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Prueba de COVID-19 , COVID-19 , Errores Diagnósticos/prevención & control , SARS-CoV-2/aislamiento & purificación , COVID-19/diagnóstico , COVID-19/epidemiología , COVID-19/prevención & control , COVID-19/psicología , Prueba de COVID-19/métodos , Prueba de COVID-19/normas , Prueba de COVID-19/tendencias , Portador Sano/diagnóstico , Portador Sano/epidemiología , Portador Sano/prevención & control , Monitoreo Epidemiológico , Humanos , IncertidumbreRESUMEN
Background: In their landmark report on the "Principles and Practice of Screening for Disease" (1968), Wilson and Jungner noted that the practice of screening is just as important for securing beneficial outcomes and avoiding harms as the formulation of principles. Many jurisdictions have since established various kinds of "screening governance organizations" to provide oversight of screening practice. Yet to date there has been relatively little reflection on the nature and organization of screening governance itself, or on how different governance arrangements affect the way screening is implemented and perceived and the balance of benefits and harms it delivers. Methods: An international expert policy workshop convened by Sturdy, Miller and Hogarth. Results: While effective governance is essential to promote beneficial screening practices and avoid attendant harms, screening governance organizations face enduring challenges. These challenges are social and ethical as much as technical. Evidence-based adjudication of the benefits and harms of population screening must take account of factors that inform the production and interpretation of evidence, including the divergent professional, financial and personal commitments of stakeholders. Similarly, when planning and overseeing organized screening programs, screening governance organizations must persuade or compel multiple stakeholders to work together to a common end. Screening governance organizations in different jurisdictions vary widely in how they are constituted, how they relate to other interested organizations and actors, and what powers and authority they wield. Yet we know little about how these differences affect the way screening is implemented, and with what consequences. Conclusions: Systematic research into how screening governance is organized in different jurisdictions would facilitate policy learning to address enduring challenges. Even without such research, informal exchange and sharing of experiences between screening governance organizations can deliver invaluable insights into the social as well as the technical aspects of governance.
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Tamizaje Masivo/organización & administración , Pandemias/estadística & datos numéricos , Prueba de COVID-19 , Técnicas de Laboratorio Clínico , Infecciones por Coronavirus/diagnóstico , Infecciones por Coronavirus/epidemiología , Femenino , Humanos , Masculino , Evaluación de Necesidades , Desarrollo de Programa , Evaluación de Programas y Proyectos de Salud , Reino UnidoRESUMEN
BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: This article examines a cervical screening incident from the 1960s and draws lessons for screening policy. STUDY DESIGN AND SETTING: Concern about harmful overtreatment of symptomless lesions prompted university gynecologist Herbert Green to study, between 1965 and 1970, a 'special series' of 33 women with carcinoma in situ (CIS) who were managed with only limited punch or wedge biopsy. These women were carefully followed up but not treated unless they showed evidence of progression to invasive cancer. This paper examines source documents and subsequent publications in order to ascertain lessons from this incident. RESULTS: In keeping with the 1964 Helsinki Declaration, written consent was not sought. Green published the outcomes for his patients with CIS including the 'special series.' A Judicial inquiry (the Cartwright Inquiry) in 1987 concluded that some women had suffered harm and some had died, but numbers and evidence were not clearly stated. Medical case review for the Inquiry identified 25 women with only punch or wedge biopsy; in 21 of these, there were reasons why no further treatment was given; two had developed cervical cancer, and none were recorded as having died. The case review found eight patients, not necessarily in the 'special series,' who 'in retrospect and by 1987 standards' might have benefited from earlier conisation or hysterectomy. CONCLUSION: Subsequent claims relating to Green's practice have wrongly stated that as many as one hundred women or more had treatment withheld and over 30 died as a result. These claims are inaccurate.