate of 35% was found. In general, the retracted memories predominantly involved positive events and some respondents experienced pressure during the withdrawal. Social feedback and event plausibility were the two main reasons for the withdrawal. Compared to recollection scores, belief scores decreased significantly after withdrawal, and some respondents even formed nonbelieved memories. After retracting the memories, most respondents felt they gained benefits (e.g., they had resolved a psychological problem that had bothered them for years). These studies give us a more general understanding of retracted memory experiences in the general population.

Repressed Memories (of Sexual Abuse Against Minors) and Statutes of Limitations in Europe: Status Quo and Possible Alternatives.

One of the most heated debates in psychological science concerns the concept of repressed memory. We discuss how the debate on repressed memories continues to surface in legal settings, sometimes even to suggest avenues of legal reform. In the past years, several European countries have extended or abolished the statute of limitations for the prosecution of sexual crimes. Such statutes force legal actions (e.g., prosecution of sexual abuse) to be applied within a certain period of time. One of the reasons for the changes in statutes of limitations concerns the idea of repressed memory. We argue that from a psychological standpoint, these law reforms can be detrimental, particularly when they are done to endorse unfounded psychological theories. The validity of testimonies is compromised many years after the alleged facts, and abolishing the statute of limitations increases the chance that even more (false) recovered memories of abuse might enter the courtroom. We propose solutions to these changes such as establishing an independent expert committee evaluating claims of sexual abuse.

Self-relevance enhances susceptibility to false memory.

Eyewitness testimony serves as important evidence in the legal system. Eyewitnesses of a crime can be either the victims themselves-for whom the experience is highly self-referential-or can be bystanders who witness and thus encode the crime in relation to others. There is a gap in past research investigating whether processing information in relation to oneself versus others would later impact people's suggestibility to misleading information. In two experiments (Ns = 68 and 122) with Dutch and Chinese samples, we assessed whether self-reference of a crime event (i.e., victim vs. bystander) affected their susceptibility to false memory creation. Using a misinformation procedure, we photoshopped half of the participants' photographs into a crime slideshow so that they saw themselves as victims of a nonviolent crime, while others watched the slideshow as mock bystander witnesses. In both experiments, participants displayed a self-enhanced suggestibility effect: Participants who viewed themselves as victims created more false memories after receiving misinformation than those who witnessed the same crime as bystanders. These findings suggest that self-reference might constitute a hitherto new risk factor in the formation of false memories when evaluating eyewitness memory reports.

Inducing emotionally negative nonbelieved memories using negative pictures.

Memories that can be recalled but are no longer believed are termed nonbelieved memories. The current studies examined the creation of emotionally negative nonbelieved memories after viewing negatively valenced pictures. In both experiments, participants took part in two sessions. In Session 1, after being presented with a set of neutral and negative pictures, participants had to rate their emotional state. One week later, in Session 2, participants had to complete a recognition task to identify pictures that had appeared during the previous session. During this task, participants' memories for some pictures were challenged by telling them that their answers were incorrect in order to evoke nonbelieved memories. The experimental procedure was successful in creating nonbelieved memories in the participants. Specifically, in Experiment 1 (N = 35), we induced nonbelieved true memories for both negative and neutral pictures. We found a significant decrease in both belief and recollection after the challenge, with the change in belief being twice as large as the change in recollection. In Experiment 2 (N = 43), we successfully induced both nonbelieved true and false memories for negative pictures. Again, the reduction of belief was significantly greater than that of recollection. In general, participants evinced better memory for negative pictures, but following challenges people were just as likely to accept false social feedback and change their memories regarding other types of pictures. In both experiments, our challenges did not lead to notable changes in emotional state. In general, our findings show that emotionally negative nonbelieved memories can be successfully evoked in an experimental setting.

Creating false rewarding memories guides novel decision making.

When memories of past rewarding experiences are distorted, are relevant decision-making preferences impacted? Although recent research has demonstrated the important role of episodic memory in value-based decision making, very few have examined the role of false memory in guiding novel decision making. The current study combined the pictorial Deese/Roediger-McDermott false memory paradigm with a reward learning task, where participants learned that items from some related lists gained reward and items from other lists led to no reward. Later, participants' memories and decision-making preferences were tested. With three experiments conducted in three countries, we successfully created false memories of rewarding experiences in which participants falsely remembered seeing a nonpresented lure picture bring them reward thereby confirming our constructive association hypothesis. Such false memories led participants to prefer the lure pictures and respond faster in a follow-up decision-making task, and the more false memories they formed, the higher preferences for the lure items they displayed (Experiment 2). Finally, results were replicated with or without a memory test before the decision-making task, showing that the impact of false memory on decision making was not cued by a memory test (Experiment 3). Our data suggest that the reconstructive nature of memory enables individuals to create new memory episodes to guide decision making in novel situations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

External and internal influences yield similar memory effects: the role of deception and suggestion.

In legal cases, testimonies can become contaminated because of an amalgam of external and internal influences on memory. It is well-established that external influences (e.g., suggestive interviews) can hurt memory. However, less focus has been placed on the impact of internal influences (e.g., lying) on memory. In the current review, we show that the available evidence suggests that both external and internal influences exert similar effects on memory. That is, we review studies showing that suggesting non-occurrences and suggesting non-experiences can lead to omission errors and false memories, respectively. Likewise, these memory effects are also observed when focusing on internal influences. That is, false denials, feigning amnesia and fabrication have been shown to affect memory in terms of forgetting (i.e., omissions) and false memories (i.e., commissions). Also, we show that both external and internal influences can lead to changes in the belief that an event occurred. We argue that in legal cases, triers of fact should concentrate on whether both types of influences might have affected testimonial accuracy in witnesses, victims, and suspects.

Self-Esteem and Self-Compassion: A Narrative Review and Meta-Analysis on Their Links to Psychological Problems and Well-Being.

The present review addressed the relationship between two self-related concepts that are assumed to play a role in human resilience and well-being: self-esteem and self-compassion. Besides a theoretical exploration of both concepts, a meta-analysis (k = 76, N = 35,537 participants) was conducted to examine the magnitude of the relation between self-esteem and self-compassion and their links to indices of well-being and psychological problems. The average correlation between self-esteem and self-compassion was strong (r = 0.65, effect size = 0.71), suggesting that - despite some distinct features - the overlap between both self-related constructs is considerable. Self-esteem and self-compassion displayed relations of a similar magnitude to measures of well-being and psychological problems, and both concepts accounted for unique variance in these measures once controlling for their shared variance. Self-esteem and self-compassion can best be seen as complementary concepts and we invite researchers to look more at their joint protective role within a context of well-being and mental health as well as to their additive value in the treatment of people with psychological problems.

A scientometric and descriptive review on the debate about repressed memories and traumatic forgetting.

Recent work suggests that the debate surrounding repressed memory and traumatic forgetting continues today. To further investigate this debate, we performed preregistered scientometric analyses on publications on the debate about repressed memory to provide information about its bibliometric evolution. Furthermore, we reviewed these publications to highlight the different positions taken by scholars on this debate. We reviewed 434 publications extracted from Scopus and Web of Science from 1969 to 2022. Our scientometric analyses permitted us to visualize the development of the publications on repressed memories and identify the terminology used to label this phenomenon. We identified three waves of publications (i.e., 1994-2000; 2003-2009; 2012-2021) showing that there is a recent peak of scholarly attention into this topic. 40% of scholars supported the phenomenon of repressed memory while 29% did not. Moreover, although in the last wave of publications, 35% of articles included critical arguments against the existence of repressed memory, a sizable number of publications (21%) supported ideas in favour of repressed memory. Finally, we observed that the term dissociative amnesia is another expression used to refer to the phenomenon. Our results provide additional evidence that the debate on repressed memories (and dissociative amnesia) is far from being over.

Challenging memories reduces intrusive memories and the memory amplification effect.

This study scrutinizes the influence of attenuating beliefs about the veracity of traumatic experiences on the manifestation of intrusive recollections and the memory amplification effect. Participants were exposed to distress-inducing visual stimuli, subsequently rating their emotional status pre and post exposure. They engaged in a recognition task, identifying scenarios within the stimuli. Participants' recall was contested, casting doubt about the occurrence of certain scenes. Subsequently, they maintained a daily log of intrusive memories over a week. A second session reiterated the same process. This method effectively diminished the certainty in the participants' traumatic memories. Scenes whose occurrence was contested demonstrated a significant decline in both intrusive memories and memory amplification when juxtaposed with uncontested ones. Interestingly, no significant correlation emerged between the diminished belief in traumatic incidents and reductions in intrusive memory or memory amplification. Thus, this study advocates that interrogating the veracity of traumatic recollections can mitigate the prevalence of intrusive memories and the memory amplification effect, suggesting a novel potential therapeutic approach for trauma-related disorders.

Preference for cheap-and-easy memory verification strategies is strongest among people with high memory distrust.

When choosing strategies for verifying one's memory, people are more influenced by the perceived cost of using a strategy than by its likelihood of yielding reliable information (i.e., cheap-strategy bias). The current preregistered study investigated whether people with high memory distrust are less likely to exhibit this bias than their low memory distrust counterparts. Participants (N = 535) imagined a scenario in which they witnessed an accident and were then led by friends to question their memories about the accident. Participants had to propose five strategies for verifying that particular memory. Following this, they rated each strategy's cost, reliability, and their likelihood of using it, as well as completing two validated measures of trait memory distrust. Contrary to our prediction, compared with participants with low memory distrust, participants with higher memory distrust exhibited a larger cheap-strategy bias. Follow-up analyses suggested that compared with memory-trusters, memory distrusters' strategy choices were more influenced by a strategy's perceived cost, and less influenced by its perceived reliability. Our results suggest that people who are more skeptical about their memories may be more cynical about the worthwhileness of verifying their memory, which could make them especially susceptible to misinformation acceptance and false memory creation.

#StudentsToo. prevalence of sexual assault reports among students of three European universities and their actions post-assault.

OBJECTIVE: Previous research has indicated high rates of sexual assault (SA) among US students (> 25%). Yet this type of investigation has been less frequent at European universities. METHODS: We conducted an investigation at three universities, two Dutch universities (N = 95 and N = 305) and one university in Belgium (N = 307). Students were asked to estimate the prevalence of SA, and to report about their personal experience. We defined SA as any situation in which students were inappropriately touched, forced to a sexual act without their consent, or were (sexually) verbally intimidated. RESULTS: 56% of students (Location 1: n = 54/95; Location 2: n = 172/305; Location 3: n = 172/307) across all three samples reported experiencing SA. The disclosed assaults were mostly unwanted sexual contact (i.e., groping) by male strangers aged 18-35 years. One-third of the sample reported to have done nothing post-assault, and among those who took actions, the majority disclosed the assault to friends, but rarely to family members. Also, 3-5% of students (Location 1: n = 3; Location 2: n = 11; Location 3: n = 11) (falsely) denied the assault. Seeking justice and needing support were important motivators of action, whereas psychological factors (i.e., memory distrust) were antagonists of this. Finally, besides psychological factors, fear of interpersonal consequences (e.g., being labelled as a "drama queen") was a strong influence to either deny or try to forget the assault. CONCLUSION: SA appears to be frequent among European students and further investigation including other European universities is warranted.

Factors affecting the forced confabulation effect: a meta-analysis of laboratory studies.

During police investigations, interviewees are sometimes forced to confabulate a response to questions for which they don't know the answer. In this registered report, we conducted a three-level meta-analysis to examine whether forcing people to confabulate an answer to these questions can lead to false memories for the confabulated details and/or events (i.e., forced confabulation effect). Results showed that forced confabulation indeed led to the production of false memories. Qualitative reviews of studies suggested that the forced confabulation effect is enhanced after receiving confirmatory feedback. Moreover, we found evidence that longer delays between the forced confabulation phase and the final memory task are necessary to observe the forced confabulation effect for entire events. However, caution is needed when interpreting the forced confabulation effect. Specifically, our moderator analyses revealed that voluntarily produced confabulation led to more false memories than forced confabulation. Also, our exploratory analysis indicated that the forced confabulation effect was mainly observed in within-subject designs. Taken together, our meta-analysis supports the notion that forcing participants to confabulate can lead them to later report such confabulations as part of the truth. Nonetheless, caution is warranted because this effect might be due to the introduction of misinformation through asking unanswerable questions.